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ABSTRACT 
This study examined the effect of audit quality on the market value of listed non-financial 
companies in Nigeria. Audit quality was explained by Audit Firm Size (AFS), Audit 
Experience (AE), Auditor Industry Specialization (AIS), Audit Fees (AF), Audit Tenure 
(AT) and Audit Opinion (AOP) while market value by market Price per Share (MPS). 
Expost facto design was adopted for this study.The requisite data were obtained from the 
audited financial statements of 47 listed non-financial companies for a period of 12 years 
(2004-2015) giving rise to 564 company-year observations. Multiple linear regression 
analysis, particularly, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method was used to analyze the 
data. The results indicated that audit quality has significant positive effect on market 
value of non-financial companies listed in Nigeria. More specifically, AFS, AIS, AF, AT 
and AOP have significant positive effect on market value whereas, AE exerts a significant 
negative effect on market value. We therefore recommend that regulatorybodies such 
asSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), and professional accounting bodieslikeInstitute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and Association of National Accountants of 
Nigeria (ANAN) should ensure audit quality by enforcing thesanctions and disciplinary 
measures on auditors/audit firms that tend to mar audit quality as audit quality is seen to 
have the capability of significantly affecting the market value of companies in Nigeria 
positively.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study    
Companies’ financial statements provide information about their financial position and 
performance. This information is used by a wide range of stakeholders implying that the 
accuracy of these financial statements is crucial for present and potential investors and 
other stakeholders whoemploy it for logical economic decisions. It is thus pertinent that 
these financial statements be prepared in a manner that should be useful, related and 
possessing the ability of influencing user’s economic decision (Sadegh, Reza & Farzard, 
2013; Arnold, 2013; Marjolein, 2011; Beest, Braam & Boelens, 2009; Lin, Liu & Wang, 
2007; Schelker, 2007). This makes independent external audit so important since it 
enhances the credibility of financial reporting needed; increases the confidence of users 
of the financial statements and firm value (Jusoh & Ahmed, 2014; Yuniarti & Zumara, 
2013).   
 
Audit is an independent function consisting of an ordered and structured series of steps, 
critically examining the assertions made by an individual or an organization about the 
economic activities in which they are engaged and communicating the results in the form 
of a report to the users (Salehi & Mansoury, 2008; Salehi, 2010). It can also be viewed as 
an examination of an entity’s financial statements prepared by the accountants. 
Consequently, audit reports substantiate the information drawn from the financial 
statements. In order to achieve increased credibility of financial statements, there is need 
for quality audit. The auditor evaluating the company’s financial statements should be 
independent from the company’s management providing this same information and 
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should have the ability and willingness to put confidence on the audit quality (AQ).In 
spite of the annual financial statements’ audit, there is an increasing concern of investors 
about the integrity of firm’s financial reporting due to scandals involving once well-
respected companies like Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Cadbury Nigeria Plc. and 
African Petroleum (Oluwagbuyi & Olowolaju, 2013; Okolie & Izedonmi, 2014). This 
calls for increasing demand for auditors that are independent enough to restore the 
confidence of financial statement users on the credibility of work done by the auditors.   
 
De Angelo (1981) sees audit quality as the ability of the auditor to detect 
misrepresentations and manipulations and the willingness to report such. From De 
Angelo’s perception, we can say that audit quality explains the ability of the audit to 
effectively constrain earnings misrepresentation and financial statement manipulations. A 
measure of audit quality is in its ability of the auditor to improve the credibility ofthe 
financial statements by reducing the noise and bias that may be caused by earnings 
misrepresentation and manipulations. 
 
A high audit quality improves reporting entities’ implementation of appropriate 
accounting standards thereby, increasing the assurance that the financial statements are 
reliable, transparent and useful to the market. Audit quality underpins confidence in the 
credibility and integrity of financial statements that is made available to investors, 
owners, creditors and other users (Salehi, 2010; Arezo, 2011; Arber, Hysen, Skender & 
Arben, 2012; Suyono, 2012; Okolie & Izedonmi, 2014; Ziaee, 2014). Once investors and 
prospective investors have confidence in the financial statements of a company, such 
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confidence will increase the demand for the shares of that company which will as well 
increase the company’s share market value.  It suffices to state that audit quality provides 
a basis of assurance to users of the financial statements; it attracts investors easily 
through improved assurance as to the clients’ true financial position hence, affecting the 
market value of such a firm (Okolie & Izedonmi, 2014; Jusoh & Ahmed, 2014).  
 
Market value firstly, is the price at which a security is trading and could presumably be 
purchased or sold and secondly, it is what investors believe a firm is worth(Campbell, 
2012); According to Ziaee (2014) and Seyed-hossein, Saudah and Maisarah (2013), audit 
quality plays an essential role in maintaining an efficient market environment. That is to 
say, audit quality is necessary for the well-functioning of markets. Chang, Dasgupta and 
Hillary (2004) and Pitman and Fortin (2004) reveal that high audit quality aids the 
reduction of cost of capital and increases access to equity financing as well as having 
economic consequences on the capital market. To Titman and Trueman (1986), the better 
the audit quality; the more the investors rely on the companies’ accounting information 
which could eventually send good signals to the market for higher valuation of such 
companies’ shares.  
 
This triggers the question: Can audit quality influence or affect the value of a firm? This 
question needs to be investigated and answered. It is on this backdrop that this study 
therefore seeks to investigate the effect of audit quality on the market value of listed non-
financial companies in Nigeria by explaining audit quality from DeAngelo (1981) view to 
include auditor’s competence (audit firm size, audit experience, and auditor industry 
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specialization) and independence(audit fees, audit tenure and audit opinion). The market 
value is also explained using market price per share.  
 
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
The auditing profession performs a role in giving reasonable assurance to the various 
users of financial statements as it relates to the reliability and credibility of the figures 
presented by management in the financial statements. But this seems futile as several 
cases of corporate financial scandals in Nigeria like Cadbury Nigeria Plc, African 
Petroleum, Lever Brothers Nigeria Plc and Nampak (Odia, 2007; Okolie & Agboma, 
2008; Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010; Oluwagbuyi & Olowolaju, 2013; Okolie & Izedonmi, 
2014) have posed a great challenge on the credibility of audit reports since these cases 
resulted from audited financial statementswhere the auditors failed to detect and report 
financial misstatements and manipulations. This has brought a great deal of 
disappointment to investors and other corporate financial reporting stakeholders 
consequently, impacting negatively on investors’ economic decisions.  
 
What could be the reason(s) for such perceived audit failure that has impacted negatively 
on the value of client’s stock? Some studies are of the view that such perceived audit 
quality failure can be traced to over familiarity due to longevity of audit firm tenure 
(Haboya & Ohiokha, 2014; Francis, 2004). The high/low fees as opined by some 
researchers can influence audit quality. According to Taqi (2013), the auditors that obtain 
higher fees send signals to the stakeholders that they will provide a high quality audit. In 
contrast, Zunaidah, John, Amariah, Zuraidah and Carl (2013) are of the opinion that 
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higher audit fees can impair audit independence consequently marring the quality of 
audit. Nasution (2013) also believes that these scandals took place because of the 
auditors’ lack of independence. Another possible cause of perceived reduction in audit 
quality can be traced to a threat of replacement that might instill fear of losing the 
reputation that the audit firm has built over the years in form of size and market gain. 
Experience or expertise may also determine audit quality. However the question remains: 
Which of these audit quality variables or determinants (audit tenure, audit fees, audit 
opinion, audit firm size, audit experience and audit industry specialization) impact on the 
market value of listed non-financial firms in Nigeria?The use of these variables to 
represent audit quality in this study is on the basis that prior studies are of the view that 
audit quality impacts on firm’s market value (Titman & Trueman, 1986). Impliedly, these 
determinants of audit quality are capable of impacting on the firms’ market value.  Again, 
it is necessary to investigate the assertion that the reliability of financial reports of a 
company which can affect the value positively or negatively is highly dependent on audit 
quality (Okolie & Izedonmi, 2014). 
 
In addition, considerable number of researches (Lin, Liu & Wang, 2007; Yaser, Julia & 
Denise, 2008; Mark, Christopher & Woon, 2009; Hsien & Hua, 2011; Marjolein, 2011; 
Arber, Hysen, Skender & Arben, 2012; Hsien & Hua, 2013; Lasse, Hannu & Tomi, 2013; 
Romana & Richard, 2013; Ahsan, Haiyan & Donghua, 2014; Mohd & Ayoib, 2014; 
Morteza, 2014)  have been conducted to analyze audit quality. In spite of this growing 
literature on audit quality internationally, it is observed that most studies have centered 
on the determinants of audit quality. Again, few studies focused attention on audit quality 
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as it affects or impacts on corporate performance, valuation and market reaction. It is also 
perceived that sufficient attention has not been given to audit quality especially as it 
relates to auditor experience, auditor industry specialization and audit opinionand how 
they affect value of firms.       
 
So far, research has shown that, the confidence in audit to successfully constrain financial 
misstatementsand manipulations by companies is considerably doubtful and this has led 
to a reduction of reliance on audited financial statements by stakeholders in making series 
of economic decisions which are usually based on the value and quality of the company 
presented in these statements. Again, the studies on audit quality globally focused heavily 
on internal audit quality and factors affecting audit quality: audit firm size, audit tenure, 
audit experience, audit fees, auditor industry specialization and audit opinion,withlittle 
attention to the effect of audit quality on market value of firms. Hence, this current study 
adopts audit quality surrogates as in prior studies and examined the effect of audit quality 
on the market value of non-financial firms listed in Nigeria. These audit quality 
surrogates include; auditor’s competence (audit firm size, audit experience, and auditor 
industry specialization) and auditor independence(audit fees, audit tenure and audit 
opinion) whereas, market price per share is adopted as market value surrogate. These has 
enabled a successful empirical investigation on the impact of audit quality on the market 
value of listed non- financial companies in Nigeria and consequently, advise policy 
makers appropriately on what to invest attention. Thisresearch area will also enhance the 
stock of extant literature on audit quality in Nigeria.  
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1.3  Objectives of the Study 
The main purpose of this study is to determine the effect of audit quality on the market 
value of listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. Hence, the specific objectives of this 
study include: 
1. To determine the effect of Audit Firm Size (AFS) on the market value of 
listed non-financial companies in Nigeria; 
2. To determine the effect of Audit Experience (AE) on the market value of 
listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. 
3. To determine the effect of Audit Industry Specialization (AIS) on the market 
value of listed  non-financial companies in Nigeria; 
4. To investigate the effect of Audit Fee (AF) on the market value of listed non-
financial companies in Nigeria; 
5. To investigate the effect of Audit Tenure (AT) on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies; 
6. To investigate the effect of Audit Opinion (AOP) on the market value of listed 
non-financial companies in Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4  Research Questions 
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In an attempt to achieve the study objectives the study is guided by the following 
questions. 
1. What is theeffect of Audit Firm Size (AFS) on the market value of Nigerian 
listed non-financial companies?  
2. What is theeffect of Audit Experience (AE) on market value of Nigerian listed 
non-financial companies?  
3. What effect has Auditor Industry Specialization (AIS) on market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies?  
4. What effect has Audit Fee (AF) on market value of Nigerian listed non-
financial companies?  
5. What effect has Audit Tenure (AT) on the market value of Nigerian listed 
non-financial companies? 
6. What effect has Audit Opinion (AOP) on the market value of Nigerian listed 
non-financial companies? 
 
1.5  Research Hypotheses 
 The following null hypotheses were formulated to guide this study: 
Ho1: Audit Firm Size (AFS) has no significanteffect on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
Ho2: Audit Experience (AE) does not have significant effect on market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
Ho3: Auditor Industry Specialization (AIS) has no significant effect on market 
value of Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
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Ho4: Audit Fee (AF) has no significant effecton market value of Nigerian listed 
non-financial companies  
Ho5: Audit Tenure (AT) does not have significant effect on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
Ho6: Audit Opinion (AOP) does not have significant effect on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study adds to the general body of knowledge on audit quality and most specifically 
on the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of firms in the context of an 
emerging economy like Nigeria. The findings of this study is of immense benefit to the 
management of companies, creditors, investors and other users of financial statements, 
regulatory bodies, accounting institutes, the auditors academics and other researchers.   
The findings of this study will give a guiding light to the management of listed firms who 
intend to add value to their organization on the stock market with respect to what 
decision to take regarding the type of auditor choice, the audit fee negotiation, audit 
tenure, experience and auditors who are industry specialist. 
The findings will also go a long way in giving the creditors, investors and other users of 
financial statement a clue on how to assess the quality of audit; whether the involvement 
of a particular audit firm is capable of influencing their investment worth, then shedding 
a light towards what decisions to take in respect of their investment in the various 
companies and choices of auditor(s). 
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The various regulatory bodies and other organizations such as Securities and Exchange 
Commission(SEC), Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC), Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and Association of 
National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) will be most interested in the findings of this 
study because it will draw their attention as to whether constructive adjustments should 
be made to regulatory policies regarding auditors and auditing in Nigeria with specific 
reference to audit tenure rotation and switch, audit fees and audit industry specialization. 
Finally, this study may be significant to academics and other researchers who may want 
to carry out further research on audit quality by offering them insight as to the techniques 
of testing the effect of audit quality on the market value of firms. Other researchers may 
wish to either confirm the findings of this current study or build up on it. Whichever the 
case, this study is only a modest attempt aimed at adding to extant literature on audit 
quality and value of firms in accounting and finance.  
This current research has provided evidence as to how audit quality affects the value of 
firms in the stock market in an emerging economy like Nigeria.       
 
1.7  Scope of the Study     
The audit quality is explained from DeAngelo (1981) view to include auditor’s 
competence (audit firm size, audit experience, and auditor industry specialization) 
andauditor’sindependence (audit fees, audit tenure and audit opinion). The market value 
is measured by market price per share. 
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The study covers a 12-year period from 2004 – 2015. This period was chosen to account 
for both the boom and fall periods of the Nigerian capital market and to achieve the 
researcher’s desire to do a long term study since prior studies in Nigeria were on short 
term basis.  It has also reviewed the annual reports and accounts of forty-seven (47) non-
financial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange making a total of 564 
company year observations of the listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. The choice of the 
non-financialsector was to let go the financial sector for various obvious reasons. First, 
the numerous reforms in the sector makes the researcher supposed that a lot of things 
like: mergers, acquisitions and liquidity problem in some banks that led to the 
establishment of Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria AMCON by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria to take over non-performing assets of some of the Nigerian banks and 
many more are currently accounting for the value of the Nigerian financial sector hence 
including it in the study might not allow for accurate result; secondly, the sector accounts 
for about half of the Nigerian Stock Exchange market capitalization therefore, we 
presumed that the financial sector should be studied separately as including it in the study 
might distort the findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE  
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2.1  Introduction 
This chapter reviews the related literature pertaining to the effects of audit quality on the 
value of companies. It is divided into five (5) subsections, covering the introduction, 
conceptual framework, theoretical framework of audit quality, reviewsof related 
empirical studies on audit quality and firm value and the last section presents the 
summary of the chapter.  
 
The essence of the review of literature is to use the evidences from the previous studies to 
establish the gap in literature and also serve as a basis for validation of the research 
findings.   
2.2  Conceptual Framework 
Three concepts are discussed in this section. These concepts are: Audit quality, market 
value and non-financial companies.   
2.2.1 Audit Quality 
Audit quality is in essence a complex and multi-faceted concept. This perhaps is the 
reason why the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) (2011) 
states that there have been a number of attempts to conceptualize ‘audit quality’ in the 
past but none has resulted in a definition that has achieved universal recognition and 
acceptance (Beattie, Fearnley & Hines, 2010; Okolie, 2014). Again, audit quality 
perception may depend on whose eye one is looking through because the various 
stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors, and other users of the financial 
statementsmay have different views as to what constitutes audit quality.  However, the 
classic definition of audit quality that is cited by most audit researchers is that of De 
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Angelo (1981) which defines audit quality as the market –assessed joint probability that a 
given auditor will both detect material misstatements in the client’s financial statements 
and report the material misstatements. According to this definition, audit quality is a 
function of the auditor’s ability to detect material misstatements and report the errors. It 
means De Angelo’s view of audit quality is in two dimensions. First, detecting financial 
misstatements and errors in financial statements; this measures the technical capability of 
auditors. Secondly, reporting a discovered breach measures auditor’s independence. The 
external auditor must be independent as this is very important in lowering the existence 
of information asymmetry. In line with this view, Ali, Reza and Mahdi (2009) state that 
the auditor’s professional opinion will be of little value to statement users if they believed 
the auditor is not wholly independent of management.   
 
Francis (2004) defines audit quality as the ability of audit function in meeting minimum 
legal and professional requirements. Davidson, Stening and Wai (1984) views audit 
quality as the accuracy of auditor’s information reporting.  Following this is the definition 
of Arezoo (2011) that sees audit quality as the ability to produce financial information 
without misstatements, omissions and/or biases. Closely related to this view is the 
perception of Wallace (1987) which states that audit quality is a measure of the auditor’s 
ability to reduce noise and bias and meticulously improve accounting data while 
Davidson and Neu (1993) further view audit quality as the ability of auditors to detect 
and eliminate material misstatements and manipulations in reported net income.  
Palmrose (1988) definition of audit quality does not stop at these two characteristics of 
competence and independence but defines audit quality in terms of level of assurance on 
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financial statements. He states that audit quality is the probability that financial statement 
contains no material misstatement. 
 
However, for the purpose of this study, audit quality is viewed as the ability of audit to 
detect material misstatements and reporting the errors in such a manner that can influence 
the level of stakeholders’ assurance and confidence in the credibility and reliability of 
clients’ financial statements; as basis for economic decisions. This ability of the auditor 
to detect material misstatements and reporting the detected errors and omissions is 
dependent on the audit firm size, audit tenure, audit experience, audit fees, auditor 
industry specialization and audit opinion. All these audit quality attributes if present; are 
capable of influencing stakeholders’ reliability on the financial statements in making 
economic decisions. 
 
2.2.1.1  Factors Influencing Audit Quality  
Audit quality can be influenced by many factors. According to Francis (2004) and 
Adeyemi, Okpala and Dabor (2012) factors influencing audit quality may include: Audit 
fees, Audit tenure, Audit firm alumni, Audit committees and Audit firm size. In addition 
to these factors, Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) include Audit independence as one of the 
factors influencing audit quality. 
 
Arezoo (2011) grouped factors affecting audit quality into direct and indirect factors, 
where direct factors include measures like financial reporting compliance with GAAP, 
quality control review, bankruptcy, desk review and SEC performance whilst the indirect 
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factors include audit size, audit tenure, industry expertise, audit fees, economic 
dependence, reputation, and cost of capital. 
Going by the definition of audit quality by DeAngelo (1981), ‘audit quality is the market 
–assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both detect material misstatements in 
the client’s financial statements and report the material misstatements’, it can be inferred 
that audit quality is in twofold. First, the ability of the auditor to detect material 
misstatements, errors and omissions representing the technical ability/competence of the 
auditor and secondly, the ability of reporting such which represents the auditor’s 
independence. If this definition is upheld then, it means that more audit independence 
improves audit quality and more audit expertise or competence also improves audit 
quality. However, Knechel (2013) points out that the level of one of these features/traits 
of audit quality does not influence the level of the other as these two features (audit 
competence and audit independence) in the De Angelo (1981) definition are treated as 
orthogonal. This relationship is illustrated in figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit Quality  
Uninformed Independence  
High  
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Source: W. Robert Knechel (2013) 
Figure 2.1 Orthogonal Relationships of Audit Quality Traits 
 
Figure 2.1 explains the orthogonal relationship between audit competence and audit 
independence where the ray springing from the origin of the graph indicates increasing 
levels of audit quality. This can be explained thus: A good and improving audit quality is 
obtained in a good combination of audit independence and audit competence. This seems 
to support the statement by Richard (2006) that audit quality appears as a balance 
between its two determinants: Audit competence and audit independence. We can see 
that first, where audit competence and audit independence are low, the audit quality is 
also low and it might not be desirable from the societal point of view in the sense of 
having no economic value. Second, we can see that where the auditor is highly 
independent but possesses little expertise (a condition referred to as an uninformed 
independence) audit quality will also be low as an auditor may not have anything to give 
a quality report on as they are not competent enough to find errors, misstatements and 
A
u
di
t 
In
de
pe
n
de
nc
e  
No Economic 
Value  
Improving 
Audit Quality  
 
 17 
 
omissions. Again, a tremendous expertise with low level of independence presents a low 
audit quality as well and this is said to be conflicted expertise because an auditor with 
much knowledge without or with low level of independence seems to conflict the audit 
quality definition in a manner that produces low level audit quality with low economic 
value. Hence, a proper mix of these features of audit quality should be of great concern as 
a balanced mix is capable of improving audit quality. 
 
It is against this backdrop that this study therefore adopts the measures of audit quality as 
spelt out in the study of DeAngelo (1981) since the definition seems to be the most 
acceptable definition of audit quality and all other measures tend to trace their roots to it.    
 
2.2.1.2  Measures of Audit Quality 
`The measures of audit quality adopted in this study are derived from the definition of 
audit quality by DeAngelo (1981) to include (1) Audit competence and (2) audit 
independence which according to Knechel (2013) are orthogonal. That is, a proper mix of 
these two traits brings about improved audit quality.     
1.  Audit Competence 
It is deduced from DeAngelo (1981) definition of audit quality that audit competence is 
the technical ability of the auditor to detect errors in the financial statements. Lee and 
stone (1995) explain competence as the expertise that can be used explicitly enough to 
conduct audits objectively.  
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In Mohammed, Gugus and Zaki (2005), competence of auditors is a quality required to 
conduct audit properly. They are also of the view that audit competence can be displayed 
in good personal quality, adequate knowledge and specialization expertise in the field. In 
the same light, Evi and Nor (2015) are of the view that competence significantly affects 
audit quality and that audit quality can be achieved if the auditor has good competence. In 
their view, competency is composed of experience and knowledge. Also, Abdul, 
Sutrisno, Rosidi and Achsin (2014) are of the view that auditor competence can be 
measured with knowledge, experience, industry specialization and auditor’s reputation. 
 
Following the above views, this current study has measured audit competency with the 
following surrogates: 
i. Audit firm size (audit reputation); 
ii. Audit experience and  
iii. Auditor industry specialization. 
 
(a) Audit Quality and Audit Firm Size 
Size of audit firm has been one of the most commonly used audit quality variables in 
prior research and it has consistently provided positive effect on audit quality. Wibowo 
and Rossieta (2010) assert that the probability for delivering high audit quality increases 
as the audit firm size gets bigger.  
Audit firm size explains whether a client financial statement is audited by a large 
company or by a small company (De Angelo, 1981). De Angelo (1981) is of the view that 
when the audit firm is large and has many clients, it has less incentive to behave 
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opportunistically. This suggests that larger or more prestigious accounting firms have 
greater incentives not to perform a low-quality service at a high-quality price because 
they have more wealth and more valuable reputation (Dye, 1993; De Angelo, 1981). In 
support of this, studies like Watts and Zimmerman (1986); Ashbaugh and Warfield 
(2003) suggest that large audit firm sizes give higher audit quality because of greater 
monitoring ability gained by size.  
 
Moizer (1979) opines that large audit firms have an incentive to investigate and report 
irregularities because of the fear of losing reputation hence, ensuring audit quality. 
Lennox (1999) adds to this by stating that, large audit firms have greater stake to avoid 
issuing inaccurate reports. His view is consistent with that of De Angelo (1981) and Dye 
(1993) that big auditors have more to lose by failing to report a discovered breach as a 
result, increasing the audit quality supplied by such large audit firm.  
 
It is worth noting that these big audit firms may offer better services than smaller ones 
because they may possess more resources and may utilize staff with superior skill and 
experience (Palmrose, 1986; Dezoot, Hermanson, Archambeatt & Reed, 2002; Louise, 
2005; Soliman & Elsalam, 2012). To Francis (2004), big audit firms have established 
brand name reputation and therefore have to protect this reputation by providing high 
audit quality. Various studies also find that larger audit firms are associated with a variety 
of phenomena consistent with high quality, including lower litigation activity, fewer 
accounting errors, higher earnings response coefficients, lower probability of informed 
trading (DeFond, 1992; Davidson & Neu, 1993; Teoh & Wong, 1993; Becker, DeFond, 
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Jiambalvo & Subramanijam, 1998; Francis & Williams, 1998; Francis, Maydew & 
Sparks 1999; Lennox, 1999;  Nelson, Elliot & Tarpley, 2002; Chang, Dasgupta & 
Hillary, 2007; Seyedhossein, Saudah & Maisara, 2013).  
 
Others have theorized that there is no real audit quality difference but that the perception 
exists because large firms are well known and have gained a reputation for high quality 
(Imhoff, 1988; Boone, Brocheler & Carroll 2000; Lawrence, Minutti-Meza & Zhang, 
2011; Okolie, 2014). On the whole, there seem to be mixed evidences on audit quality 
and audit firm size, but it appears that there is some relationship between them since most 
empirical studies find large audit firms to have more incentive to be accurate because 
they have a reputation at stake and therefore have more to lose in case of any litigation. 
 
(b) Audit Quality and Audit Experience 
Experience is the knowledge and proficiency gained by someone with the passage of 
time. Audit experience is related to how long the auditor works (Mohammed, Gugus & 
Zaki, 2015). According to Suyono (2012), the audit expertise will increase with more 
experience in doing audit task leading to better audit quality. Audit quality can be 
achieved when the auditor gains more general experience in the audit profession. 
Marthlin (2013) in explaining audit experience attribute states that an audit expertise is 
achieved through formal education and is expanded through experiences in practices. 
Enofe, Mgbame, Efayena and Edegware (2014) still in line with the above definitions of 
audit experience explain that repeated work by an auditor over a long period of time will 
improve the quality of audit. This can also be explained by the learning curve (experience 
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curve) principle which is a graphical representation of the common sense principle that 
the more one does something the better one gets at it (Huang & Wang, 2010). This 
learning curve principle is illustrated in figure 2.2 as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Analysis  
Figure 2.2 Learning Curve 
This learning curve also known as experience curve explains workers’ experience as a 
worker puts in more time into a job via increasing repetition frequencies the more he 
gains experience. This interprets the old saying that: “practice makes perfect”.  
The competency acquired from the experience will generally improve audit quality. 
Besides the general audit experience, an auditor simultaneously accumulates client – 
specific experience which grant him/her the opportunity to have more in-depth 
knowledge about a specific client’s business operations, accounting system and possible 
risk hence, resulting to higher audit quality (Johnson, Khurana & Reynolds, 2002; 
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Marjolein, 2011; Suyono, 2012; Mahmond, Forough & Hamid, 2013). Mohammed, 
Gugus and Zaki (2015), relate audit experience to how long the auditor works and also 
assert that audit experience is capable of providing more audit quality when the findings 
from their study reveal a significant influence of audit working experience on audit 
quality. 
Drawing from the views of the extant literature, this study investigated the assumption 
that repeating work for a long term period improves the quality of the work. In this 
respect, experience has been adopted as one of audit quality proxies. It has to be stated 
here that experience as proxy for audit quality has not before been adopted by many audit 
quality researchers. 
 
(c) Audit Quality and Auditor Industry Specialization   
The relationship between audit quality and auditor industry specialization or expertise has 
been extensively studied in prior research. It is observed that there are fundamental 
differences in characteristics of errors and methods of error detection across industries 
and thus, auditors who have industry specific expertise are better equipped to detect 
errors and abnormalities than those auditors without such expertise (Al-khaddash Al-
Nawas & Ramadan, 2013). 
Industry specialists are those who have gained great training and experience concentrated 
in a specific industry (Solomon, Shield & Whittington, 1999; Sun & Liu, 2011). Auditors 
are considered to be industry specialist when a set of audit partners focus their training 
and experiences in the field of interest and invest significant resources in the study of 
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legal regulation, production processes and market behaviors of key players in an industry 
(McMeeking, Peasnell & Pope, 2006). According to Omidfar and Moradi (2015), an 
audit firm is known as an industry specialist if they are able to know and understand 
special industrial issues in that industry; they are active in the industry and are also aware 
of the effect of special industrial issues on companies in the industry. 
Industry specialized auditors provide expert services to their clients because they have 
great industry-specific knowledge (Sun & Liu, 2011). The market share approach criteria 
to identify auditor industry specialization assumes that the degree of audit expertise of the 
auditing organizations can be found by observing the relative share of the market of 
auditing organizations that provide a special industry with services. An organization that 
has a higher share of the market has a higher expert knowledge regarding that industry 
too.  
Prior studies have used several surrogates to measure auditor industry specialization in 
terms of market share of client sales, client total assets, audit fees and number of clients 
audited by audit firm in a particular industry. (Gramling & Stone, 2001; Balsam, 
Krishnan & Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2003; Almutairi,2007; Jiang, Jeny-Cazavan & 
Audousset- Coulier, 2012; Minutti-Meza, 2016; Bruynseels, Knechel & Willekens, 
2006). 
 
Industry specialization is advantageous to the audit firm because it result in higher audit 
quality (Ignace & Irina, 2013; Low, 2004). Hammersley (2006) opins that audit 
specialists(i.e; auditor industry specialist) understand the clients accounting information 
better than when they audit firms that are outside their specialization. Auditor industry 
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specialist adds value when specific industry knowledge is needed to identify errors in the 
financial statements and consequently impact on the quality of audit (Low 2004). Auditor 
industry specialists are better auditors because they easily identify the problem areas in 
specific industry and plan better audit towards such areas. Cairney and Young (2006) are 
of the view that industry specialization is more efficient than specializing in 
heterogeneous industries. 
Industry specialization can lead to higher audit fees resulting from increased perceived 
audit quality. Supporting this view is the findings of Mayhew and Wilkens (2003) which 
reveal that audit firm will earn a premium for industry specialization if their market share 
is significantly higher than that of the competitors in the industry. However, DeFond, 
Francis and Wong (2000) are of the view that specialization is linked with a discount to 
attract clients. 
Auditor industry specialization is most beneficial because it leads to an increase in audit 
quality (Chen, Robyn & Keith, 2005). Other auditing research also confirms the 
importance of auditor industry expertise as they assert that knowledge of the industry 
may increase audit quality by improving the accuracy of error detection and enhancing 
the quality of the auditors risk assessment (Solomon, Shield & Whittington, 1999; 
Taylor, 2000; Owhoso, Messier & Lynch, 2002; Low, 2004; Balsam, Krishnan & Yang, 
2003). 
O’keefe, King and Gaver (1994), is of the view that apart from the ability of audit 
industry specialization to detect material misstatements in financial statements, audit 
industry specialization also attempts to protect their reputation capital through increased 
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compliance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) relative to non- specialist 
auditors. These evidences are consistent with the notion that auditor industry 
specialization contributes to greater audit quality (Hogan & Jeter, 1999; Solomon, Shield 
& Whittington, 1999). To Krishnan (2003) high audit quality is very possible where 
auditor industry specialization is present because in his view,  specialist auditors are 
likely to develop database detailing industry – specific best practices, industry –specifics 
risk and errors and unusual transactions, all of which can serve to enhance overall audit 
quality.             
The need for the demand of auditor specialization in an industry is quit enormous as it 
points to higher technical competence. Auditor industry specialization enhances the 
likelihood that auditors will discover errors and the probability of reporting the 
discovered errors (Hosseinmakani, 2014; Ariunada, 2000; Hammersley, 2006). Auditor 
industry specialization therefore leads to higher audit quality. It is therefore not out of 
place to include auditor industry specialization as a surrogate for audit quality in terms of 
auditor competence.  
 
2.  Audit Independence 
In corporate audit thought, the success of any audit is largely dependent on the 
independence of the auditor. This is so because, audit independence is a core professional 
value which governs their performance and behavior that demonstrate audit quality. It 
can then be suggested that the independence of the auditor is very important because 
his/her independence is capable of reducing information asymmetry hence reducing 
agency problems between owners and management.  
 26 
 
De Angelo (1981) relates the probability of detecting errors to auditor competence and 
associates the probability of revealing the anomalies with auditor independence. 
Therefore audit independence is defined as the probability that the auditor will disclose 
any misstatement in financial statements given that these misstatements are already 
discovered (De Angelo, 1981).  Okolie (2014) also sees audit independence as an 
unbiased mental attitude in making decisions throughout the audit and financial reporting 
process. He also states that audit independence is the quality of being free from influence, 
persuasion or bias.  
Sridharan, Caines, McMillan and Summers (2002) explain auditor’s independence as a 
non-bias mental attitude to make a decision in all audit and reporting. Nasution (2013) 
also expresses his view about auditor independence. To him, auditor independence is an 
absence of auditor personal interest in the auditing assignment thereby, avoiding material 
bias that is capable of affecting the reliability and credibility of the financial statements. 
Listya and Sukrisno (2014) see auditor independence as the relationship between auditors 
and the clients who have neutral nature such that the findings and report given by the 
auditor is only influenced by the evidence found and collected in accordance with the 
rules and principles of the profession. 
In essence, auditor independence requires auditor to keep themselves impartial, free from 
bias and vested interest,the absence of which will likely impair the value or quality of the 
audit. Hence, where audit independence is perceived to exist; audit will possess the 
ability of increasing the reliability and credibility of the information presented in the 
financial report. 
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Several studies like Windsor and Warning-Rasmussen (2009) have shown that audit 
independence is one of the key factors that affect audit quality positively. Haboya and 
Ohiokha (2014) are of the view that audit independence is directly proportional to audit 
quality. This is in accordance with Francis’ (2004) view that the higher the audit 
independence, the higher the audit quality. Listya and Sukrisno (2014) are also of the 
view that auditor independence can affect audit quality. 
Some proxies for audit independence in reviewed literature include audit tenure, audit 
fees, audit opinion type/audit judgment and non-audit services (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; 
Okolie, 2014; Nasution, 2013; Emad & Ahmed, 2012). Sequel to this, it is pertinent to 
include audit independence as a proxy for audit quality. Consequently, audit 
independence is studied via the following surrogates: 
i. Audit fees, 
ii. Audit tenure and 
iii. Audit opinion type 
(a) Audit Quality and Audit Fees 
One of the first studies of audit fees is that of Francis (1984). It argues that a large audit 
firm will charge higher fees to deliver high-quality services. Another study by De Angelo 
(1981) argues that demand for services created by reputation for quality creates economic 
‘quasi rents’ which manifest in fee premiums. Amba and Al-Hajeri (2013) define audit 
fees as a fee that company is expected to pay to an external auditor for performing audit 
and assurance services. Several studies have also demonstrated that the large audit firms 
earn a significant fee premium over small firms (Palmrose, 1986; Wooten, 2003).  
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In line with the above studies, Moizer (1997) and Rodrigo and Andre (2012) assert that 
audit fee is associated with higher audit quality resulting in higher reputation of the 
auditors. This view is also supported by Francis (2004) that higher audit fee means higher 
audit quality. Where billing rates are higher, it implies greater expertise, or more hours 
are used which also implies more audit effort. McLennan and Pack (2004) also assert that 
reputable audit firms charge higher fees for their perceived reputation.  
 
Xin, Andre, Elaine and Hong (2008) are not indifferent to the views of audit fees as they 
state that in a competitive audit market, a fee differential between audit firms reflects a 
return to higher quality.  Yuniarti (2011) is of the view that audit fee is a factor that 
significantly affects the quality of audit. According to him, higher fees connote audit 
quality. According to Okolie (2014), higher audit fees are reflected in higher cost 
resulting from greater audit quality. The hallmark of these arguments is that an individual 
has an economic incentive to incur above average costs in order to produce a service of 
above average quality. Eventually, consumers recognize this improved quality and are 
prepared to pay a higher fee in order to receive the service.  
 
On the contrary, Li and Lin (2005) and Zunaida, John, Amariah and Zuraidah (2013) are 
of the view that higher fees paid to auditors can impair auditor’s independence as these 
higher fees are capable of increasing the bond between the auditor and client,  hence  
reducing auditor’s independence. These contrary views notwithstanding, the present 
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study utilized audit fees as a definition for audit quality in order to draw conclusion as to 
the effect that audit quality has on the valuation of firms. 
 
(b) Audit Quality and Audit Tenure 
Most studies have made use of audit tenure as a determinant of audit quality and have 
also shown that audit tenure significantly influences audit quality whether positively or 
negatively. 
 
Adeyemi, Okpala and Dabor (2012) define Audit firm tenure as the length of the audit 
firm-client relationship as of the fiscal year end covered by the audited financial 
statements. Audit tenure for short can be explained as when the same auditor audited the 
financial statements of a company for two to three years, for long as nine or more years. 
Therefore, audit tenure for a medium term can be within four to eight years (Adeyemi, 
Okpala & Dabor, 2012). 
 
 Watts and Zimmerman (1983) are of the view that the longer the audit tenure the more 
the auditor becomes dependent on his client. This means auditor’s objectivity and 
independence will be destroyed and hence jeopardize audit quality. Knapp (1991) also 
establishes a decrease in auditors’ ability to detect anomalies as the tenure increases or 
gets longer. This might be attributable to a loss of auditors’ independence due to long 
term relationship with client. It can also be traced to clients’ knowledge of the ways and 
methods of audit (audit procedure) therefore changing its method of fraudulent acts.  
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Also, where there is auditor rotation rule, the auditor might not be so thorough in his 
effort to identify weaknesses since he is aware that he has a limited audit time with a 
particular client in which case he may not deem it fit to impress a client. In the same vain, 
Copley and Doncent (1993) assert that the longer the period of engagement, the higher 
the risk of lower audit quality. This also replicates the view of Donald and Cray (1992) 
that audit quality decreases as audit tenure increases. This seems to contradict the 
learning curve principle which expounds that the more one does a work repeatedly, the 
more the experience consequently, the better the performance. To Francis (2004), audit 
tenure can decrease audit quality. When a client has the same audit firm for a long period 
of time (exception for where there is a mandatory audit firm rotation), it is capable of 
impairing the independency of the auditor, who becomes captive to the client. Following 
this is Bazrafshan (2010) and Adeniyi and Mieseigha (2013) that discover that long term 
relationship between client and auditor leads to increase in management flexibility in the 
use of creative accounting. Haboya and Ohiokha (2014) are also of the view that longer 
audit tenure has negative effect on audit quality 
However, knowledge of the client is good and this might be gone when the client 
switches to another audit firm too frequently (Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Marjolein, 2011). 
Some studies like Barbadillo and Aguilar (2000); Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds 
(2002); Carcello & Nagy, (2004); Nashwa (2004); Wang (2009); Marjolein (2011); 
Adeyemi, Okpala and Dabor(2012); Mahmond, Forough and Hamid (2013) are of the 
opinion that longer  audit tenure allows the auditors to know their client’s  internal 
control and accounting system better; increase expertise in specific industry and this 
makes easier for the auditors to fight earnings management and other irregularities  in 
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clients financial reporting process but this will not be available where there is frequent 
client switch or rotation. 
 
The dilemma in research debates as to whether to change auditors from time to time or to 
build a long term relationship with the audit firm seems to be unending. This conflict in 
prior studies forms the basis for the choice of audit tenure as proxy for audit quality in 
this present study. 
 
(c) Audit Quality and Audit Opinion  
According to International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 200, the objective of an audit of 
the financial statements is to enable the auditor to express an opinion as to whether the 
financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
identified financial reporting framework. Thus, the auditing process is completed with the 
drafting of the auditor’s opinion regarding the client’s financial position. This audit report 
supplements the accounting information drawn from the financial statements. Audit 
opinion increases the credibility of management disclosure (Arber, Hysen, skender & 
Arben, 2012).  
 
The audit report which states the opinion of the auditors describes the findings of the 
audit and expresses their view on the true and fair condition of the company and brings to 
the attention of the management any weakness, uncertainty and /or irregularity found in 
the course of the audit. In such a situation, an audit exercise can generate four types of 
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audit opinion which can include unqualified audit opinion report, qualified audit opinion 
report, disclaimer of opinion reports and adverse opinion reports (Hayes, Dassen, 
Schilder & Wallage, 2005; Tahinakis, Mylonakis & Daskalopoulous, 2010; Moradi, 
Rudkhani & Jabbari, 2013; Iskandar, 1993). 
Unqualified opinion is stated when an auditor concludes that the financial statements of 
the company under examination present in a true and fair manner the company’s financial 
position. The qualified opinion is issued when in the process of auditing the financial 
statements of the firm, the auditor believes that the financial statements present in a true 
and fair manner the company’s financial position, but are unsure of certain values and/or 
ways certain things are handled. This report type does not question the accuracy of 
financial data but expresses ‘except for’ certain issues to which the matter/ qualification 
relates like lack of consistency in method of accounts preparation among different fiscal 
year, deviation from accounting standards in the course of preparing accounts, to mention 
but a few. 
A disclaimer opinion is issued in case where the auditor is not satisfied with the 
evidences collected and the accuracy of the financial statements and they find it difficult 
to express an opinion on the financial statements. Where a disclaimer opinion is issued, 
the auditor should also be in a position to justify their disclaimer by providing details or 
referring to issues or areas that necessitated the disclaimer. The adverse opinion is an 
exact opposite of the unqualified opinion, where the auditor out-rightly expresses an 
opinion that the financial statements of the examined firm do not present a ‘true’ and 
‘fair’ position. 
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Whichever the opinion reported by the auditor, prior researchers are of the opinion that 
the audit opinion gives rise to three possible consequences. First, management may put 
pressure on the auditor to issues a clean opinion. Secondly, the market price of the 
company’s share may be affected and thirdly, the management compensation may also be 
affected (Iskandar, 1993). 
If the above assertions are true then the quality of the audit can be impaired, if auditors 
tend to go with the management to issue a clean-report (where in essence, it is not) in 
order, to be retained as an auditor to the company.  
The ability of the auditors to express the correct opinion at any material time regardless 
of pressure from management and fear of no-retention, explains auditors independence 
and this is capable of increasing the credibility of the financial statements and perceived 
quality of audit to the various financial report stakeholders which in turn affects user’s 
perception about the firm and thereto influences the price of companies’ shares in the 
market. 
This current study is concerned with how the opinion of the auditor affects the market 
prices of the company’s share. It is on this note that the researcher thought it right to 
include audit opinion as an audit quality surrogate in this study.  
 
 
2.2.1.3  Audit Quality and Firm Value 
Lawani, Umanhonlen and Okolie (2015) state that firm value is the total value of the 
company’s stock. According to Muhibudeen (2015) Business can be valued differently 
depending on the context which may include; Economic value, accounting value and 
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market value. This study is concern with market value that refers to the value of a firm on 
the stock market.  This firm value is based on trade and the beliefs of investors on the 
quality of audit on the financial statement which then portrays the accounting figures 
contained in them as relevant and credible. Consistent with this is the assertions of 
Mukhtaruddin, Relasan, Bambang, Irham and Abukosim (2014) that, high stock price 
makes the value of the firm high. High value indicates prosperity (Soliha & Taswan, 
2002) and that share prices should not be too high or too low but should be optimal. 
 
Looking at the value of the firm’s share price from the perspective of audit quality, 
Hogan (1997) argues that audit quality is capable of affecting IPOs (initial public offers) 
pricing. This is in consensus with the view of Ghosh (2007) that external audit quality 
affects firm value. Wibowo and Rossieta (2010) assert that high quality audit is perceived 
to be a vital factor that contributes to market efficiency of any economy. Taqi (2013) also 
argues that while audit failures cause a decline in firm value, a high audit quality rather 
impacts on the firm value positively. Jusoh and Ahmad (2014) are also in support of the 
assertion that the quality of the audit is capable of positively impacting or impairing on 
the value of firms.Hence, where the quality of an audit firm becomes questionable and 
threatened, the value of firms audited by such a firm decreases and as a result, such 
companies would withdraw the services of the audit firm. This was the case with once a 
time famous accounting firm “Arthur Andersen” (Ziaee, 2014; Ali, Reza & Mahdi, 
2009). In spite of these assertions about the importance of audit quality on the market 
value of firms, this study had to lay emphasis on the effect of each of the audit quality 
surrogates as used in the study on the market value of firms. 
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i. Audit Firm Size and Market Value 
Audit firm size is explained as whether a firm’s financial statement is audited by a large 
or small audit company. Where a firm is audited by a large audit firm referred to as the 
Big-4 auditors, there is this confidence that the financial statements are presenting a true 
and fair view (De-Angelo 1981) consequently, investors based their decisions on the 
report by Big-4 auditors that are perceived to possess quality. It was based on this that 
Tagi (2013) argues that a high audit quality by Big-4 auditors affects the value of the firm 
positively. Prior to Taqi (2013) assertion; Aber, Hysen, Skender and Arben (2012) are of 
the view that, Big-4 auditors have positive effect on the stock prices of firms audited by 
them. 
The type of auditor that audit a firm financial statements sends signals to the market as 
most investors and prospective investors believe that these Big-4 auditors have 
experience, prestige and reputation as such audit with much care and high quality bearing 
in mind that any undetected misstatement and manipulations that eventually have any 
adverse effect on the client’s company is capable of destroying their reputation. So, 
investors are confident that the audit by these highly reputable auditors is more effective 
in curbing earnings management, manipulations and creative accounting. This in turn 
leads to increased value of the Big-4 auditor client’s firms in the market (Lin, liu & Wang 
2007). Hussainey (2009) is also of the view that investors have high future earnings 
anticipation where the firm in which they have investment is audited by a Big-4 auditor 
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because of the value that an audit by such prestigious audit firm gives to its client’s 
shares in the market thereby leading to huge earning returns. 
Other researchers like Ahsan Haiyan and Donghua (2014) Marjolein (2011), and 
Mohammed (2012) are of the opinion that these quality audit firms does not really 
perform quality audit but that it is a perception because they are well known and have 
gained reputation hence audit by them does not provide any additional benefit to the 
client’s value in the market. Well, this arguments are not far from the various opinions 
about the quality of audit done by a big audit firm or a small audit firm in section 2.2.1.2 
where audit quality and audit firm size where discussed. Therefore, where investors 
(market) believe in quality by the big-4 audit firm we can infer that the share value of 
firms audited by them will certainly be positively affected and vise-versa when audited 
by a non-big-4 audit firm. This can be supported by a common saying that says “show me 
your friend and I will tell you who you are” hence, where a big-audit firm that is reliable 
and possesses reputation and credibility is the auditor, there is every possibility that the 
financial statement will be credible and reliable thereby, attracting more value to the 
client’s firm. 
ii. Audit Experience and Market Value 
Audit experience relates to the knowledge and proficiency gained by auditors in the 
process of their audit work. Mohammed, Gugus and Zaki (2015) opine that audit 
experience is obtained as the auditor keeps doing the work. Therefore where an auditor is 
known for continuous audit there is possibility of sending signals to the market about the 
firm they are auditing.  
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A work done by an experienced person in a particular field is better than one done by an 
amateur person hence an experience person is seen as possessing quality and is relied 
upon since he appears to be credible. In the same vain, an audit by an experienced auditor 
is thus seen as credible and reliable so, it sends signals to the market and influences 
decision of investors and the value of shares in the market (Ziaee, 2014) 
An audit by an experienced auditor is capable of sending signals to the market because 
these experienced auditors are presumed to have high and quality knowledge about the 
client’s financial statements and knowledge on how to detect errors, omissions, 
misstatements and manipulation therefore where such an experienced auditor audits a 
client’s financial statements it sends positive signals to the market on the credibility of 
the auditor client’s financial statements. This in turn assist investors in decisions that 
might lead to an increase in the demand for the shares of the experienced auditor client 
company resulting in increased share prices along with the value of the firm in the market 
(Ziaee, 2014; Mohammed, Gugus & Zaki, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
iii. Auditor Industry Specialization 
Auditor industry specialization refer to auditors who have gained great training and 
experience in a specific industry having concentrated knowledge of the legal regulations, 
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production processes and other specific issues coherent in the industry (Sun & Liu, 2011; 
McMeeking, Peasnell & Pope, 2006). Auditor industry specialization add value to client-
firm as on lookers feel that these auditor industry specialist understand better the 
accounting information of the client than the ones who are not specialist. 
Auditor industry specialist easily identify the problem areas, develop data base that 
details industry – specific best practices, risk, errors and unusual transactions so, they are 
viewed as better and efficient auditors. Therefore, where an auditor industry specialist 
audit a firm they transmit value from the assumption of the credibility passed on the 
financial statements to the market thereby increasing the value of the auditor-client’s firm 
(Omidfar & Moradi, 2015). Shah-hosseini (2014) also supports the notion that the value 
of shares in the market relates to a large extent directly with the auditor industry 
specialization. Meaning that the market value of firms increases where their financial 
statements are audited by auditor industry specialist because they transmit audit quality. 
 
iv. Audit Fees and Market Value 
An audit fee is the fee that a company is expected to pay to an external auditor for 
performing audit and assurance services. This audit fees can either be high or low. Some 
scholars are of the view that high audit fees can only be paid for quality services 
therefore, higher audit fees means higher audit quality (Moizer, 1997; Francis, 2004; 
Rodrigo & Andre, 2012). These perceived audit quality in high audit fees is rather 
transmitted into high firm value in the market as proponents of audit quality via high 
audit fees believe that the high fees is paid for the numerous and thorough work done by 
 39 
 
the auditors hence exerts influence on the prices of company’s shares in the market 
meaning that share prices of companies with high audit fees will increase as the high 
audit fees is translated as quality audit and assurance services in the market. 
Some scholars seem to be different in their views and opinion as they are highly 
optimistic that high audit fees can impair auditor independent judgment and opinion (Li 
& Lin, 2005). Zunaidah, John, Amariah, Zuraidah and Carl (2013) observe that high audit 
fees can affect the value of shares of the company paying the audit fees negatively as the 
high audit fees alerts the market that the auditors have sold their integrity for the high 
cost of their services thus, have reported what the management desires and not the 
independent audit opinion about the affairs of the company. Consequently, results to a 
reduced value of the firm paying the high fees. 
 
v. Audit Tenure and Market Value 
Audit tenure is the length of audit firm-client relationship time covered by the same 
auditor. This audit firm-client relationship can be as short as 2 – 3 years or as long as 9 or 
more years (Adeyemi, Okpala & Dabor, 2012). There is every possibility that the longer 
audit tenure is capable of jeopardizing auditor independence (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1983) as auditor who stay long in a company seems to be dependent on his client and lose 
their sense of objectivity, credibility and integrity. Therefore, where investors notice a 
long audit tenure they seems to be skeptical about such company’s financial statements as 
there is every possibility that the auditor might not be independent in the opinion about 
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the credibility of their client’s financial statement which can affect the company’s stock 
negatively in the market (Wang, 2009; Hamed, Rohaida, Rasid & Mohamed, 2015) 
On the other hand, some scholars opine that the longer an auditor audit a company’s 
financial statement the better because by staying so long he is bound to know so much 
about his client’s accounting system which as well makes it easier for the auditor to 
detect problem areas, fight earnings management, other manipulation and irregularities 
(Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Mahmond, Forough & Hamid, 2013). Thus, the assurance of the 
market that a long tenure audit injects audit quality influence investors decisions resulting 
in increased demand for the shares of such company leading to a rise in the share price of 
such company and subsequently, increased market value (Ardiana, 2014). 
 
vi. Audit Opinion Type and Market Value 
Firth (1978) purports that audit opinion has a signaling effect on the market value of 
firms as such, states that the type of audit opinion impacts greatly on the share prices of 
firms. Abern Hysen, Skender and Arben (2012) opinion is not far from Firth (1978) as 
they also assert that audit opinion have impact on stock prices; the nature of opinion 
determines the effect, if the opinion is qualified it is capable of sending bad signals about 
the company to the market but share prices eventually rises where an auditor states an 
unqualified opinion that, the firm’s financial reports and statements are presenting a true 
and fair view. The unqualified audit opinion also makes the market to see such company 
with a form of ‘standing well’ thereby, causing a rise in the demand for the shares of that 
company (Robu & Robu, 2013).                
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Some authors are of the view that audit opinion has no effect on the prices of shares in 
the stock market and that the type of audit opinion about the financial statements of a 
firm is only a write up to the firm’s management thus, makes no meaning to investors in 
the market but that investors have other things to look out for in a firm in determining its 
value (Moradi, Salehi, Rigi, & Moeinizade, 2011). To Tahinakis, Mylonakis and 
Daskalopoulou (2010), audit opinion is not only meaningful to investors but opines that 
the Audit report in itself have limited informational content that is proficient enough to 
influence investors’ decision on what shares to buy. This investors’ decision on what 
shares to buy is capable of affecting the share prices of firms and this effect on share 
prices is hence not dependent on the type of audit opinion as audit report in itself is not 
informative enough, therefore Al-Thuneibat, Khamees and Al-fayoumi (2008) opined 
that audit opinion cannot send signals to the market much more of affecting share prices 
of companies with either a clean or an unclean audit opinion. 
From the above, we can deduce that research has shown that firm market value is heavily 
dependent on audit quality. It is pertinent that the quality of audit be improved as this will 
lead to a rise in the credibility of financial information incorporated in the financial 
statements, consequently, sending signals to the market as to what is necessarily the value 
of a specific firm. 
 
 
 
2.2.2  Market Value 
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There are many different meanings of market value.Some definitions include that of 
Evans and Evans (2007) which views market value as the price that would be paid by a 
motivated buyer to a motivated seller after a property's exposure to a market place of 
equally capable buyers, each with full information about the property and the market 
place and neither operating under any sort of outside influences. Market value according 
to Campbell (2012) first, is the price at which a security is trading and could presumably 
be purchased or sold and secondly, it is what investors believe a firm is worth; calculated 
by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the current market price of a firm's 
shares. Scott (2003) sees market value of a stock or bond as the current price at which 
that security is trading. 
The market value of the firm is most preferred in this study because it allows for the 
overcoming of the use of data that may be reflecting outdated valuation as inherent in the 
use of book values. The market value of a firm's equity also allows for easy comparison 
of the relative sizes of different companies. 
Various variables for market value of firms have been used by researchers across the 
globe (Okolie, 2014; Henri & Ane, 2013; Ferreira, Ding & Wongchoti, 2014). However, 
this study adopts the following market value variable: Market Price per Share (Market 
Price/Share). 
 
1. Market Price/Share 
The value of a company as perceived by an investor and other users is often associated 
with stock prices. High stock prices make the value of the company high (Mukhtaruddin, 
Relasan, Soebyakto, Irham & Abukosim, 2014). This is usually the desire of the owners 
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because high share prices indicate prosperity. The market price per share is maintained as 
the market value of the company stock per share at the end of the year.   
 
2.2.3 Non-Financial Companies in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, companies are grouped into sectors where companies can be listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). These sectors include: agricultural, conglomerate, 
natural resources, industrial goods, oil and gas, consumer goods, constructions/real 
estates, health care, information and communication technology, services and financial 
sector, totaling 11sectors operating in Nigeria (NSE, 2016). This current study centered 
its attention on 10 sectors leaving the financial sector hence; refer to the 10 sectors which 
are not the financial sector as the‘non-financial companies’. The sectors that make up the 
non-financial companies are described as follows: 
 
Table 2.1: Non-Financial Sectors in Nigeria 
 
INDUSTRY 
 
SUB-SECTORS 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
Agriculture - Crop Production  
-Fishing/Hunting/Trapping 
-Livestock/Animal Specialties 
This sector comprises all units engaged 
in agriculture, fishing and hunting. 
Agricultural production covers, 
primarily, the production of crops, 
plants, vines, or trees (excluding 
forestry operations); and the keeping, 
grazing or feeding of livestock for the 
sale of livestock or livestock products 
(including serums) for livestock 
increase, or for value increase. Fishing, 
hunting and trapping covers units 
mainly engaged in commercial fishing 
(including shellfish and marine 
products); in operating fish hatcheries, 
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and fish and game preserves; and in 
commercial hunting and trapping.  
 
 
 
Construction/ 
Real Estate 
- Building Construction  
-Non-Building/Heavy 
Construction 
- Property Management 
- Real Estate Development 
- Real Estate Investment 
Trusts(REITs) 
-Building 
Structure/Completion 
- Site Preparation Services 
-Other Construction Services 
This sector includes companies mainly 
engaged in the construction of buildings 
which include the construction of a 
house, farm, industrial, commercial or 
other building structures, and carrying 
out alterations, additions, and renovation 
or general repairs to these buildings. 
Establishments primarily engaged in the 
construction of buildings for sale, such 
as developers, are included, as are 
companies that are mainly involved in 
renting or leasing real estate to others; 
managing real estate for others; selling, 
buying or renting real estate for others; 
and providing other real estate related 
services, including appraisal services. 
The construction of non-building or 
heavy construction structures includes 
the construction or general repair of 
roads, highways, streets, public 
sidewalks, bridges, guardrail 
construction, airport runways or parking 
lots, and organizing or managing their 
construction, including on-site 
assembly. Also Included are installation 
of road signs, providing architectural 
supervision or consultant engineering 
services, as well as services such as site 
preparation, building structure and 
completion. 
 
 
Consumer 
Goods 
- Automobiles/Auto Parts 
-Beverages-Brewers/Distillers 
- Beverages-Non-Alcoholic 
- Consumer Electronics 
- Food Products 
-Food Products-Diversified 
- Household Durables 
-Personal/Household Products 
- Textiles/Apparel 
This sector comprises companies that 
are engaged in the production and 
manufacturing of final goods. In 
general, these are products and services 
classified for personal use, specifically 
intended for the mass market. This 
major sector encompasses goods that are 
consumed rather than used in the 
production of other goods, and include 
Table 2.1 Continue 
Table 2.1 Continue 
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- Tobacco Products 
- Toys and Games 
both durable and non-durable 
consumables. Included in this sector are 
manufacturers of automobiles/auto 
parts, household durable good, textiles 
and apparel, as well as manufacturers’ 
food, beverages and tobacco products. 
 
 
Healthcare - Healthcare Providers 
- Medical Equipment 
- Medical Supplies 
- Pharmaceuticals 
The healthcare sector comprises 
establishments providing healthcare 
services. This includes companies that 
manufacture healthcare equipment and 
supplies, and provide healthcare-related 
services, including distributors of 
products and providers (owners and 
operators) of healthcare facilities and 
organizations. Also included in this 
sector are the companies involved in the 
research, development, production and 
marketing of pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology products. Providers of 
diagnostic, preventive, remedial and 
therapeutic services such as doctors, 
nurses, hospitals and other private, 
public and voluntary organizations are 
listed under this sector, as are health 
insurance firms. The services provided 
by establishments in this sector are 
delivered by trained professionals with 
the requisite expertise. 
 
 
Industrial 
Goods 
- Building Materials  
- Electronic and Electrical 
Products 
- Packaging/Containers 
- Tools and Machinery 
 
This sector comprises companies 
primarily involved in the manufacture 
and distribution of capital goods, 
including aerospace and defense, 
engineering and building products, 
electrical equipment, industrial 
machinery, and packaging products for 
industrial and consumer products. Their 
businesses are dominated by the 
production of goods for commercial use. 
 
 
Information & 
Communications 
-Computers and Peripherals 
- Computer Based Systems 
ICT consists of all technical means used 
to handle information and aid 
Table 2.1 Continue 
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Technology - Computer Software 
-DiversifiedCommunication 
Services 
-Electronic Office Equipment 
- Internet Service Providers 
- IT Services 
- Processing Systems 
-Scientific and Technical 
Instruments 
- Semiconductors 
-Telecommunications Carriers 
-Telecommunications 
Equipment 
-Telecommunications Services 
-Other ICT Products and 
Services 
 
communication. This major sector 
consists of IT as well as telephony, and 
stresses the role of unified 
communications and the integration of 
telecommunications, intelligent 
management systems, and audio-visual 
systems in modern information 
technology. ICT covers four main areas, 
including (1) technology software and 
services--including developers of 
software in various fields such as the 
Internet, applications, systems, 
databases, home entertainment, as well 
as companies that provide IT consulting 
and services, and data processing and 
outsourced services; (2) technology 
hardware and equipment--including 
manufacturers and distributors of 
communications equipment, computers 
and peripherals, and electronic 
equipment and related instruments; (3) 
semiconductors and semiconductor 
equipment manufacturers; and (4) 
telecommunications carriers, equipment 
manufacturers and service providers. 
ICT comprises any communications 
device for radio, television, cellular 
phones, satellite systems, etc., as well as 
various services and applications 
associated with them. Electronic office 
equipment includes copiers, data storage 
devices and other products such as 
mailing/letter-handling machines, and 
peripheral computer devices such as 
networking and point-of-sale (POS) 
equipment. Companies such as Internet 
cafes which are primarily engaged in 
offering limited Internet connectivity in 
combination with other services such as 
facsimile services, training, rental of on-
site personal computers and game rooms 
are also included in this sector. 
 
 
Natural 
Resources 
- Chemicals  
- Metals 
This sector comprises companies that 
are involved in a wide range of 
Table 2.1 Continue 
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- Precious Metals 
- Precious Stones 
- Paper/Forest Products 
-Non-Metallic Mineral Mining 
- Mining Services 
commodity-related manufacturing 
industries. This denotes materials that 
came from nature in an unprocessed 
state, including chemicals, construction 
materials, glass, paper and forest 
products (such as timber tracts, forest 
nurseries and related activities such as 
reforestation and the gathering of gums, 
barks, balsam needles, tree seeds, and 
other forest products), and metals, 
minerals and mining companies, as well 
as producers of steel. This includes 
companies engaged in the exploration, 
extraction and processing of minerals 
and ores. Extraction of minerals is 
undertaken by such processes as 
underground or open-cut mining, 
dredging, quarrying, the operation of 
wells or evaporation pans, or by 
recovery from ore dumps or tailings, 
and all supplementary activities aimed 
at preparing the raw materials for 
manufacturing. Ores are valued chiefly 
for the metals contained, to be recovered 
for use as such or as constituents of 
alloys, chemicals, pigments or other 
products. Forest products comprise two 
categories of materials--paper and allied 
products, and lumber and wood 
products. These are often combined, as 
many companies that produce pulp and 
paper also produce lumber and wood 
products in integrated operations. 
 
 
Oil & Gas - Coal Extraction  
-Coal and Coal Products 
Distributors 
-Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
Extraction 
- Petroleum Refining 
-Petroleum and Petroleum 
Products Distributors 
-Petroleum Bulk Stations and 
Terminals 
- Gasoline Stations 
This sector includes all companies 
engaged in operating and/or developing 
oil and gas field properties, and 
companies primarily engaged in 
recovering and producing liquid 
hydrocarbons from oil and gas field 
gases. Their business are dominated by 
(1) the exploration, production, 
marketing, refining and/or transportation 
of oil and gas products, coal and other 
consumable fuels; and (2) construction 
Table 2.1 Continue 
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-Energy Equipment and 
Services 
- Field Services 
-Integrated Oil and Gas 
Services 
or provision of oil rigs, drilling 
equipment and other energy related 
services and equipment. This includes 
establishments primarily engaged in 
performing geophysical, geological, and 
other exploration services for oil and 
gas. Companies that are engaged in 
drilling (spudding, drilling in, re-
drilling, and directional drilling), 
completing and equipping wells; in the 
operation of separators, emulsion 
breakers, distilling equipment, and field 
gathering lines for crude oil and natural 
gas; and in all other activities in the 
preparation of oil and gas, up to the 
point of shipment from the producing 
property, are also included in this sector. 
Companies primarily engaged in the 
wholesale distribution of crude 
petroleum and petroleum products, 
including liquefied petroleum gas, from 
bulk liquid storage facilities are also 
included in this major group. 
 
 
Services - Advertising Agencies  
- Employment Solutions 
- Printing/Publishing 
- Waste Management 
- Airlines 
- Courier/Freight/Delivery 
- Rail Transportation 
- Road Transportation 
- Water Transportation 
- Storage/Warehousing 
- Transport-Related Services 
- Hospitality 
- Hotels/Lodging 
- Education/Training 
- Media/Entertainment 
- Repair/Maintenance 
- Travel and Tourism 
- Miscellaneous Services 
- Apparel Retailers 
-Automobile/Auto Part 
Retailers 
This sector includes companies that are 
primarily engaged in providing a wide 
variety of services for individuals, 
business and government 
establishments, and other organizations. 
These services encompass commercial 
services and supplies, as well as 
transportation services. Commercial 
services include printing, employment, 
environmental, advertising services, 
etc., while transportation includes 
airlines, couriers, marine, road and rail, 
and other transportation infrastructure 
and services, such as parking, 
stevedoring, harbor services, navigation 
services, airport operation, and cargo 
warehousing and storage for goods and 
postal services. Waste management 
includes sewage collection, treatment, 
and disposal through sewage treatment 
facilities. Also included in this major 
Table 2.1 Continue 
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-Electronics/Appliances 
Retailers 
-Food/Drug Retailers and 
Wholesalers 
- Specialty Retailers 
sector are hotels and lodging 
establishments, as well as restaurants 
and other leisure facilities. Other 
services that appear under this sector are 
media and entertainment, and other 
establishments providing miscellaneous 
services, (e.g., repair, travel and 
education, etc.).Wholesale trade 
includes the resale of new or used goods 
to businesses or institutional users 
(including government), while retailers 
sell merchandise to final consumers for 
personal or household consumption. 
Retailers include department stores and 
shops, motor vehicle retailers and 
service outlets, and specialty outfits 
such as mail order houses, vending 
machine operators and consumer 
cooperatives. 
 
 
Conglomerates  This sector comprises companies that 
incorporate engineering and production 
to manufacture a varied group of 
products. This group encompasses a 
wide range of industries, many of which 
have progressed from traditional 
practices and technologies, to diversify 
and develop niche products for key 
markets around the globe. 
 
 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange  
The companies within these non-financial sectors listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange are 130 companies (see Appendix A1).This study decided not to consider the 
financial sector as a lot of things like: mergers, acquisitions and liquidity problem seems 
to be predominant in the financial sector in recent times as a result, including it in the 
study might not allow for accurate result.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework  
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This study builds its foundation on Agency Theory, Lending Credibility Theory; Theory 
of Inspired Confidence and Signaling Theory. These baseline theories are next reviewed 
one after the other. 
 
2.3.1  Agency Theory 
The most prominent and widely used or mentioned theory in auditing is the agency 
theory.The first scholars to propose, explicitly, that a theory of agency be created, and to 
actually begin its creation, were Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick, independently and 
roughly concurrently (Ross, 1973). This theory is based on the idea that when a business 
is first established, its owners usually manage it and as the business grows, the owners 
would appoint agents to oversee the management of the business in the best interest of 
the owners. This separation of the ownership from management gave rise to the agency 
issues. The agency theory analyses the relationship between two parties, namely, the 
investors and managers. The manager undertakes to perform certain duties for the 
investors and the investor undertakes to reward the managers. 
This theory is adopted on the premise that agents have more and better 
information than the principals. This information asymmetry makes it difficult for owners 
to monitor the affairs of the company; this gave rise to the demand for auditors (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978; Salehi, 2010; Farouk & Hassan, 2014; Okolie, 2014 & Kipchoge, 
2015). According to this theory, the role of the auditor is to supervise the relationship 
between the managers and the owners more as a control mechanism that diminishes 
information asymmetry and protects the interest of the owners (Salehi, 2010; Eilifsen 
&Messier, 2000; Schipper, 1989; Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995). Wallace, Naser and 
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Mora (1994) state that agency theory believes that audit quality helps to decrease the 
disagreement between directors and investors. 
 
Another basis for agency theory is the possibility of agents pursuing self-interest rather 
than complying with the requirements of the contract,For this reason, the principals 
(owners) will always be interested in the outcome of the business generated by their 
agents (managers/directors) (Kim, Chung & Firth, 2003).   
The agency theory is of the view that audit has an important role in providing information 
that can reduce information asymmetry (Salehi, 2010; Sadegh, Reza & Farzad, 2013). It 
is believed therefore that, the auditor’s work can be used as a guide for valuation of 
companies (Salehi, 2010; Muhibudeen, 2015) since auditors’ statement tends to expose 
the true position of the figures in the financial statements. For this reason, agency theory 
is normally used theoretically to legitimize the reason why company audit is important.    
 
Hence, agency theory is a useful theory of accountability which helps in explaining the 
development of audit quality which is capable of adding credibility to financial 
statements and increasing users’ confidence in the figures presented by these managers 
believing that the financial statements are free from bias and material misstatement. 
 
2.3.2 Lending Credibility Theory 
This theory was formulated by Birnbaum and Stegner in 1979.This theory is of the view 
that the primary function of the audit is to add credibility to the financial statements. 
Audited financial statements are seen to have elements that increase the financial 
 52 
 
statement users’ confidence in the figures presented by the management in the financial 
statements. The users are perceived to gain benefits from the increased credibility; these 
benefits are typically considered to be the improved quality of investment decisions made 
based on reliable information.  
 
Although Porter (1990) in Salehi (2010) is of the view that audited information does not 
form the primary basis for investors’ investment decisions, Healy and Palepu (2001) are 
of the view that, since directors are aware of the quality of audit, they will tend to 
disclose more information thereby adding to the credibility of the financial statements. 
The ability of audit to lend credibility to financial statements is one of the driving forces 
for the development of audit quality.  
 
2.3.3  Theory of Inspired Confidence 
This is a theory of rational expectation. Limperg (1932) addresses both demand for and 
supply of audit services. The demand for audit services is the direct consequence of 
participation of third parties in the company (i.e. interested parties of the company). 
These parties demand accountability from the management in return for their investments 
in the company. However, since this information provided by the management may be 
biased with the outside parties having no direct means of monitoring, an audit is required 
to assure the reliability of this information.  
 
This theory links the users’ requirement for credible financial reports and the capability 
of the auditor to meet such a demand. According to Okolie (2014), the theory bestows on 
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the auditor high level of confidence as the only messiah who can bring to the principal all 
relevant information necessary and capable of reducing information asymmetry; thus the 
auditor is under an obligation to conduct his work in a manner that does not betray the 
confidence which he commands. This theory also explains the need for audit quality 
necessity and development.  
 
 
2.3.4 Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory was formulated byMichael Spence in 1973 (Connelly, Certo, Ireland & 
Reutzel, 2011).Signaling theory stands on the agency theory (Okolie & Izedonmi, 2014). 
This explains the manner by which managers may impart to the market additional 
information about their company and their own behaviour. Signaling theory suggests that 
companies with good performance use financial information disclosure through the help 
of quality audit to send signals to the market. A high quality audit sends a signal to the 
market that the financial statements are credible. The signal of transparency and 
credibility sends assurance about the quality of firm’s financial disclosure in statements 
to the stakeholders and this positively suggests the quality of audit.  
 
This theory also believes that the market perception of the quality of the company’s 
auditor influences the company’s share price. According to Xin, Andre, Elaine and Hong 
(2008), audit quality serves as a signal of company’s value in the market. Okolie (2014) 
is also of the opinion that even voluntary disclosure that may be used as signals, can 
 54 
 
achieve enhanced credibility only in the presence of a quality audit. This also explains the 
necessity for the development of audit quality.  
 
2.4   Empirical Studies 
This section reviews related empirical studies from other economies as well as Nigeria. In 
our review, we take into cognizance studies that made use of variables similar to this 
current study and observed what findings where reached. This has assisted the 
comparison of the findings of this study with prior ones. The various studies reviewed are 
next presented one after another.  
 
2.4.1 Empirical Studies on Audit Firm Size (AFS)and Market Value 
Lin, Liu and Wang (2007) study the market implication of audit quality and auditor 
switch from the Chinese perspective. The findings suggest that large auditors in China are 
perceived more effective in curbing earnings management leading to higher Earnings 
Response Coefficient (ERCs) and conclude that audit information is valued by the market 
in China and large auditors have been able to differentiate themselves in the Chinese 
stock market. Also, Xin, Andre, Elaine and Hong (2008) examine the impact of audit 
quality on Initial Public Offer (IPO) under-pricing using sample of Australian firms for a 
period of eight years using regression model on the 371 sampled observation data. The 
results suggest that quality auditors proxied by Big 4 serve as a signaling device that 
enhances post-issue market value of equity. 
Consistently, Hussainey (2009) examines the impact of audit quality (measured by the 
big 4 accounting firms) on the ability of the investor to predict future earnings using 
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regression model.  The study covers UK non-financial firms for a period of 7 years 
covering 1996 – 2002.  Their findings reveal that financial statements audited by the big 
4 auditors are capable of assisting investors in better anticipation of future earnings of 
firms. Further to this, if the earnings of a firm can be anticipated, it then means that 
investors can rely on such information for future investment which will automatically 
impact on the value of the firm. Since the prediction of firm’s earnings can affect its 
value, we then infer that audit quality can impact on firm value. Another study by Mark, 
Christopher and Woon (2009) is also in line with the studies by Hussainey (2009); Xin, 
Andre, Elaine and Hong, (2008) and Lin, Liu and Wang, (2007) when they study auditor 
quality and the role of accounting information in explaining UK stock returns. The study 
employ orthogonal variance decomposition. The evidence shows that earnings 
components vary conditionally on auditor quality. Lasse, Hannu and Tomi (2013)’s 
finding is not different from the previously reviewed study (Xin, Andre, Elaine & 
Hong,2008; Lin, Liu & Wang, 2007; Hussainey, 2009) even though the study was for a 
longer period of fifteen years using a large sample of 1,915 takeover offers in the USA. 
The study investigates whether the market perception of auditor quality makes a 
difference to the market value of a firm. The findings reveal that the takeover process 
makes a small correction to the market price of the target when it has Big-4 auditor.  
Also, Hsien and Hua (2013) in trying to answer the question ‘Do Big 4 audit firms 
improve the value relevance of earnings and equity?’ used ordinary least square 
regression method on the data from Taiwan capital market. The evidence found is that the 
earnings and book value of equity audited by the Big-4 auditors explain more variation in 
stock return than those audited by the non-Big-4 auditors. Consequently, they draw a 
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conclusion that both earnings and book value audited by the Big-4 audit firms are 
generally more relevant than those audited by the non-Big-4 audit firms.Bahman, Zahra 
and Sacid (2013) investigated the value relevance of auditor type in Tehran Stock 
Exchange. They sampled 156 listed companies for a period of 10 years from 2007 to 
2010 using multiple regression analysis approach. They used price per share for value 
relevance and found that auditor type has a positive impact in the market. 
Chen, Bin and Xijia (2014) examined the effect of interim auditing on inter-investor 
divergence with a large sample of 2326 listed Chinese firms from 1997 – 2000 using 
regression analysis tool. They used Big-5 auditors and stock price as variables for the 
study and found that investors rely more on audited financial information in their 
decisions on which company’s shares to diversify their investments. Similarly, Afza and 
Nazir (2014) explore the effect of audit quality on firm value from the Pakistan market. 
They proxied audit quality by big-4 auditors and Tobin’s Q for market measure. They 
studied 124 companies listed on Pakistan market as at 31/12/2011 using regression 
analysis. The result of their findings reveals that audit quality has a strong and significant 
positive impact on Tobin’s Q. 
Ardiana (2014) in evaluating the role of external audit in improving firm’s value in 
Indonesia where audit characteristics measured as audit firm size and firm’s value is 
measured by price to earnings ratio (P/E), Price to book value (P/B) and Tobin’s Q. The 
study uses 2,240 company-year observations (i.e., 320 companies for 7years) for 2007-
2013 periods. The finding reveals that audit firm size affects all the three measures of 
firm value.   
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From the Nigerian studies, Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) investigate the impact of audit 
quality on the share prices of quoted companies in Nigeria. One of the audit quality proxy 
used by them is audit firm size. The study adopts multiple regression method on the data 
extracted from annual reports of 57 companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
for a period of six (6) years.  The findings show that audit quality (audit firm size) exerts 
significant influence on the market price per share of quoted companies in Nigeria.Still 
on the Nigerian research on audit quality and firm valuation, Okolie (2014) investigates 
the influence that audit firm size exerts on the market value of companies in Nigeria. The 
study also makes use of a six (6) year period and 57 companies giving a total of 342 
observations. The study reveals that audit firm size exerts significant influence on the 
market price share of companies sampled in Nigeria. The study findings are not far-
fetched from the finding in Okolie and Izedonmi (2014). We perceive that what might 
have accounted for this similarity in findings is that audit firm size is one variable of 
audit quality used by the same author in the prior study with the same data, sample and 
methodology.  
 
Farouk and Hassan (2014) also examine audit quality impact on financial performance of 
quoted cement firms in Nigeria for a period of five (5) years from 2007-2011. They 
sample four (4) firms and obtain their data from the annual reports and accounts of these 
cement companies. Collected data were analyzed using multiple regression analysis.  The 
result of the findings shows that auditor size and auditor independence have significant 
impact on the financial performance of quoted cement companies in Nigeria. This study 
covers one industry in the manufacturing sector of listed firms in Nigeria. It is necessary 
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to improve on the sample size by incorporating other sectors even if it is to take one firm 
from each sector so as to give a fair representation of quoted companies in Nigeria. 
 
The findings of the study by Yaser, Julia and Denise (2008)  seems to be different from 
the ones already reviewed as they found no impact of high quality auditors (i.e. the Big-
4) on reported accounts value and reliability when they measure reported accounts value 
with market value of equity and auditor quality as the Big-4 auditors. Similarly, 
Marjolein (2011) investigates whether investors react on a restatement announcement in a 
different way when the restating company is audited by a Big-4 audit firm. The study 
makes use of regression analysis tool. The evidence reveals that the audit quality 
measured by the size of the audit firm has no role in the market reaction following a 
restatement.  
 
Mohammed (2012) in his investigation into what determines valuation of IPOs in Saudi 
Arabian companies used regression analysis on 28 sampled companies covering a 
number of sectors for 6 years. The findings reveal that there is an adverse effect of the 
external auditor on the IPOs premium in the Saudi market. This means that the premium 
value is reduced when the external auditor is one of the Big 4. A study by Ahsan, Haiyan 
and Donghua (2014) on audit quality and market pricing of earnings and earnings 
components in China also have similar result like Marjolein (2011) and Mohammed 
(2012) as the study shows that Big-4 audit does not provide any incremental benefit to 
clients in terms of market pricing of clients’ financial numbers. Another study from Iran 
by Shah-hosseini (2014) examines the effect of audit quality on the valuation of IPO. The 
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study uses elements of audit quality to consist of Audit Firm Size. Adopting a regression 
model, the result indicates that there is no relationship between Audit Firm Size with 
valuation of shares. These findings are consistent with the study of Mohammad, (2012) 
on Audit Firm Size but differs where the findings are not agreeing with the point that the 
audit firm size affect the value of the firm as affirmed by some researchers like 
Hussainey (2009), Xin, Andre, Elaine and Hong (2008), Farouuk and Hassan (2014) but 
strongly opines that it is the specialization of the accounting firm auditing the financial 
statements that can affect the firm value. 
However, drawing from the above evidences, we may infer that the effect of audit quality 
proxied by audit firm size has mixed results in other economies with Nigerian studies 
having same finding hence, the need to substantiate these findings. Again, there is need to 
add to extant literature on audit quality and market value in Nigeria. 
 
2.4.2  Empirical Studies on Audit Experience and Market Value 
Ziaee (2014) investigates the effect of audit quality on the performance of listed 
companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. The study uses period of audit, audit reputation 
and audit firm experience as variables for audit quality.  Correlation analysis technique 
was used and the study finds that there is a relationship between audit quality and 
financial performance of companies. There seems to be dearth of studies on audit 
experience and market value therefore, this study is adding to the extant literature in this 
area 
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2.4.3 Empirical Studies on Auditor Industry Specialization (AIS) and Market 
Value 
The study by Shah-hosseini (2014) examines the effect of audit quality on the valuation 
of IPO. The study uses audit quality element to consist of auditor specialization. 
Adopting a regression model, the result indicates that there is a direct relationship 
between auditor specialization and value of shares in IPOs.Another study from Iran by 
Omidfar and Moradi (2015) supports the idea that audit industry specialization can lead 
to improved quality of financial information on the capital market when they investigate 
the effect of industry specialization on audit opinion in Iran for the period of nine (9) 
years covering from 2004 to 2012.These findings are consistent with the study of Shah-
hosseini (2014). From the foregoing, all evidences of studies reviewed on auditor 
industry specialization and market value reveal that the auditor’s knowledge of a specific 
industry impact/affect the value of firms in the market. Well, the finding of this study is 
adding to the extant literature and also substantiates the findings of the empirical studies 
reviewed.  
2.4.4 Empirical Studies on Audit Fees and Market Value 
Similarly, Taqi (2013) examines the consequences of audit quality from the signaling 
theory perspective. This study unlike most studies administers questionnaire to 101 
accountants.  It uses path analysis and the result shows that audit quality proxied by audit 
fees has an effect toward higher valuation of clients.Jusoh and Ahmad (2014) investigate 
the relationship between audit quality and firm performance in Malaysia. The study 
proxies firm performance by ROA and Tobin’s Q testing for both book value 
performance and market share value performance.  The study sampled 730 listed 
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companies in Malaysia and used multivariate regression model to analyze the data 
obtained from the sample on a three (3) year period. The finding reveals that audit quality 
proxied by audit fees affects positively both performance indicators (ROA and Tobin’s 
Q). This is possible since audit quality has the potentials of reducing agency cost hence 
resulting in increased performance. Antonio (2014) investigates the relationship between 
audit fees and firm value using Brazilian public companies, from 2009 – 2011. The study 
proxied firm value by Tobin’s Q using regression for the analysis and found that increase 
in audit fees increases Tobin’s Q of the audited company. 
Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) investigate the impact of audit quality on the share prices of 
quoted companies in Nigeria. The study adopts multiple regression method on the data 
extracted from annual reports of 57 companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
for a period of six (6) years.  They used audit fees and market price per share for audit 
quality and market value respectively. The findings show that audit quality exerts 
significant influence on the market price per share of quoted companies in 
Nigeria.Farouk and Hassan (2014) also examine audit quality impact on financial 
performance of quoted cement firms in Nigeria for a period of five (5) years from 2007-
2011. The study uses a sample of four (4) firms and obtains the requisite data from the 
annual reports and accounts of these cement companies. Collected data were analyzed 
using multiple regression analysis.  The result of the findings shows that auditor 
independence measured as audit fees have significant impact on the financial 
performance of quoted cement companies in Nigeria. This study covers one industry in 
the manufacturing sector of listed firms in Nigeria. It is necessary to improve on the 
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sample size by incorporating other sectors even if it is to take one firm from each sector 
so as to give a fair representation of quoted companies in Nigeria. 
 
Similarly, Hamed, Rohaida, Rasid and Mohamed (2015) examine the impact of audit 
quality on firm performance for Malaysian listed companies for the period of 2003 to 
2012. In this study, they use audit fees as a proxy for audit quality. Tobin’s Q is also used 
as measures for firm performance. They also found that an audit fee is significantly and 
positively related to Tobin’s Q. This finding is not consistent with the findings by 
Zunaidah, John, Amariah, Zuraidah and Carl (2013) that use similar dependent variable 
(Tobin’s Q). This disparity might be traced to the audit quality variables used. The one 
used audit size while the other made use of audit fees. We found consistency in the 
findings by Taqi (2013), Jusoh and Ahmad (2014) and Antonio (2014) This similarity in 
findings may be due to the fact that both studies are studies in Malaysia and both made 
use of similar proxies (audit fees) for the independent variable: Audit quality.  
 
Zunaidah, John, Amariah, Zuraidah and Carl (2013) examines the impact of managerial 
ownership, leverage and audit quality on firm performance in Malaysian ACE Market, 
sampled 82 listed companies for a period of three(3) years and data obtained from the 
annual reports of sampled firms were subjected to regression analysis techniques as a 
method for analysis and test of hypothesis. The findings are of the view that audit quality 
has a statistically significant negative effect on firm performance where they proxy audit 
quality by Audit Fees and Firm performance by Tobin Q (Q-ratios). This tends to agree 
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with scholars that are of the view that higher fees paid to auditors can impair audit quality 
and consequently impacting negatively on firm performance.  
 
2.4.5  Empirical Studies on Audit Tenure and Market Value 
Wang (2009) observes the effects of audit partner tenure and firm profitability on market 
value in Taiwan using a sample of 40 observations in the electronic industry and 34 
observations in general industry for two (2) years. The study use regression analysis 
technique for analyzing the sample data.  The study finds that audit rotation/tenure exerts 
adverse reaction on the market value, hence, concluded that Taiwan is not in support of 
long audit tenure. Also, Ardiana (2014) in evaluating the role of external audit in 
improving firm’s value in Indonesia where audit characteristics used for the study is audit 
tenure and firm’s value is measured by price to earnings ratio (P/E), Price to book value 
(P/B) and Tobin’s Q. The study uses 2,240 company-year observations (i.e., 320 
companies for 7years) for 2007-2013 periods. The finding reveals that audit quality 
characteristics; audit tenure affects all the three measures of firm’s value used in the 
study.   
Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) investigate the impact of audit quality on the share prices of 
quoted companies in Nigeria. The study used audit tenure as one of the proxy for audit 
quality and price per share as the dependent variable. They also used multiple regression 
method on the data extracted from annual reports of 57 companies quoted on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange for a period of six (6) years.  The findings show that audit quality exerts 
significant influence on the market price per share of quoted companies in Nigeria. This 
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finding is consistent with that of Wang (2009) and Ardiana (2014) but differ with the 
findings of Bahman, Zahra, and Sacid (2013) when they investigated the value relevance 
of auditor tenure in Tehran Stock Exchange. They sampled 156 listed companies for a 
period of 10 years from 2007 to 2010 using multiple regression analysis approach. They 
used price per share for value relevance and found that long audit tenure has a negative 
impact on the value relevance of firms in Tehran Stock Exchange. Likewise, Hamed, 
Rohaida, Rasid and Mohamed (2015) examine the impact of audit quality on firm 
performance for Malaysian listed companies for the period of 2003 to 2012. They used 
audit firm rotation as proxy for audit quality in this study. Return on assets and Tobin’s Q 
are also used as measures for firm performance. They found that there is insignificant 
relationship between audit quality proxy audit firm rotation and ROA. They also found 
that audit firm rotation is found to be insignificantly and negatively related to Tobin’s 
Q.This finding is not consistent with that of Wang (2009), Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) 
and Ardiana (2014) but with the findings of Bahman, Zahra, and Sacid (2013) 
 
2.4.6 Empirical Studies on Audit Opinion (AOP) and Market Value 
Firth (1978) argues that the quality of the audit firm that audited the financial statements 
does not really matter but the type of audit opinion on the financial statements.  He 
further opines that the type of audit opinion impacts greatly on the share prices and this is 
capable of influencing investors’ decision. Salehi (2010) findings seem to follow on Firth 
(1978) when they emphasize the effectiveness of external auditors’ report on the external 
users with evidence from Iran. In this case, questionnaire usable data were administered 
and collected from different participants using a binomial test in testing the hypotheses. 
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The results reveal that audit report is easily understandable from various stakeholders in 
Iran and it is the cornerstone to investment decisionmaking. More so, a more recent study 
by Aber, Hysen, Skender and Arben (2012) investigates the effect on stock prices of 
announced audited financial statements of Croatia and Slovenia firms. The Study applied 
discriminant analysis and logit models with the type of opinions as dependent variable 
and eleven financial ratios as independent variables. The result shows that auditor 
opinion has an impact on the stock prices.  
 
A research on the effect of financial ratios on auditor opinion in the companies listed on 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) by Rudkhani and Jabbari (2013) found a significant 
relationship between auditor opinion and various financial ratios and one of which is 
market-value ratio. Market-value ratio used for this study is the market price of common 
stock. The study used a discriminant analytical technique to analyze the data of 184 listed 
companies on the TSE for a period of 6 years covering 2005-2010. Robu and Robu 
(2013) analyzed the influence of the audit opinion on the financial statements of the listed 
companies on the investors’ decision in the financial market as it relates to stock 
acquisition or sale, using the ANCOVA regression analysis on the financial reports of the 
59 sampled companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE), during the 2012 
accounting period. The study reveals that the audit opinion expressed in the audit report 
has an important impact on the stock return. This finding is consistent with that of Firth 
(1978), Aber Hysen, Skender and Arben (2012), and Rudkhani and Jabbari (2013).   
Mohamad, Babak and Kamran (2014) examined the impact of qualified audit opinion on 
the expected return on common stock in Tehran Stock Exchange. The study used a 
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sample of 120 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from the period of 2004 to 
2011 and forecasted earnings per share was used as a proxy for expected return on 
common stock. The obtained panel data were analyzed via regression analysis tool and 
found that there is a positive relationship between qualified audit opinion and expected 
return on common stock. Congruently, Ardiana (2014) in evaluating the role of external 
audit in improving firm’s value in Indonesia where audit characteristics comprise of audit 
opinion and firm’s value is measured by price to earnings ratio (P/E), Price to book value 
(P/B) and Tobin’s Q. The study uses 2,240 company-year observations (i.e., 320 
companies for 7years) for 2007-2013 periods. The finding reveals that all the three 
measures of firm’s value are affected by audit opinion.   
Contrary to the findings on audit opinion and market value discussed so far, is the 
findings by Al-Thuneibat, Khamees and Al-Fayoumi (2008) who investigated the effect 
of the qualified audit reports on share prices and returns in Jordan, conducting a market-
based study on the qualified audit reports of the shareholding companies in Jordan during 
the 2000-2005 periods. Their findings reveal that there is no clear or significant effect of 
a qualified audit opinion on share prices and returns. They suggested that the independent 
audit opinion does not have relevant information for the financial market of that 
country.Tahinakis, Mylonakis and Daskalopoulou (2010) examine audit reports issued 
and published for companies with shares on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) during the 
2005-2007 periods using the market model. The study results indicate that audit reports 
have limited informational content for investors and do not form part of their decision 
making process. They further explain that such finding might be explained by lack of 
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understanding for the content, importance and value of such reports. The findings of this 
study were supported by a similar study by Moradi, Salehi, Rigi and Moeinizade (2011).  
Moradi, Salehi, Rigi and Moeinizade (2011) investigate the effect of audit report on the 
prices of shares and returns in Iran Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for a period of five (5) 
years. They make use of regression model and find that qualified audit opinion has no 
significant effect on share prices and returns in Iran. For these researchers, audit opinion 
by quality auditors or non-quality auditors makes no meaning to investors in Iran; 
therefore, they do not appreciate the value content of the audited financial statements 
hence, having no effect on the prices of shares in Iran.Again, Bahman, Zahra, and Sacid 
(2013) investigated the value relevance of the audit report in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
They sampled 156 listed companies for a period of 10 years from 2007 to 2010 using 
multiple regression analysis approach. They used price per share for value relevance and 
found that audit opinion makes no difference in the capital market i.e. audit report is not 
valued in the market. 
Another study from Iran by Shah-hosseini (2014) examines the effect of audit quality on 
the valuation of IPO. The study uses elements of audit quality to consist of audit opinion. 
Adopting a regression model, the result indicates that there is no relationship between the 
type of audit opinion with valuation of shares in IPOs. This finding varies from the study 
of Firth, (1978), and Mohammad, (2012) but is found to be consistent with Moradi, 
Salehi, Rigi and Moeinizade (2011) and Bahman, Zahra, and Sacid (2013) 
These reviewed studies are summarized in the following tables for easy understanding: 
Table 2.2: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Audit Firm Size on the 
Market Value of Firms 
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Name of 
Author (s) 
 
Topic Country Variables Methodology  Findings  
Lin, Liu and 
Wang (2007) 
 
The Market 
Implications of 
Audit Quality 
and Auditor 
Switch: 
Evidence from 
China  
 
China Dependent:  
-Large 
Auditors 
Independent: 
-Earnings 
Response 
Coefficient 
(ERCs) 
 
Regression  Audit 
information 
is valued by 
the market in 
China 
 
Xin, Andre, 
Elaine and  
Hong (2008) 
Audit Quality 
Compensation 
and Initial 
Public Offering 
Underpricing 
 
 
Australia Dependent: 
-Underpricing 
Independent: 
-Big 4 
 
Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) 
Regression 
Audit quality 
(Big 4) 
enhances 
post-issue 
market value 
Yaser, Julia 
and 
Denise(2008) 
The Role of 
Asset 
Reliability and 
Auditor Quality 
in Equity 
Valuation 
Italy  Dependent: 
-Market value 
of equity 
Independent: 
-Market value 
of asset 
-Market value 
of liability 
-Book value of 
asset 
-Liability 
-Earnings 
-Net book 
value 
-Audit quality 
(Big 4) 
 
 
Regression No impact of 
high Audit 
Quality on 
equity value 
Hussainey 
(2009) 
The Impact of 
Audit Quality 
on Earnings 
Predictability  
United 
Kingdom 
(UK) 
Dependent: 
-Stock return 
Independent: 
-Earnings 
Change/period 
-Earnings yield 
(EPS) 
 
Regression Financial 
statement 
audit by Big 
4 auditors 
enhances 
investor 
anticipation 
on further 
earnings of  
firm better 
 
 
Table 2.2 Continue 
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Mark, 
Christopher 
and Woon 
(2009) 
Auditor quality 
and role of 
Accounting 
Information in 
Explaining UK 
Stock Returns  
United 
Kingdom 
(UK) 
Log excess 
returns 
Cash flow 
accrual 
Audit Firm 
Size 
Log 
book/Market 
ratio 
 
 
Orthogonal 
Variance 
Decomposition  
Earnings 
component 
vary 
conditionally 
on Audit 
Quality 
Marjolein 
(2011) 
Restatement 
announcements: 
The effect of 
Audit Quality 
on the Market 
reaction 
Tilburg Dependent: 
-Cumulative 
Market –
adjusted 
Abnormal 
return for 
restating 
(CAR) 
Independent: 
-A firm Size 
(Big 4/Non Big 
4) 
Control: 
-Company Size 
-Leverage 
 
 
Regression Audit 
Quality (Big 
4) has no role 
in market 
reaction  
Mohammed 
(2012) 
Determinants of 
IPO valuation 
in Saudi 
Arabian 
companies  
Saudi 
Arabia 
Dependent: 
-Firms 
Premium 
Independent: 
-Book value of 
firm 
-EPS of firm 
-Debt ratio of 
firm 
Audit size (Big 
and Non Big 4)  
 
 
Regression External 
audit has 
adverse 
effect on 
IPOs 
premium 
Lasse, Hannu 
and Tomi 
(2013) 
Valuation of 
Takeover 
Targets and 
Auditor Quality 
United 
States of 
America 
(USA) 
Dependent: 
-Cumulative  
abnormal 
return (CAR) 
Independent: 
-Auditors 
Characteristics: 
Big-4 
-Target firm 
characteristics 
Multi-variate  
Regression 
Auditor 
quality 
makes small 
impact on the 
market prices 
Table 2.2 Continue 
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-Acquirer firm 
characteristics 
-Deal 
characteristic 
 
 
Hsien and 
Hua (2013) 
Do 4 Big Audit 
firms improve 
the value 
relevance of 
earnings and 
equity? 
Taiwan Dependent: 
-Earnings 
-Book value of 
equity 
Independent: 
-Audit firm 
size (Big 4) 
OLS 
Regression 
Earnings and 
book value 
of firm 
equity 
increases 
where 
financial 
statement are 
audited by 
Big 4 
auditors 
 
 
Bahman, 
Zahra and 
Sacid (2013) 
The Value 
Relevance of 
Audit Report, 
Auditor Type 
and Auditor 
Tenure: 
Evidence from 
Iran 
 
 
Iran Dependent:-
Price per share 
Independent: 
-Auditor type 
Regression Auditor type 
has a positive 
impact in the 
market 
Chen, Bin 
and Xijia 
(2014) 
Effect of 
Auditing: 
Evidence from 
Variability of 
Stock Returns 
and Trading 
Volume. 
China Dependent:-
Stock Price 
Independent: 
-Big-4 auditors 
Regression Investors rely 
more on 
audited 
reports by 
Big-4 
auditors in 
taking their 
investment 
decisions 
 
 
Afza and 
Nazair 
(2014) 
Audit Quality 
and Firm 
Value: A Case 
of Pakistan 
Pakistan Dependent:-
Tobin’s Q 
Independent: 
-Big-4 auditors 
Regression Audit quality 
has a strong 
and 
significant 
positive 
impact on 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Ardiana 
(2014) 
The role of 
external audit in 
Indonesia Dependent: 
-Price to 
Regression  All three 
measures of 
Table 2.2 Continue 
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improving 
firm’s value: 
case of 
Indonesia  
earnings ratio 
-Price to book 
value 
-Tobin’s Q 
Independent: 
-Audit tenure 
-Audit Firm 
size 
-Audit opinion 
 
 
firm value 
are affected 
by the 
various audit 
quality 
characteristic 
Okolie 
(2014) 
Audit firm size 
and market 
price  per share 
of quoted 
companies in 
Nigeria  
Nigeria Dependent: 
-Market Price 
per Share 
Independent: 
-Audit Firm 
Size 
 
Regression  
AFS 
significantly 
influences 
market prices 
per share 
 
 
Okolie and 
Izedonmi 
(2014) 
The Impact of 
Audit Quality 
on the share 
prices of quoted 
companies in 
Nigeria  
Nigeria Dependent: 
- Market Price 
per Share 
Independent: 
-Audit Firm 
Size 
- audit fees 
-audit tenure 
-Degree of 
Audit client 
importance to 
the audit firm 
(ACI). 
 
 
Regression Audit 
Quality exert 
significant 
influence on 
MPS  
Farouk and 
Hassan 
(2014) 
Impact of Audit 
Quality and 
Financial 
Performance of 
Quoted Cement 
Firms in 
Nigeria 
Nigeria Dependent: 
-NPM 
Independent: 
-Audit Fees 
-A size (Big 4) 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
AFS and AI 
have 
significant 
impacts on 
the Firm 
Price of 
quoted 
cement 
companies in 
Nigeria. 
 
 
 
Ahsan, 
Haiyan and 
Donghua 
(2014) 
Audit Quality 
and Market 
Pricing of 
earnings and 
earnings 
China Dependent: 
-Annual 
returns 
Independent: 
-Accruals 
Regression Audit quality 
does not add 
value to 
clients 
market 
Table 2.2 Continue 
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components in 
China 
-Operational 
cash flow 
-Audit quality 
(Big 4) 
 
 
pricing  
Shah-
hosseini 
(2014) 
The Effect of 
Audit quality 
on the valuation 
of stocks in an 
IPO 
Iran Dependent: 
-Pricing 
Independent: 
-Auditor size 
-Auditor 
specialization 
-Amount of 
explanatory 
paragraph ratio 
 
Regression No 
relationship 
between 
AFS, type of 
audit opinion 
with 
valuation of 
share prices  
 
Source: Researcher’s Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Audit Experience 
on the Market Value of Firms 
 
 73 
 
Name of 
Author (s) 
 
Topic Country Variables  Methodology  Findings  
Ziaee (2014) The Effect of 
Audit Quality 
on the 
performance 
of listed 
companies in 
Tehran Stock 
Exchange.  
Iran Dependent: 
-Financial 
performance 
Independent: 
-Period of 
Audit 
-Audit 
reputation 
-Audit 
firmexperience  
 
Correlation  Audit Quality 
could affect 
the financial 
performance 
of companies. 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Audit Industry 
Specialization on the Market Value of Firms 
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Name of 
Author (s) 
 
Topic Country Variables  Methodology  Findings  
Shah-hosseini 
(2014) 
The Effect of 
Audit quality 
on the 
valuation of 
stocks in an 
IPO 
Iran Dependent: 
-Pricing 
Independent: 
-Auditor size 
-Auditor 
specialization 
-Amount of 
explanatory 
paragraph 
ratio 
 
 
Regression there is a 
relationship 
between 
auditor 
specialization 
with shares 
valuation 
Omidfar and 
Moradi 
(2015) 
The effect of 
industry 
specialist on 
auditor’s 
opinion in 
Iran 
Iran Dependent: 
-Audit 
opinion 
Independent: 
-Auditor 
industry 
expertise 
-Audit size 
-Auditor 
switch 
Regression 
 
Auditor 
industry 
specialization 
improve 
quality of 
financial 
information 
on the capital 
market 
 
Source: Researcher’s Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Audit Fees on the 
Market Value of Firms 
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Name of 
Author (s) 
 
Topic Country Variables Methodology  Findings  
Taqi (2013) Consequences 
of Audit 
Quality in 
Signaling 
Theory 
Perspective 
Indonesia Higher fee, 
Good 
reputation, 
Lower 
litigation, 
Higher client, 
Valuation and 
Audit Quality 
 
 
Path Analysis Audit quality 
have an effect 
toward higher 
valuation of 
client  
Zunaidah, 
John, 
Amariah, 
Zuraidah and 
Carl (2013) 
Managerial 
Ownership 
leverage and 
Audit Quality 
impact on 
firm 
performance. 
Evidence 
from the 
Malaysian 
ACE Market  
Malaysia Dependent: 
-Tobin Q (Q-
ratio) 
Independent: 
-Managerial 
ownership 
-Leverage  
-Audit 
Quality: 
Audit Fees 
Control: 
-Firm size 
-Profitability 
 
 
Regression Audit Quality 
has 
significant 
negative 
effect on firm 
performance  
Jusoh and 
Ahmed 
(2014) 
Equity 
ownership, 
Audit quality 
and Firm 
Performance 
in Malaysia, 
using 
Generalized 
least square 
estimations 
technique  
Malaysia Dependent: 
-Return on 
Asset 
-Tobin’s Q 
Independent: 
-Managerial 
ownership 
-Institutional 
ownership 
-Audit 
Quality: 
Audit Fees 
 
 
Generalized 
Least Square 
Estimation  
Technique 
Audit Quality 
affects 
positively 
both 
performance 
indictor 
Antonio 
(2014) 
Association 
between 
Independent 
Auditor Fees 
and Firm 
Value: A 
Study of 
Brazilian 
Public 
Brazil Dependent:    
-Tobin’s Q 
Independent: 
-Audit Fees 
Regression Increase in 
audit fees 
increases 
Tobin’s Q 
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Companies 
 
 
Farouk and 
Hassan 
(2014) 
Impact of 
Audit Quality 
and Financial 
Performance 
of Quoted 
Cement Firms 
in Nigeria 
Nigeria Dependent: 
-NPM 
Independent: 
-Audit Fees 
-A size (Big 
4) 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
AFS and AI 
have 
significant 
impacts on 
the Firm Price 
of quoted 
cement 
companies in 
Nigeria. 
 
 
 
Okolie and 
Izedonmi 
(2014) 
The Impact of 
Audit Quality 
on the share 
prices of 
quoted 
companies in 
Nigeria  
Nigeria Dependent: 
-Market Price 
per Share 
Independent: 
-Audit Firm 
Size 
- audit fees 
-audit tenure 
-Degree of 
Audit client 
importance to 
the audit firm 
(ACI). 
 
 
Regression Audit Quality 
exert 
significant 
influence on 
MPS  
Hamed, 
Rohaida, 
Rasid and 
Mohamed 
(2015) 
The Impact of 
Audit Quality 
on Firms 
Performance: 
Evidence 
from 
Malaysia 
 
Malaysia  Dependent: 
-Audit Firm 
Size 
-Audit Firm 
Rotation  
Independent: 
-Return on 
Assets 
-Tobin’s Q 
 
Regression  There is a 
positive 
relationship 
between audit 
quality and 
firms 
performance   
 
Source: Researcher’s Review 
 
Table 2.6: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Audit Tenure on 
the Market Value of Firms 
 
 
Table 2.5 Continue 
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Name of 
Author (s) 
 
Topic Country Variables Methodology  Findings  
Wang (2009) The Effects of 
Firm Market 
Value on 
Audit Partner 
Tenure and 
Firm 
Profitability. 
Taiwan Dependent: 
-Market 
Value per 
Share 
Independent: 
-Book Value 
per Share 
-Audit partner 
rotation 
Control: 
-Age 
-Growth 
-Leverage 
-Size 
 
 
Regression Audit partner 
rotation exert 
adverse 
reaction on 
the market 
value of firms  
Bahman, 
Zahra and 
Sacid (2013) 
The Value 
Relevance of 
Audit 
Report, 
Auditor 
Type and 
Auditor 
Tenure: 
Evidence 
from Iran 
 
Iran Dependent:-
Price per 
share 
Independent: 
-Audit Tenure 
Regression Long audit 
tenure is has a 
negative 
impact on the 
valued 
relevance of 
firms in the 
market 
Ardiana 
(2014) 
The role of 
external audit 
in improving 
firm’s value: 
case of 
Indonesia  
Indonesia Dependent: 
-Price to 
earnings ratio 
-Price to book 
value 
-Tobin’s Q 
Independent: 
-Audit tenure 
-Audit Firm 
size 
-Audit 
opinion 
 
 
Regression  All three 
measures of 
firm value are 
affected by 
the various 
audit quality 
characteristic 
Okolie and 
Izedonmi 
(2014) 
The Impact of 
Audit Quality 
on the share 
prices of 
quoted 
companies in 
Nigeria Dependent: 
- Market 
Price per 
Share 
Independent: 
-Audit Firm 
Regression Audit Quality 
exert 
significant 
influence on 
MPS  
Table 2.6 Continue 
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Nigeria  Size 
- audit fees 
-audit tenure 
-Degree of 
Audit client 
importance to 
the audit firm 
(ACI). 
 
 
Hamed, 
Rohaida, 
Rasid and 
Mohamed 
(2015) 
The Impact of 
Audit Quality 
on Firms 
Performance: 
Evidence 
from 
Malaysia 
 
Malaysia  Dependent: 
-Audit Firm 
Size 
-Audit Firm 
Rotation  
Independent: 
-Return on 
Assets 
-Tobin’s Q 
 
Regression  There is a 
positive 
relationship 
between audit 
quality and 
firms 
performance   
 
Source: Researcher’s Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Effect of Audit Opinion on 
the Market Value of Firms 
 
Firth, (1978) Qualified 
Audit Reports: 
Their impact 
Iran Dependent: 
-Abnormal 
return 
Regression Audit 
opinion 
impact on 
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on investment 
decisions 
Independent: 
-Types of 
Audit 
qualification 
-Audit firm 
size 
 
 
share prices. 
 
Al-Thuneibat, 
Khamees and 
Al-Fayoumi 
(2008) 
The effect of 
qualified 
auditor’s 
opinion on 
share prices: 
evidences from 
Jordan  
Jordan Dependent: 
-Share prices  
-Return on 
earnings 
Independent: 
-Qualified 
audit report 
 
Regression No 
significant 
effect of a 
qualified 
audit opinion 
on the share 
prices and 
returns  
 
 
Salehi (2010) Evaluating 
effectiveness 
of External  
Auditors 
Report: 
Empirical 
Evidence from 
Iran 
 
 
Iran Questionnaire Binomial 
Test 
Audit Report 
affect 
investment 
decision 
Tahinakis, 
Mylonakis and 
Daskalopoulou 
(2010) 
An appraisal of 
the impact of 
audit 
qualifications 
on firms’ stock 
exchange price 
fluctuations 
 
Greece Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cumulative 
Arithmetic 
Abnormal 
Return 
Audit report 
content 
 
 
Binomial 
Test 
Audit Report 
affect 
investment 
decision 
Moradi, 
Salehi, Rigi 
and 
Moeinizade 
(2011) 
The effect of 
qualified audit 
report on share 
prices and 
returns. 
Evidence from 
Iran 
 
Iran Dependent: 
-Return on 
shares 
Independent: 
-Return on 
market 
portfolio 
 
 
Regression Qualified 
audit opinion 
has no 
significant 
effect on 
share prices 
and return 
Arber, Hysen, 
Skender and 
Arben 
Effect of Audit 
Opinion on 
Stock Prices: 
Europe Dependent: 
-Opinion type  
Independent: 
Discriminant 
Analysis and 
Logit Model   
Audit 
opinion have 
impact on the 
Table 2.7 Continue 
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(2012) The case of 
Croatia and 
Slovenia 
 
-Return on 
assets 
-Liquidity 
ratio 
-Quick ratio 
-Return on 
current assets 
on sales 
-Equity to 
debt ratio  
-Short term 
financial ratio 
-Working 
capital 
percentage on 
total assets 
-Leverage 
ratio 
 
 
market prices  
Bahman, 
Zahra and 
Sacid (2013) 
The Value 
Relevance of 
Audit Report, 
Auditor Type 
and Auditor 
Tenure: 
Evidence 
from Iran 
 
 
Iran Dependent:-
Price per 
share 
Independent: 
-Auditor 
Report 
Regression Audit report 
is not valued 
in the market 
Rudkhani and 
Jabbari (2013) 
Effect of 
financial ratios 
on auditor 
opinion in the 
companies 
listed on 
Tehran stock 
exchange(TSE)  
Iran 
 
Dependent: 
-Market share 
price 
Independent: 
-Auditor 
opinion 
Discriminant 
Analysis 
 
There is 
significant 
relation 
between 
auditor 
opinion and 
market price 
of common 
stock 
 
 
 
Robu and 
Robu (2013) 
The influence 
of the audit 
report on the 
relevance of 
accounting 
information 
reported by 
listed 
Italy 
 
Dependent: 
-Stock return 
Independent: 
-Audit 
opinion 
expressed 
ANCOVA 
regression 
analysis 
Audit 
opinion 
expressed in 
the audit 
report have 
an impact on 
the stock 
return 
Table 2.7 Continue 
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Romanian 
companies.  
 
 
Mohamad, 
Babak and 
Kamran 
(2014) 
Economic 
Consequences 
Qualified 
Audit 
Opinions: 
Evidence from 
Listed 
Companies in 
Tehran Stock 
Exchange 
 
 
Iran Dependent: 
-Forecasted 
Earnings per 
Share 
 Independent: 
-Audit 
Opinion 
 
Regression There is a 
positive 
relationship 
between 
qualified 
audit opinion 
and expected 
return on 
common 
stock 
Ardiana 
(2014) 
The role of 
external audit 
in improving 
firm’s value: 
case of 
Indonesia  
Indonesia Dependent: 
-Price to 
earnings ratio 
-Price to book 
value 
-Tobin’s Q 
Independent: 
-Audit tenure 
-Audit Firm 
size 
-Audit 
opinion 
 
 
Regression  All three 
measures of 
firm value 
are affected 
by the 
various audit 
quality 
characteristic 
Shah-hosseini 
(2014) 
The Effect of 
Audit quality 
on the 
valuation of 
stocks in an 
IPO 
Iran Dependent: 
-Pricing 
Independent: 
-Auditor size 
-Auditor 
specialization 
-Amount of 
explanatory 
paragraph 
ratio 
Regression No 
relationship 
between 
AFS, type of 
audit opinion 
with 
valuation of 
share prices  
 
Source: Researcher’s Review 
On the strength of the summary of empirical works presented in Tables 2.1 to 2.6, a total 
of45 related prior studies were reviewed with some of the studies indicating a positive 
effect of audit quality on the value of the firms and others indicating a negative or no 
effect on firm value. It is observed that three studies out of the positive-effect studies are 
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from Nigeria and no Nigerian study indicates a negative effect or no effect of audit 
quality on firm value. Again, the most popularly used technique in the reviewed studies is 
the regression analysis technique totaling. It may be correct to infer that the differences in 
findings might not be due to the technique used because both positive, negative and/or no 
effect findings made use of this same technique. 
  
2.5  Gap in Literature 
Many empirical works have been carried out on audit quality in Nigeria with focused 
attention on internal audit quality laying emphasis on the audit committee. We also found 
out that much attention has been paid to determinants of audit quality with very scanty 
studies focusing on how the audit quality affects the value of the firms in Nigeria. The 
few studies that consider the effect of audit quality on the firm value in Nigeria used few 
years. This can be seen in the study by Farouk and Hassan (2014) who use only five (5) 
years. Okolie (2014) and Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) also used six (6) years. 
 
Apart from the limited study periods by the Nigerian studies, we also observed that some 
of these studies used very few firms like the use of only cement companies out of the 
whole Industrial Goods Sector (Farouk & Hassan, 2014). Okolie (2014) used as much as 
342 firm-year observations: a cross-section of manufacturing companies listed in 
Nigeria.Again, very few explanatory variables were used in the previous studies for 
independent variables. More so, literature indicated mixed findings in other economies 
but realized that all the reviewed studies in Nigeria reveal that audit quality impacts on 
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market value; we also submit that this results need to bevalidated. This current study has 
filled all these identified gaps by: 
 Extending the study period to 12 years as against five (5) and six (6); 
 Increasing the number of observations to 564 as against 342  
 Adding more variables to the independent variables and 
 Studying a broader section of listed companies  
By doing these, the research has contributed to the extant literature on audit quality and 
its effect on market value in Nigeria.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
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This study investigates the effect of audit quality on the market valuation of listed 
companies in Nigeria. In this regard, the chapter discusses the methodology used in the 
study. It focuses on the research design used for the study. 
 
3.2  Research Design  
This study adopts an ex-post facto research design. This design is used because of its 
relevance in causal research such as this one. It is also used because it is a design that is 
suited for an occasion in which the researcher does not have control over the independent 
variables because the situation necessitating the study already has taken place. This 
design is deemed most apt considering that the study is making use of already existing 
audited financial statements of listed companies in Nigeria. 
 
3.2.1  Population 
The study population covers the entire non-financial companies listed on the floor of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) that remained listed as at the year ended 31st December, 
2015. This brings the study population to a total of 130 companies (See Appendix A1).  
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Sample Size and Sampling Technique 
This study used the following criteria to select the sample: 
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1. The company must have been listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
on or before 1st January, 2004 and stay listed throughout the twelve (12) years 
under study. 
2. The company must not be classified under the financial sector 
3. The company must have complete data values for each financial year covered in 
the study period  
The use of the criteria above produced a sample size of 47 companies listed on the floor 
of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (See Appendix A2). It is believed that the sample size is 
a good representation of the study population. 
 
3.3  Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection  
This study depended basically on secondary data bearing in mind the nature of its design. 
The requisite data on audit quality were extracted from the financial statements especially 
the auditor’s reports, profit and loss accounts, statementsof financial position and notes to 
the accounts as contained in their audited annual reports and accounts for the relevant 
years (12 years- 2004-2015).  
 
Also, the requisite data on the firm valuation were extracted from the published daily 
share prices from the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Some of the audited financial statements 
were obtained from the company’s annual returns that were filed with the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange library while others were collected from the various companies’ website. Other 
data were retrieved from books, journals, and the NSE website.   
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3.4 Techniques of Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis were used to analyze panel data 
obtained for the study.Multiple regressions using the ordinary least square (OLS) method 
was adopted to produce the results of the analysis. OLS was used because it minimizes 
the errors between the actual and observed data in the study 
 
The study first measured and analyzed the market value variables and the audit quality 
variables using data obtained from a cross-section of listed companies in Nigeria. To 
determine the effect of audit quality on the value of firm,the study determined the 
dichotomous variables which include: audit firm size, audit industry specialization, audit 
tenure and audit opinion. The market price per share was obtained and taken directly as 
reported by the Nigerian stock exchange. The various surrogates for audit quality were 
determined as presented in sections 3.2.4.1. 
 
The obtained data were processed using a regression analysis technique with the help of 
SPSS version 21. Microsoft Excel and SPSS were used throughout the study for data 
processing and analysis. ANOVA (analysis of variance: F-test) was used to ascertain 
whether there is significant effect of the different categories of AQ surrogate on the 
market value of companies in Nigeria. ANOVA was selected for its suitability in 
comparing more than two groups of data. It is also more suitable for sample sizes of more 
than 30 (Emaikwu, 2010; Agburu, 2001; Azende, 2011; Akpa, 2011). 
The study applied a 5% level of significance. The decision rule for testing the hypotheses 
was to accept the null hypothesis if the critical value is greater than the calculated T-
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value or reject the null hypothesis if the critical value is less than calculated value of ‘t’, 
respectively. 
To guarantee proper analysis; the sub-sections below identified and defined the variables 
used for the study. The variables are hereby presented: 
 
3.4.1  Variables Identification and Definitions 
Various audit quality and firm valuation surrogates have been used by researchers of 
accounting and finance across the globe. However, this study adopted the following 
variables identified and defined hereunder. 
 
(a) Independent Variables 
This section presents the independent variables adopted in this study. The independent 
variable used for the study is audit quality. The variables for audit quality are identified 
and defined as follows: 
 
1. Audit Quality Variables 
In as much as a variety of proxies for audit quality has been used in several empirical 
works earlier reviewed, the study adopted the following variables to proxy for audit 
quality as applied in this study:. 
i. Audit Firm Size  
This is an audit quality proxy that measures audit competence. Audit firm size measures 
whether a client’s financial statement is audited by a large company or by a small 
company. In this case the big audit firms are called the ‘Big 4’. For the purpose of this 
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study, the Big 4 accounting firms include; Akintola Williams Deloitte, Ernest and Young 
Nigeria, KPMG Nigeria and Price Water House Coopers. Auditing done by Big 4 audit 
firm is assumed to be of a better quality than that done by the non-Big 4 firms. 
 
The study made use of dichotomous values. To obtain the values for audit firm size the 
study assumes value of “1” if company is audited by any of the Big 4 and “0” if 
otherwise (DeAngelo, 1981; Okolie,2014).    
 
ii. Audit Experience 
This is another audit quality surrogate that explains audit competency. Audit experience 
relates to how long the auditor works. Several researches opine that audit expertise will 
increase with more experience in doing audit task leading to better audit quality (Suyono, 
2012). Audit experience is developed as follows: age of an audit firm (Minute-Meza, 
2010; Suyono, 2012). Age of audit firm is accepted by this study for calculating audit 
experience on the basis that no company can be and remain in existence over time if it is 
not in successful operation. We therefore believe that an audit firm that has been in 
operation for a number of years must have acquired much experience in performing audit 
task hence, leading to better audit quality.   
 
iii. Auditor’s Industry Specialization 
The formula used to calculate auditor industry market share for this study is as used by 
Jiang, Jeny-Cazavan and Audousset- Coulier (2012) and Minutti-Meza (2010). The 
formula is presented as; 
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𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑘 =
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑖𝑘
𝑖=1
 
Where: 
𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑘 = Market share of audit firm i for industry 𝑘 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 = Number of clients of firm (j) audited by audit firm (i) in industry (k) respectively.   
i = an index of auditors 
j = an index of clients firm 
k = an index of clients industry 
ik = number of auditors in industry 
jik = number of clients audited by auditor i in industry  
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1  = The sum of the number of client j in industry k audited by auditor i  
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑖𝑘
𝑖=1  = The sum of the number of client j in industry k audited by all other 
auditors i in industry k 
NOC = Number of client 
MSNOC = Market share of the number of client in industry k 
In this case the formula is recast as  
𝑀𝑆𝑁𝑂𝐶 =
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1
∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑖𝑘
𝑖=1
 
 
This current study adopts 𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑘  measure to include number of clients audited by auditor i 
in industry k deflated by the total clients audited by all auditors in industry k. MSNOC is 
measured as the number of clients served by an auditor in a specific industry scaled by 
the number of clients served by all auditors in the same industry. 
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O’keefe and Gaver (1994) posit that the use of number of clients in industry is an 
adequate surrogate for auditor’s industry specific knowledge. The number of clients is 
adopted because Omidfar and Moradi (2015) in their view about auditor industry 
specialization emphasize that auditor industry specialization must be active in the 
industry and the number of clients audited in the industry shows the level of activeness of 
the auditor in such industry. 
To assign auditor industry specialist, a cutoff ratio is calculated as 
  1 (𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 1)     
4(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠)
× (1 + 20%) 
This equals to 30% (Jiang, Jeng- Cazavan & Andousset – Coulier, 2012) 
Therefore an audit firm will be considered as audit industry specialist if it has market 
share up to 30% and above. Thus assign ‘1’ where audit firm has ≥30 and ‘0’ if 
otherwise.   
 
iv. Audit Fees  
This is the fee that a company is expected to pay to an external auditor for performing 
audit and assurance services. This is a proxy for audit quality that can easily impair 
auditor’s independence. It is measured as the natural log of the audit fees paid by the 
company (Palmrose, 1988; Li & Lin, 2005; Okolie, 2014). The use of the natural log is 
for the transformation of large numbers to enable apt analysis. 
 
v. Audit Tenure  
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This is another surrogate for audit quality that can influence auditor’s independence. It 
explains the length of audit firm-client relationship as of the fiscal year end covered by 
the audited financial statements (Adeyemi, Okpala & Dabor, 2012). It is believed that the 
length of auditor-client relationship can impair the independence of the auditor in its 
opinion while others believe that long audit tenure will improve audit quality. This 
disparity in views about audit tenure brings about the inclusion of this proxy in this study. 
It is obtained thus: assume ‘1’ if the audit firm auditsthe company for up to and more 
than three years and ‘0’ if otherwise.      
 
vi. Audit Opinion 
This expresses the independence of an auditor as to whether it is reporting exactly what 
has been audited. It can either be qualified or unqualified audit report (Hayes, Dassen, 
Schilder& Wallage 2005). To obtain this variable we assume ‘1’ if opinion is unqualified 
(clean report) and ‘0’ if opinion is qualified (unclean report). (Minutti-Meza, 2010; 
Ardiana, 2014) 
 
(b)  Dependent Variable 
This section identifies and defines the dependent variable for the study. The dependent 
variable used is market value 
2.  Market-Value Variable 
This study adopts market price per share as market-value variable; 
 
i. Market Price per Share 
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For the purpose of this study, market price per share is maintained as the market value of 
the company stock per share at the end of the year. The market price per share at the end 
of the year is most preferred in this study because it allows for overcoming of the use of 
data that may be reflecting outdated valuation as inherent in the use of book values. 
Again, since the financial statements presents the state of the company at the end of the 
year it is therefore pertinent to use the price of the shares at the last trading day of the 
financial year as it also tell the value of the company at the end of the year in spite of 
whatever the company has been through in the financial year. 
 
3.4.2  Model Specification      
The study adopted models used by Zunaidah, John, Amariah, Zuraidah and Carl (2013); 
Okolie (2014); Okolie and Izedonmi (2014); Shah-hosseini (2014) and Jusoh and Ahmed 
(2014) with little modifications to suite the current study’s need. The adoption of their 
model with slight modification is bases on the point that these studies are similar to this 
current study as such used variables that are similar as well hence; we infer that the 
adoption of their model with little modification based on the study variables should not 
be out of place. The model for the study is hereunder presented. 
 
 
MPS= f (AQ) 
MPS = f (AFS, AF, AT, AIS, AOP, AE) 
 
Where; 
 93 
 
f  = Function of 
MV= Market Value 
MPS= market price per share  
AQ=Audit Quality 
AFS= Audit Firm Size 
AF=Audit Fees 
AT= Audit Tenure  
AIS= Audit Industry Specialization  
AOP= Audit Opinion 
AE= Audit Experience  
 Using the multiple regression analysis technique, this model was reconstructed for 
the study as follows: 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1AFS𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2AF𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3AT𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4AIS𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5AOP𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6AE𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒  
 
 Where; 
𝛽0 = the constant 
𝛽1, 𝛽2 … 𝛽6  = the regression coefficients  
e  =the error term 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA PRESENTATION,ANALYSIS ANDDISCUSSIONS OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction  
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This chapter presents data collected from the annual reports of the 47listed non-
financialcompanies on theNigerianStock Exchange, and the prices of these companies’ 
shares for the period 2004-2015.Collected data are on the audit firm size, audit 
experience, audit industry specialization, audit fees, audit tenure, audit opinion and share 
price: These data so collected were analyzed using multiple linear regression technique. 
In order to answer the research questions, the research hypotheses were also tested. 
4.2 Data Presentation and Analysis 
This section presents data collected from the 47listed non-financialcompanies used for 
the study. The raw data are presented in appendix B1 while the processed data using 
Microsoft Excel are presented in appendix B2. 
This section also analyzes the obtained data with the help of SPSS version 21. Multiple 
regression using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method was adopted to produce the 
results of the analysis. The analysis of these data is presented in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Validity Test  
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For both reliability and validity of results obtained via the regression analyses, the 
following tests were duly conducted: (1) test for collinearity, (2) correlation, (3) test for 
normality and (4) Fishers Statistics 
First, is the test for collinearity using the collinearity statistics: Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and Tolerance Value are usually the two measures used for determining 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. That is; these techniques explain 
whether the independent variables are so correlated to the point of distorting the results. 
Where the VIF of all independent variables are less than 10, multicollinearity does not 
exist. Also, the tolerance values that explains existence of multicollinearity is said to 
signify multicollinearity where tolerance value is greater or equal to 1 (≥ 1) (Berenson & 
Levine, 1999; Farouk & Hassan, 2014). 
 Table 4.1 Test for Collinearity 
Variables Tolerance VIF 
AFS 0.56 1.71 
AE 0.94 1.07 
AIS 0.79 1.27 
AF 0.65 1.53 
AT 0.94 1.06 
AOP 0.97 1.03 
F(6,557)=68.84, p=0.000  
 Source: Results of Analysis via SPSS v 21 
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Table 4.1 reveals that VIF obtained from the regression result for all the independent 
variables are consistently less than 10 (AFS=1.71<10; AE=1.07<10; AIS=1.27<10; 
AF=1.53<10; AT=1.06<10 and AOP=1.03<10). Hence, there is an absence of multi-
collinearity problem among the independent variables under investigation. 
In addition, the tolerance values are also less than 1. The independent variables tolerance 
values are AFS =0.59, AE =0.94, AIS =0.79, AF = 0.65, AT = 0.94 and AOP = 0.97; 
evidently, all these values are less than 1. This has further complemented the results from 
VIF and as well shows a complete absence of multi-collinearity between variables. 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation Analysis of the Study Variables 
Variables MPS AFS AE AIS AF AT AOP 
MPS 1.000       
AFS 0.447*** 1.000      
AE -0.057 0.106*** 1.000     
AIS 0.313*** 0.418*** 0.216*** 1.000    
AF 0.591*** 0.567*** 0.152*** 0.311*** 1.000   
AT 0.107*** 0.153*** -0.004 0.001 -0.029 1.000  
AOP 0.093*** 0.15 -0.105*** -0.022 -0.040 0.122*** 1.000 
Source: Based on Field data 
*** = Significant at 5% 
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Again, the results of the correlation as presented in Table 4.2 further validate the results 
of this study as there is no high positive or negative correlation among both the 
dependent and independent variables. The P-P Plots and the histogram obtained from the 
data processing of this study indicate that the data are normally distributed and further 
concretize the validity of results obtained from these data (See Appendix D). 
Furthermore, the Fishers Statistics (F-Stat) of 68.84 which is significant at 1% (See Table 
4.1) indicates that the MPS model is best fit implying that, the results of this study can be 
relied upon with the full assurance that it measures what it purports to measure namely, 
the effect of audit quality on the market value of non-financial companies listed in 
Nigeria.       
 
4.2.2 Descriptive Analysis 
This section presents the result from the descriptive statistics analysis in Table 4.3 as 
follows. 
Table 4.3:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
AFS 
AE 
AIS 
AF 
AT 
AOP 
MPS 
Valid N 
564 
564 
564 
564 
564 
564 
564 
564 
0.00 
3.00 
0.00 
2.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
1.00 
64.00 
1.00 
5.28 
1.00 
1.00 
1200 
0.66 
34.47 
0.65 
3.91 
0.87 
0.93 
40.37 
0.47 
18.80 
0.48 
0.52 
0.34 
0.25 
96.45 
Source: Extract from Results Analyzed via SPSS v 21 
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 Table 4.3 shows that the mean of MPS is 40.37 with a fluctuation of about 96.45; this 
indicates that non-financial companies listed  in Nigeria operate at a mean market value 
of ₦40.37 with likely variations of about ₦96.45k. The fluctuation is higherthan the 
mean value implying that the MPS of the companies under study is low. 
AFS has a mean value of 0.66 with a standard deviation of 0.47. AFS of about 66 percent 
indicates that on the average, about 70 percent of the companies in the study are audited 
by the Big-4 audit firms. The standard deviation of 0.47 is an indication that there is a 
considerable cluster of firm choices around the Big-4 and that most studied companies 
are audited by Big-4 with low variation of only 0.47 of companies not audited by Big-4 
auditors.  
AE has a mean value of 34.47 and a deviation of 18.80. This is an indication that most of 
the firms studied are audited by experienced auditors with a little variation of 
inexperienced auditors who have audited the financial reports in the data used for the 
study. 
AIS is found to have a mean value of 0.65 meaning that about 65 percent of companies 
under study were audited by auditors who are said to be industry specialist. The standard 
deviation of about 48percent is an indication that few of the companies in this study were 
audited by non-AIS. If there is any assertion that AIS are better auditors then, we expect 
that the audit by these AIS is of quality and is capable of giving a signal to the market 
thereby improving the value of firms audited by them. 
AF is observed to have a mean of ₦3.9 million with a deviation of ₦0.52 million 
meaning that on the average, a number of studied companies pay high audit fees with few 
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companies paying less than a million in a year of observation in the study. If high audit 
fees relate with high audit quality which improves market value then, we should be 
expecting a robust result on the regression coefficient of AF since most companies 
included in this study pay high audit fees as indicated by the result in Table 4.3.  
AT is also an independent variable in this study that is observed to have a mean value of 
0.87 and a deviation of 0.34. This indicates that most of the companies selected for this 
study have auditors that audited the companies’ financial statements for up to and over 3 
years. The result shows that about 87 percent of the studied companies are in the category 
of long term audit, that is, long audit tenure. If longer audit tenure implies improved audit 
quality then, the result from the regression that should determine the effect of AT on the 
market value will certainly indicate a positive effect if audit tenurereally affects market 
value. 
AOP also presents a mean value of 0.93 and a standard deviation of 0.25; this shows that 
over 93 percent of companies in this study obtained a clean (unqualified) audit report 
with a mild variation of 25 percent suggesting a considerable clustering of AOP around 
the mean. We therefore assume that there is a possibility that the result will affect the 
market value as clean audit report is supposed to give a signal of good financial position 
to the market. 
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4.2.3 Correlation Analysis 
Presented in Table 4.4 is the result of correlation among the set of variables used in the 
study. 
 
Table 4.4: Correlation Results 
Variables MPS AFS AE AIS AF AT AOP 
MPS 1.000       
AFS 0.447*** 1.000      
AE -0.057* 0.106*** 1.000     
AIS 0.313*** 0.418*** 0.216*** 1.000    
AF 0.591*** 0.567*** 0.152*** 0.311*** 1.000   
AT 0.107*** 0.153*** -0.004 0.001 -0.029 1.000  
AOP 0.093*** 0.15 -0.105*** -0.022 -0.040 0.122*** 1.000 
Valid N 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
Source: Based on Field data 
*** = Significant at 5% 
 
 
Table 4.4 presents the relationship between the variables of the study. The result shows a 
very low correlation amongst variables generally; indicating that there is no problem of 
high correlation among variables: whether positive or negative correlation. The result 
further shows a positive correlation between the dependent variable, MPS and AFS, AIS, 
AF, AT and AOP. This positive correlation shows a strong relationship between the 
dependent variable and AFS, AIS, AF, AT and AOP. These strong relationships are 
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significant at 1 percent. The relationship between MPS and AE seems to be weak as the 
table shows a negative correlation between them. The table further indicates that this 
weak relationship is not significant at 5 percent but at 10 percent 
Note that the positive and/or negative correlation here does not necessarily mean that 
there is a negative relationship between variables; rather it explains the strength of the 
relationship. The establishment of a positive or negative relationship can only be 
ascertained through the inferential statistics and the test of hypotheses.However, drawing 
from the fact that 5 of 6 independent variables overall shows a strong relationship with 
the dependent variable, it is therefore pertinent to conclude that there is a strong 
relationship between audit quality and market value.          
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4.2.4 Regression Analysis 
The main tool used to analyze data for this study was the regression analysis. The result 
of regression analysis is presented in Table 4.5 and 4.6 as follows: 
 
Table 4.5: Model Summary 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
    R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 0.653a 0.426 0.420 0.426 68.842 6 557 0.000 
a Predictors: (Constant), AOP, AFS, AE, AT, AIS, AF  
   Source: Results of Analysis via SPSS v 21 
 
 
Table 4.5 presents the summary result that shows a relationship between AQ and MPS. 
This result shows a relationship between them.  The table shows that there is a strong 
positive relationship of 65.3 percent between AQ and MPS.  An R2 of 0.426 also 
indicates that about 43 percent of the variations in MPS can be explained by the 
variability in AFS, AE, AIS, AF, AT and AOP while about 57 percent is accounted by 
factors outside this study. The result of the regression indicates that other factors than AQ 
contribute to most of the variations in the market value of firms, here represented by 
MPS.  These other factors may be the size of the organization itself, its capital structure, 
liquidity, profitability, government interference (law), SEC and CBN guidelines amongst 
other may have an effect on the market value of firms in Nigeria.   
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Table 4.6: Regression Coefficients 
 β t-test P-Value  
Constant 
AFS 
AE 
AIS 
AF 
AT 
AOP 
-2.07 
0.087 
-0.170 
0.151 
0.527 
0.098 
0.086 
 -7.89 
  2.061 
 -5.119 
  4.186 
 13.261 
  2.973 
  2.649 
0.000 
0.040 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.003 
0.008 
 
R2=0.426, F(6,557)=68.84, p=0.000 
Source: Results of Analysis via SPSS v 21 
 
Table 4.6presents the regression result determining the effect of AQ variables on the 
market value explained by MPS. The coefficients of the various variables explain or 
describe the effect of each independent variable on the market value. 
The result indicates that if AQ is not a factor to consider in the value of firm, MPS will 
significantly reduce by 2.07 units occasioned by factors outside this study. The result also 
indicates that if a company is audited by a Big 4 auditor, it will significantly cause an 
increasing effect on the MPS by 8.7 percent. We therefore, infer that since the Big- 4 
audit firms are well known and have gained reputation for audit quality; an audit by them 
will impact on the market value (MPS) of companies audited by them.   
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On the contrary, an increase in audit by an experienced auditor (AE) will reduce MPS 
significantly by 17 percent. This seems to contradict the principles of learning curve 
(experience curve) which state that the more one does a thing the more they get better at 
it. If continuous audit is supposed to earn audit quality for such an auditor then where the 
audit quality is transmitted to the market it should increase the clients’ market value but 
this seems not to be upheld by our result. Hence, we are of the opinion that it is not just 
how long an auditor does the work but how well he understand the special industrial 
issues in his clients’ industry. 
The result further explains that an increase in AIS will significantly increase MPS by 
15.1 percent. From the results presented in Table 4.1 we observed that if industry 
specialist auditors are better auditors then, we expect that the audit by these AIS is of 
quality and is capable of giving a signal to the market thereby improving the value of 
firms audited by them. This finding tends to validate this assertion.  
Likewise, the result indicates that an increase in AF will significantly increase MPS by 
52.7 percent. It means that if all other factors are held constant, and AF is increased by a 
level, it will significantly increase MV with about 53 percent. This result is in line with 
assertions that AF explains high audit quality and that consumers in recognizing that 
more AF improves audit quality therefore are prepared to pay higher fees in order to 
receive the services.  Therefore, it is found in this study that even if another Naira is 
added to AF, it will have a significant increasing effect on MV. 
It is noticed that an increase in AT will significantly increase MPS by 9.8 percent. This 
indicates that the more an auditor continues to audit a client the better for the clients’ 
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market value because the longer audit tenure allows the auditors to know their clients’ 
internal control and accounting system better; it also allow for increased knowledge in 
specific industry which makes it easier for the auditors to fight earnings management and 
other irregularities in clients financial reporting process. This knowledge gained as a 
result of long audit tenure leads to increased market value. 
 
Table 4.6 also indicates that an increase in AOP will significantly increase MPS by 8.6 
percent. This means that more of unqualified audit opinion will consequently increase 
market price per shares.  
 
4.2.5 Test of Hypotheses  
The hypotheses formulated for the study were hereby tested in this section using the t-
values and p-values produced by SPSS output. Table 4.6 presents the calculated ‘T’ 
values which are used to compare the critical infinity value of t which is ±1.96.  This 
gives the region of acceptance and rejection to enable decision making based on the 
decision rule presented in chapter three: Accept or reject the null hypothesis if the critical 
value is greater or less than the calculated value, respectively. (i.e. Accept Ho if ±1.96> t-
cal. and Reject Ho if ±1.96< t-cal.). These hypotheses are tested in this section and 
presented as follows: 
Ho1: Audit Firm Size (AFS) has no significanteffect on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
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Table 4.6 presents the result for testing this hypothesis. It shows that t-cal. for AFS is 
2.061 with P-value of (p=0.040). The t-cal. is less than t-critical and the p-value is less 
than 0.05. This means that AFS has a significant effect on the MV of Nigerian listed non-
financial companies.  We therefore reject the null hypothesis. 
Ho2: Audit Experience (AE) does not have significant effect on market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
Table 4.6 presents the result for the test of this hypothesis given t-cal. value to be -5.119 
as against -1.96 of t tabulated.  Since the t-cal. is less than t-critical and the p-value is less 
than 0.05 (the P-value of 0.0005 shows a 1% level of significance); we therefore reject 
the null hypothesis that AE has a significant effect on MV of listed non-financial 
companies in Nigeria.  
Ho3: Auditor Industry Specialization (AIS) has no significant effect on market 
value of Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
4.186 represents the calculated t for AIS in Table 4.6 with P-value = 0.0005. The t-cal. is 
less than t-critical and the p-value is less than 0.05. Since the acceptance rule is to accept 
the null hypothesis where 1.96 > calculated value; we therefore reject the null hypothesis 
and we state that AIS has a significant effect on MV of listed non-financial companies. 
Ho4: Audit Fee (AF) has no significant effecton market value of Nigerian listed 
non-financial companies  
Table 4.6 above also presents result for testing Ho2.  We note that the values of t-cal. and 
P-value stand at 13.261 and 0.0005 respectively. Since the t-cal. is less than t-critical and 
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the p-value is less than 0.05, wereject the null hypothesis. This means that there is a 
significant effect of AF on MV of Nigerian listed non-financial companies. 
 
Ho5: Audit Tenure (AT) does not have significant effect on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
We can deduce from Table 4.6 that the t cal. of 2.973is higher than the tabulated 1.96 and 
P-value of 0.003 is also less than 0.05 (±1.96< 2.973; 0.03< 0.05). This also presents us 
with a situation of rejecting the null hypothesis; we therefore state that AT has a 
significant effect on MV of listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. 
 
Ho6: Audit Opinion (AOP) does not have significant effect on the market value of 
Nigerian listed non-financial companies 
Table 4.6 again presents the result of the test of this hypothesis. Here, we find the value 
of t cal. for AOP to be 2.645 with a P-value that is equal to 0.008. That is, the t-cal. is less 
than t-critical and the p-value is less than 0.05 (1.96< 2.645 and 0.008< 0.05).  This result 
presents us with all it takes to reject the null hypothesis and then state that AOP has a 
significant effect on MV of listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. 
The result of the test of hypotheses for this study presents a one-way result where all the 
null hypotheses are rejected. By implication, we can say that AQ proxied by AFS, AE, 
AIS, AF, AT and AOP have a significant impact on MV of the listed non-financial 
companies in Nigeria with AE having a significant negative effect and all other proxies 
indicating a positive significant effect.   
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4.2.6 Discussion of Findings 
On the strength of the regression result and analysis thereupon in the preceding section, it 
can be inferred that all the independent variables significantly affect the market value of 
listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. Admittedly, the impacts are not in one 
direction. This result is now discussed in detail in this section.  
 
4.2.6.1  Discussion of Findings on Audit Firm Size (AFS) and Market Value 
AFS (Audit Firm Size) shows that if all the other variables are held constant and there is 
an addition of one more unit to AFS, it will cause a significant positive effect of about 9 
percent on market value. That is, an audit by the Big-4 auditors result in higher impact on 
the MV of firms audited by them. This finding tends to follow the assertion by De 
Angelo (1981) that large audit firms have less incentive to behave opportunistically and 
because they have more wealth and more valuable reputation which they are assumed to 
guard, hence ensuring audit quality. Having said that, stakeholders appear to believe that 
large audit firms perform better and therefore assuring higher audit quality. Thus, this 
presumed audit quality by the Big-4 auditors as per our findings has an influence on the 
price of shares in the market. Some researchers such as Imhoff (1988) are however of the 
opinion that the large auditor firms do not really possess audit quality but perceived 
quality due to their reputation. Whether it is a real or perceived audit quality, our finding 
shows that an audit by the Big-4 audit firms sends signals to the market and further 
positively influence the market price per share of non-financial companies listed in 
Nigeria. This finding is consistent with the findings of Okolie (2014), Farouk and Hassan 
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(2014), Ardiana (2014) and Jusoh and Ahmad (2014) but differs from the findings of 
Yaser, Julia and Denise (2008), Shah-hosseini (2014), Marjolein (2011), Mohammed 
(2012) and Ahsan, Haiyan and Donghua (2014) who find that AFS has an adverse effect 
on market value. This difference in findings may be as a result of the differences in 
location and market of study as the studies in Nigeria agrees with this current findings. 
 
4.2.6.2  Discussion of Findings on Audit Experience (AE) and Market Value 
AE (Audit Experience) on the other hand shows a significant negative effect on the MV 
of non-financial companies studied in Nigeria. The regression result shows that an 
additional unit of AE will reduce MPS by 17 percent meaning that the experience of an 
auditor does not count in the market as it is possible that an audit firm can be in operation 
for years but may be inexperienced in some specific areas hence, may be unable to 
deliver well in such specific and special areas. This is possible as AIS shows a positive 
impact on MV as against AE. It therefore implies that it does not really matter how long 
an audit firm remains in operation but how well they are able to understand the clients’ 
financial environment. This finding is not consistent with the study by Ziaee (2014) as 
they found a very strong relationship between audit experience and firm performance. 
This difference may be accounted for by the difference in the dependent variable, method 
of data collection (questionnaire) and the location of study (Iran). This study expanded on 
prior studies by utilizing AE as audit quality proxy to determine if it has any effect on the 
market value of companies audited by experienced auditors and found that AE has a 
negative effect on the market value of non-financial companies listed in Nigeria. 
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4.2.6.3  Discussion of Findings on Audit Industry Specialization (AIS) and Market 
Value 
AIS (Auditor Industry Specialization) is another proxy for audit quality used in this 
study. The regression result also indicates that if other variables are held constant and 
AIS is increased by a unit, it will positively affect the market value by about 15 percent. 
This positive effect is statistically significant. This impliedly means that an audit by 
industry specialist (AIS) affects the market value of such firms audited by them. Industry-
specialist auditors are believed to be better auditors because they easily identify the 
problem areas in the specific industry and plan better audit towards such areas since they 
are used to and understand better the accounting information system in that specific 
industry. They are therefore known to be capable of enhancing the likelihood of 
discovering and reporting errors thereby possessing the ability of sending good signals to 
the market on the value of the stock of companies audited by them (AIS). This assertion 
is also upheld by the findings of this study to the effect that AIS is capable of increasing 
MPS by 15 percent; that is, AIS has a significant positiveeffect on MV. This submission 
is in accordance with the findings of Shah-hosseini (2014) and Omidfar and Maradi 
(2015). 
 
4.2.6.4  Discussion of Findings on Audit Fees (AF) and Market Value 
AF (Audit Fee) is another independent variable in this study. It impacts positively on the 
market value by about 53 percent. This positive effect is a statistically significant impact. 
AF presents the highest impact on market value in this study. It suggests that more or 
 111 
 
high AF indicates high audit quality because good auditors will charge fees that will 
cover their above average cost incurred to be able to produce a service of above average 
quality. Consequently, stakeholders perceive audit quality in high audit fees; this 
assertion reflected in our finding that a naira addition to AF will increase MPS of non-
financial companies listed in Nigeria significantly. This finding is not consistent with that 
of Zunaidah, John, Amariah, Zuraidah, and Carl, (2013) and Okolie (2014) where they 
found that AQ proxied by AF had a negatively significant effect on firm performance 
proxied by TQ. Impliedly, the reason for this variation in findings may be in the 
difference in the dependent variables in the case of the study by Zunaidah, John, 
Amariah, Zuraidah, and Carl, (2013) and possibly, the study period and number of 
observations in the study by Okolie (2014). We also discovered that this study’s finding 
is consistent with that of Taqi (2013) and Farouk and Hassan (2014). 
 
4.2.6.5  Discussion of Findings on Audit Tenure (AT) and Market Value 
Some say that the length of audit tenure (AT) can impair on the auditor’s objectivity and 
independence hence jeopardizing audit quality and possibly reduce the market value of 
firms audited on long audit tenure (Haboya & Ohiokha, 2014). We found that if AT is 
increased by a period, it will significantly increase MV by 9.8 percent (i.e, about 10 
percent). This finding seems to postulate that stakeholders in Nigeria agree with the 
assertion that ‘the longer the AT the better’ they know their client’s internal control and 
accounting system. That is to say, the more they increase in expertise in specific industry, 
the easier it becomes to discover and fight all forms of irregularities in their clients’ 
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financial reporting process. This is thus received well in the market as a signal of audit 
quality and it positively affects the prices of shares.Our finding is consistent with that of 
Okolie and Izedonmi (2014) and Ardiana (2014) who also found that AT significantly 
exerts a positive influence on MV. Wang (2009) also finds that prompt rotation of auditor 
has an adverse effect on the market value of firms. 
 
4.2.6.6  Discussion of Findings on Audit Opinion (AOP) and Market Value 
AOP (Audit Opinion) is also one of the independent variables used in the study. The 
regression result on AOP that if other variables are held constant and AOP is increased 
by a unit, it will positively affect the market value by 8.6 percent. This means that, audit 
opinion has a positive effect on MV. This finding implies that stakeholders rely on audit 
opinion as being independent and objective thus increasing the credibility of the financial 
statements audited. Consequently, the MPS is significantly affected by the nature of 
opinion issued. Here, the result suggests that the more the unqualified audit opinion, the 
higher the positive effect on the MPS. This finding is consistent with the findings from 
Firth (1978); Rudekhani and Jabbari (2013); Robu and Robu (2013) but differs from the 
findings in the study of Al-thuneibat, Khamees and Al-Fayoumi (2008) and Shah-
hosseini (2014). 
On the whole, it can be deduced that audit quality surrogated by AFS, AE, AIS, AF, AT 
and AOP in a combined effort towards improving the market value of companies under 
study accounted for about 43 percent of the variation in MPS, with AF having the highest 
positive effect and AE having a significant negativeeffect on MPS.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The effect of audit quality on the market value of listed non-financial companies in 
Nigeria was empirically analyzed in chapter four.  Deriving from the result analysis, the 
findings obtained are summarized thus:  
Audit quality proxied by AFS, AIS, AF, AT and AOP is found to have a positive effect 
on market value proxied by MPS. We also found that AE (another proxy of AQ) has a 
negative effect on market value. However, the study also found that there is a positive 
relationship between audit quality and market value and the strength of this relationship 
is as high as 65.3 percent.  
The study also found that the r2 is 43% meaning that AQ accounts for about 43 percent of 
the variations in MV of non-financial companies listed in Nigeria. 
The test of hypotheses also shows that AQ has a significant positive effect on market 
value of listed non-financial companies in Nigeria except for AE which indicates a 
significant negative effect. 
The test of significance also reveals that all the results obtained are significant at 1 
percent except for AFS which is significant at 5 percent; this is also within the tolerance 
level for this study.  
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5.2 Conclusion  
This study has examined and documented evidences on the effect of audit quality 
on market value of listed non-financial companies in Nigeria. The study used 564 
company-year observations from 2004 to 2015, proxied audit quality by six variables 
(viz, AFS, AE, AIS, AF, AT, and AOP) and market value by MPS for the purpose of 
robustness. A multiple regression was conducted and the result shows that AFS, AIS, AF, 
AT, and AOP affects market value positively. On the other hand, AE effect on the market 
value is negatively significant.We hereby conclude that, audit quality significantly relates 
with market value and substantially affects the market value of listed non-financial 
companies in Nigeria positively. This conclusion is substantive where audit quality is 
proxied by Audit Firm Size, AE, Audit Industry Specialization, Audit Fees, Audit 
Tenure, and Audit Opinion Type. This conclusion is also validated by the result of the r2 
which presents a combined effectof all the independent variable/surrogates (AFS, AE, 
AIS, AF, AT, and AOP) on the dependent variable (market value).    
 
5.3  Policy Implication from the Result 
The result and findings of this study present implications for regulators such as SEC, 
FRC and professional accounting bodies like ICAN and ANAN.  
First, regulators should be able to adjust policies on audit tenure, rotation and switch to 
allow an auditor stay longer on a particular company in order to achieve AIS which by 
our results has shown to have a positive effect on market value of audited companies. 
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Again, policies that can give a limit on audit fees should not be entertained since more 
fees seem to translate into audit quality. 
Furthermore, the regulatory bodies should endeavour to do their supervisory task well by 
ensuring that audit reports/opinions reflect the true state of the financial statements 
especially where it is audited by the Big-4 auditors so as to justify the fees paid and the 
said industry specialization they possess. 
To be able to insist on audit quality that will continually impact on the value of the 
companies’ shares in the market, these regulatory and professional bodies should have 
sanctions and disciplinary penalties like temporal suspension and total withdrawal of 
operating license from auditors/audit firms that tend to mar audit quality by giving wrong 
audit opinion in Nigeria generally.  
 
5.4  Recommendations 
Based on the findings and the conclusions drawn from the study, the following 
recommendations are made.  
Companies in Nigeria should endeavour to encourage joint audit where there will be a 
combination of the services of the Big-4 audit firms and the non Big-4 audit firms: as 
services rendered by the Big-4 tend to positively affect the market value of firms audited 
by them and the smaller audit firms will also learn from the Big-4 firms to ensure quality 
on their part. 
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Again, auditor industry specialization should be encouraged by the regulatory bodies 
through formulation of laws that will have to inspire auditor industry specialization since 
it is capable of ensuring audit quality; this is perceived by and it’s translated into better 
value of firms in the market. 
Also, high AF should not be discouraged as high audit fees seem like an incentive that 
motivates auditors to ensure AQ which also positivelyaffects the value of listed non-
financial companies in Nigeria. 
Frequent audit tenure rotation or switch should be discouraged by the regulatory bodies 
via extension of mandatory audit years as a long stay in audit service to a company aids 
audit quality which this study finds to have a positive effect on the market value of non-
financial companies listed in Nigeria. 
Auditors should be independent when issuing an opinion as the type of opinion issued 
seems to have an impact on a sensitive aspect of a corporation such as its value in the 
market. Organizations should also ensure that the financial statements prepared by them 
present a true and fair position of the firms as at date of presentation. This is necessary as 
any errors, misstatements and omissions discovered and reported in the audit report is 
capable of affecting the value of the firm negatively. 
On this note, we advocate that good supervisory work by Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) be put in place to check on auditors and costly sanctions be spelt out on 
auditors/audit firms who give an opinion that seems not to reflect errors, misstatements 
and omissions as they have discovered or fail to discover since such an action is capable 
of marring the audit profession in Nigeria. 
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5.5 Contribution to Knowledge  
There are quite a lot of studies on audit quality across the globe. Our research in the 
world of audit quality exposed us to the fact that the trend of audit quality research has 
shifted from just ascertaining what constitutes or makes up audit quality to how audit 
quality can affect the performance of firms.  It was also discovered that this shift has just 
been embraced in Nigeria as there is dearth of literature in this area. However, studies 
that tend to identify the impact of audit quality on market value in Nigeria are compared 
to this study in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1:  Identification of Areas of Contribution to Knowledge  
MAJOR AREAS OTHER STUDIES CURRENT STUDY MAJOR DIFFERENCE 
IN THE CURRENT 
STUDY 
Variables MPS, NPM, AFS, AF 
and AT with control 
variables 
 
 
MPS, AFS, AE, AIS, 
AF, AT and AOP 
No control variables used 
and the introduction of AE, 
AIS and AOP  
Study period 5 years and 6 years 
(within 2006 to 2011) 
 
 
12 years (from 2004 
to 2015) 
Additional 6 years  
No of observations  12 and 342 company 
year observations 
 
 
564 company-year 
observations 
222 company-year 
observations  
Methodology for 
data analysis  
 Regression 
 Correlation 
 Descriptive 
statistics  
 
 
 Regression 
 Correlation 
 Descriptive 
statistics   
No difference  
Findings  AQ influences 
MV 
 
 
 AQ 
influences 
MV 
positively. 
 Give direction of 
effct 
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 AFS=Positive 
but insignificant 
impact 
 AF= Negative 
and  significant 
 
 AT = Positive 
but insignificant 
impact 
 
 AFS=Positive 
but 
significant 
 AF=Positive 
and 
significant 
 Positive and 
significant 
 Positive and 
significant 
 
 Positive and 
significant 
 
 Positive and 
significant 
Coverage Manufacturing 
Companies 
Non-
Financial 
companies 
More sector 
coverage 
  
Source: Researcher’s Review 
The table 5.1 shows that both past studies and current study in Nigeria used similar 
methodology and techniques for data analysis arriving at the same view that AQ has an 
effect on MPS with the former not indicating the direction of the relationship between 
AQ and MV. However, a further look into the various analyses shows that AFS has a 
positive effect though insignificant with AF having a significant negative effect whereas,  
in the current study this same AF has the highest positive effect of 52.7 percent on MV of 
non-financial companies in Nigeria and significant effect of 9 percent of AFS on MV. 
This variation might be explained by the fact that this current study is on a long term 
basis of 12 years with 564 observations as against six years with 342 observations.  
To make this study more robust, we also increased the number of variables that explain 
audit quality rather than the use of control variables to fill in some lapses. Also, 
considering the selection of this study’s period, we used more years from 2004 which is 
before the study period (2006) of the previous studies. To achieve recency of data used 
for the study, we also updated the years to 2015 from 2011. The choices of companies 
may not be the same as one of the prior studies analyzes data from the cement companies 
Table 5.1 Continue 
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only and the other study analyzes a cross section of manufacturing companies whereas, 
this current study collected its data from the non-financial sectors leaving out only the 
financial sectors. This means that we generate our evidences from companies within the 
following sectors: Agricultural, conglomerate, natural resources, industrial goods, oil and 
gas, consumer goods, constructions/real estates, health care, information and 
communication technology and services.  
 
5.6 Limitations of Study 
This study on the impact of audit quality on the market value of listed non- financial 
companies in Nigeria has been successfully conducted. However, the journey towards 
the completion of this study was not without some hitches, some of which include the 
style/format of reporting in some companies financial statements that made it difficult 
to identify some variables like audit fees. However it became easier as we approach 
the recent years especially the era of mandatory adaption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards. 
We also had problems with availability of financial reports of companies throughout 
the 12- year study period for some companies but, we were able to overcome this by 
the use of filtering method via a pre-determined criterion to obtain the sample. 
Consequently, in spite of these limitations, we were able to get around them and 
ensure the validity of our study findings. 
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5.7   Suggested Areas for Further Studies 
This current study has examined the impact of audit quality on the market value of non-
financial companies listed in Nigeria using a panel data of 564 observations obtained 
from 47 companies for 12 years with six proxies for audit quality and MPS for market 
value. The study also discovered that all factors not included in this study accounts for 
over 50% of the variations in the market value of these companies; we therefore appeal 
that researchers who intend to do similar study should look out for these variables. Such 
other variables may be the firm’s size, its earnings and liquidity to mention a few. 
Thus, whoever intends to carry out research in this area may: 
1. Embark on similar research in the banking sector which is totally excluded from 
this study. 
2. Similar study can be done with the same study period but a comparative study 
where the impact of audit quality on market value be examined on a pre and post 
fall of the capital market in Nigeria. 
3. More audit quality variables like joint audit, restatement and many more can be 
introduced in further studies. 
4. Further studies can choose to expand on the dependent variable to encompass firm 
value generally as against an aspect of firm value (market value). 
5. Other studies can also think of determinants of market value of firms in Nigeria. 
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Appendix A1 
List of Non-Financial Companies Listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31st 
December, 2015 
S/N Company Ticker Sector 
1 7-UP BOTTLING COMP. PLC. 7UP CONSUMER GOODS 
2 A.G. LEVENTIS NIGERIA PLC. AGLEVENT CONGLOMERATES 
3 ACADEMY PRESS PLC. ACADEMY SERVICES 
4 ADSWITCH PLC. ADSWITCH INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
5 AFRICAN PAINTS (NIGERIA) PLC. AFRPAINTS INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
6 AFRIK PHARMACEUTICALS PLC. AFRIK HEALTHCARE 
7 AFROMEDIA PLC AFROMEDIA SERVICES 
8 AIRLINE SERVICES AND LOGISTICS PLC AIRSERVICE SERVICES 
9 ALUMINIUM EXTRUSION IND. PLC. ALEX NATURAL RESOURCES 
10 ALUMINIUM MANUFACTURING COMPANY PLC ALUMACO NATURAL RESOURCES 
11 ANINO INTERNATIONAL PLC. ANINO OIL AND GAS 
12 ARBICO PLC. ARBICO CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
13 ASHAKA CEM PLC ASHAKACEM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
14 ASSOCIATED BUS COMPANY PLC ABCTRANS SERVICES 
15 AUSTIN LAZ & COMPANY PLC AUSTINLAZ INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
16 AVON CROWNCAPS & CONTAINERS AVONCROWN INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
17 B.O.C. GASES PLC. BOCGAS NATURAL RESOURCES 
18 BECO PETROLEUM PRODUCT PLC BECOPETRO OIL AND GAS 
19 BERGER PAINTS PLC BERGER INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
20 BETA GLASS CO PLC. BETAGLAS INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
21 C & I LEASING PLC. CILEASING SERVICES 
22 CADBURY NIGERIA PLC. CADBURY CONSUMER GOODS 
23 CAP PLC(CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCT) CAP INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
24 CAPITAL HOTEL PLC CAPHOTEL SERVICES 
25 CAPITAL OIL PLC CAPOIL OIL AND GAS 
26 CAVERTON OFFSHORE SUPPORT GRP PLC CAVERTON SERVICES 
27 CEMENT CO. OF NORTH.NIG. PLC CCNN INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
28 CHAMPION BREW. PLC. CHAMPION CONSUMER GOODS 
29 CHAMS PLC CHAMS ICT 
30 CHELLARAMS PLC. CHELLARAM CONGLOMERATES 
31 COMPUTER WAREHOUSE GROUP PLC CWG ICT 
32 CONOIL PLC CONOIL OIL AND GAS 
33 COSTAIN (W A) PLC. COSTAIN CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
34 COURTEVILLE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS PLC COURTVILLE ICT 
35 CUTIX PLC. CUTIX INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
36 DAAR COMMUNICATIONS PLC DAARCOMM SERVICES 
37 DANGOTE CEMENT PLC DANGCEM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
38 DANGOTE SUGAR REFINERY PLC DANGSUGAR CONSUMER GOODS 
39 DN MEYER PLC. DNMEYER INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
40 DN TYRE & RUBBER PLC DUNLOP CONSUMER GOODS 
41 E-TRANZACT INTERNATIONAL PLC ETRANZACT ICT 
42 EKOCORP PLC. EKOCORP HEALTHCARE 
43 ELLAH LAKES PLC. ELLAHLAKES AGRICULTURE 
44 ETERNA PLC. ETERNA OIL AND GAS 
45 EVANS MEDICAL PLC. EVANSMED HEALTHCARE 
46 FIDSON HEALTHCARE PLC FIDSON HEALTHCARE 
47 FIRST ALUMINIUM NIGERIA PLC FIRSTALUM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
48 FLOUR MILLS NIG. PLC. FLOURMILL CONSUMER GOODS 
49 FORTE OIL PLC. FO OIL AND GAS 
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50 FTN COCOA PROCESSORS PLC FTNCOCOA AGRICULTURE 
51 G CAPPA PLC GCAPPA CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
52 GLAXO SMITHKLINE CONSUMER NIG. PLC. GLAXOSMITH HEALTHCARE 
53 GOLDEN GUINEA BREW. PLC. GOLDBREW CONSUMER GOODS 
54 GREIF NIGERIA PLC VANLEER INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
55 GUINNESS NIG PLC GUINNESS CONSUMER GOODS 
56 HONEYWELL FLOUR MILL PLC HONYFLOUR CONSUMER GOODS 
57 IKEJA HOTEL PLC IKEJAHOTEL SERVICES 
58 INTERLINKED TECHNOLOGIES PLC INTERLINK SERVICES 
59 INTERNATIONAL BREWERIES PLC. INTBREW CONSUMER GOODS 
60 IPWA PLC IPWA INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
61 JAPAUL OIL & MARITIME SERVICES PLC JAPAULOIL OIL AND GAS 
62 JOHN HOLT PLC. JOHNHOLT CONGLOMERATES 
63 JOS INT. BREWERIES PLC. JOSBREW CONSUMER GOODS 
64 JULI PLC. JULI SERVICES 
65 JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC. JBERGER CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
66 LAFARGE AFRICA PLC. WAPCO INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
67 LEARN AFRICA PLC LEARNAFRCA SERVICES 
68 LENNARDS (NIG) PLC. LENNARDS SERVICES 
69 LIVESTOCK FEEDS PLC. LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE 
70 MASS TELECOMMUNICATION INNOVATIONS 
NIGERIA PLC 
MTI ICT 
71 MAY & BAKER NIGERIA PLC. MAYBAKER HEALTHCARE 
72 MCNICHOLS PLC MCNICHOLS CONSUMER GOODS 
73 MOBIL OIL NIG PLC. MOBIL OIL AND GAS 
74 MORISON INDUSTRIES PLC. MORISON HEALTHCARE 
75 MRS OIL NIGERIA PLC. MRS OIL AND GAS 
76 MTECH COMMUNICATIONS PLC MTECH ICT 
77 MULTI-TREX INTEGRATED FOODS PLC MULTITREX CONSUMER GOODS 
78 MULTIVERSE MINING AND EXPLORATION PLC MULTIVERSE NATURAL RESOURCES 
79 N NIG. FLOUR MILLS PLC. NNFM CONSUMER GOODS 
80 NASCON ALLIED INDUSTRIES PLC NASCON CONSUMER GOODS 
81 NAVITUS ENERGY PLC UNIONVENT OIL AND GAS 
82 NCR (NIGERIA) PLC. NCR ICT 
83 NEIMETH INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS 
PLC 
NEIMETH HEALTHCARE 
84 NESTLE NIGERIA PLC. NESTLE CONSUMER GOODS 
85 NIGERIA-GERMAN CHEMICALS PLC. NIG-GERMAN HEALTHCARE 
86 NIGERIAN AVIATION HANDLING COMPANY PLC NAHCO SERVICES 
87 NIGERIAN BREW. PLC. NB CONSUMER GOODS 
88 NIGERIAN ENAMELWARE PLC. ENAMELWA CONSUMER GOODS 
89 NIGERIAN ROPES PLC NIGROPES INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
90 OANDO PLC OANDO OIL AND GAS 
91 OKOMU OIL PALM PLC. OKOMUOIL AGRICULTURE 
92 OMATEK VENTURES PLC OMATEK ICT 
93 P S MANDRIDES & CO PLC. MANDRID CONSUMER GOODS 
94 P Z CUSSONS NIGERIA PLC. PZ CONSUMER GOODS 
95 PAINTS AND COATINGS MANUFACTURES PLC PAINTCOM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
96 PHARMA-DEKO PLC. PHARMDEKO HEALTHCARE 
97 PORTLAND PAINTS & PRODUCTS NIGERIA PLC PORTPAINT INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
98 PREMIER BREWERIES PLC PREMBREW CONSUMER GOODS 
99 PREMIER PAINTS PLC. PREMPAINTS INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
100 PRESCO PLC PRESCO AGRICULTURE 
101 R T BRISCOE PLC. RTBRISCOE SERVICES 
102 RAK UNITY PET. COMP. PLC. RAKUNITY OIL AND GAS 
103 RED STAR EXPRESS PLC REDSTAREX SERVICES 
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104 ROADS NIG PLC. ROADS CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
105 ROKANA INDUSTRIES PLC. ROKANA CONSUMER GOODS 
106 S C O A NIG. PLC. SCOA CONGLOMERATES 
107 SECURE ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY PLC NSLTECH SERVICES 
108 SEPLAT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 
LTD 
SEPLAT OIL AND GAS 
109 SKYE SHELTER FUND PLC SKYESHELT CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
110 SMART PRODUCTS NIGERIA PLC SMURFIT CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
111 STUDIO PRESS (NIG) PLC. STUDPRESS SERVICES 
112 TANTALIZERS PLC TANTALIZER SERVICES 
113 THOMAS WYATT NIG. PLC. THOMASWY NATURAL RESOURCES 
114 TOTAL NIGERIA PLC. TOTAL OIL AND GAS 
115 TOURIST COMPANY OF NIGERIA PLC. TOURIST SERVICES 
116 TRANS-NATIONWIDE EXPRESS PLC. TRANSEXPR SERVICES 
117 TRANSCORP HOTELS PLC TRANSCOHOT SERVICES 
118 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION OF NIGERIA 
PLC 
TRANSCORP CONGLOMERATES 
119 TRIPPLE GEE AND COMPANY PLC. TRIPPLEG ICT 
120 U A C N PLC. UACN CONGLOMERATES 
121 U T C NIG. PLC. UTC CONSUMER GOODS 
122 UACN PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT CO. LIMITED UAC-PROP CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
123 UNILEVER NIGERIA PLC. UNILEVER CONSUMER GOODS 
124 UNION DIAGNOSTIC & CLINICAL SERVICES PLC UNIONDAC HEALTHCARE 
125 UNION DICON SALT PLC. UNIONDICON CONSUMER GOODS 
126 UNION HOMES REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 
TRUST (REIT) 
UHOMREIT CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE 
127 UNIVERSITY PRESS PLC. UPL SERVICES 
128 VITAFOAM NIG PLC. VITAFOAM CONSUMER GOODS 
129 VONO PRODUCTS PLC. VONO CONSUMER GOODS 
130 W A GLASS IND. PLC. WAGLASS INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
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Appendix A2 
List of Companies that Satisfied the Study Criterion 
S/No Company Ticker Sector 
1 OKOMU OIL PALM PLC. OKOMUOIL AGRICULTURE 
2 PRESCO PLC PRESCO AGRICULTURE 
3 LIVESTOCK FEEDS PLC. LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE 
4 U A C N PLC. UACN CONGLOMERATES 
5 JOHN HOLT PLC. JOHNHOLT CONGLOMERATES 
6 A.G. LEVENTIS NIGERIA PLC. AGLEVENT CONGLOMERATES 
7 UNILEVER NIGERIA PLC. UNILEVER CONSUMER GOODS 
8 VITAFOAM NIG PLC. VITAFOAM CONSUMER GOODS 
9 P Z CUSSONS NIGERIA PLC. PZ CONSUMER GOODS 
10 NESTLE NIGERIA PLC. NESTLE CONSUMER GOODS 
11 NIGERIAN BREW. PLC. NB CONSUMER GOODS 
12 NASCON ALLIED INDUSTRIES PLC NASCON CONSUMER GOODS 
13 GUINNESS NIG PLC GUINNESS CONSUMER GOODS 
14 INTERNATIONAL BREWERIES PLC. INTBREW CONSUMER GOODS 
15 NIG. FLOUR MILLS PLC. NFM CONSUMER GOODS 
16 DN TYRE & RUBBER PLC DUNLOP CONSUMER GOODS 
17 DANGOTE SUGAR REFINERY PLC DANGSUGAR CONSUMER GOODS 
18 CADBURY NIGERIA PLC. CADBURY CONSUMER GOODS 
19 VONO PRODUCTS PLC. VONO CONSUMER GOODS 
20 JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC. JBERGER CONSTRUCTION/REAL 
ESTATE 
21 GLAXO SMITHKLINE CONSUMER NIG. 
PLC. 
GLAXOSMITH HEALTHCARE 
22 GLAXO SMITHKLINE CONSUMER NIG. 
PLC. 
GLAXOSMITH HEALTHCARE 
23 TRIPPLE GEE AND COMPANY PLC. TRIPPLEG ICT 
24 AVON CROWNCAPS & CONTAINERS AVONCROWN INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
25 LAFARGE AFRICA PLC. WAPCO INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
26 DANGOTE CEMENT PLC DANGCEM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
27 CAP PLC(chemical and allied product) CAP INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
28 BETA GLASS CO PLC. BETAGLAS INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
29 BERGER PAINTS PLC BERGER INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
30 ASHAKA CEM PLC ASHAKACEM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
31 FIRST ALUMINIUM NIGERIA PLC FIRSTALUM INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
32 CUTIX PLC. CUTIX INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
33 THOMAS WYATT NIG. PLC. THOMASWY NATURAL RESOURCES 
34 B.O.C. GASES PLC. BOCGAS NATURAL RESOURCES 
35 TOTAL NIGERIA PLC. TOTAL OIL AND GAS 
36 OANDO PLC OANDO OIL AND GAS 
37 MRS OIL NIGERIA PLC. MRS OIL AND GAS 
38 MOBIL OIL NIG PLC. MOBIL OIL AND GAS 
39 JAPAUL OIL & MARITIME SERVICES PLC JAPAULOIL OIL AND GAS 
40 FORTE OIL PLC. FO OIL AND GAS 
41 ETERNA PLC. ETERNA OIL AND GAS 
42 CONOIL PLC CONOIL OIL AND GAS 
43 ACADEMY PRESS PLC. ACADEMY SERVICES 
44 UNIVERSITY PRESS PLC. UPL SERVICES 
45 R T BRISCOE PLC. RTBRISCOE SERVICES 
46 TRANS-NATIONWIDE EXPRESS PLC. TRANSEXPR SERVICES 
47 C & I LEASING PLC. CILEASING SERVICES 
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APPENDIX B1 
RAW DATAPRESENTATION 
Company year AFS AE AIS AF AT AOP NAME OF AUDIT Mp/S 
Okomu  2004 0 17 1 2500 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 14.5 
 
2005 0 18 1 2500 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 17 
 
2006 0 19 1 3500 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 34.1 
 
2007 0 20 1 7000 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 36.1 
 
2008 0 21 1 10000 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 32.8 
 
2009 0 22 1 15000 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 22.8 
 
2010 0 23 1 20000 1 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 15.2 
 
2011 0 3 1 21000 0 1 messrs Horwath Dafinone 23.1 
 
2012 0 4 1 24000 0 1 messrs Horwath Dafinone 42.5 
 
2013 0 5 1 24000 1 1 messrs Horwath Dafinone 44 
 
2014 0 6 1 20001 1 1 messrs Horwath Dafinone 25.4 
 
2015 0 7 1 23000 1 1 messrs Horwath Dafinone 30.3 
Presco 2004 1 52 1 2000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 9.25 
 
2005 1 53 1 3000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 11.8 
 
2006 1 54 1 5000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 10.8 
 
2007 1 55 1 5000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 14.6 
 
2008 0 21 1 8000 0 1 Messrs Spiropoulos Adiele Okpara 10.1 
 
2009 0 22 1 8000 0 1 Spiropoulos, Adiele, Okpara & Co 5.6 
 
2010 0 23 1 8000 1 1 Spiropoulos, Adiele, Okpara & Co 6.85 
 
2011 0 24 1 8000 1 1 Spiropoulos, Adiele, Okpara & Co 8.67 
 
2012 0 25 1 12000 1 1 Spiropoulos, Adiele, Okpara & Co 17 
 
2013 0 26 1 12000 0 1 Grant Thomton Nigeria 38.5 
 
2014 0 27 1 12000 0 1 Grant Thomton Nigeria 24.5 
 
2015 1 63 1 24000 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 33 
Livestock 2004 1 52 1 1200 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.83 
 
2005 1 53 1 1500 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.82 
 
2006 1 54 1 1500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.95 
 
2007 1 55 1 1500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 3.63 
 
2008 1 56 1 5500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.18 
 
2009 0 36 1 3000 0 1 BDO Professional Service 0.57 
 
2010 0 37 1 3400 0 1 BDO Professional Service 0.65 
 
2011 0 38 1 4000 1 1 BDO Professional Service 0.72 
 
2012 0 39 1 4800 1 1 BDO Professional Service 1.44 
 
2013 0 40 1 6000 1 1 BDO Professional Service 4.3 
 
2014 0 41 1 6900 1 1 BDO Professional Service 2.28 
 
2015 0 42 1 6900 1 1 BDO Professional Service 1.33 
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Company              Year     AFS     AE AIS AF ATAOP NAME OF AUDIT  Mp/S  
 
 
UACN 
 
 
 
2004 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
4500 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Price WaterHouse Coopers  
 
 
 
8.4 
 
2005 1 7 0 4500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  8.7 
 
2006 1 8 0 6000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  25.1 
 
2008 1 10 0 8000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  34.6 
 
2009 1 11 0 8000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  36.8 
 
2010 1 12 0 6850 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  37.5 
 
2011 1 13 0 6850 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  31.2 
 
2012 1 14 0 40863 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  42 
 
2013 1 15 0 22000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  67 
 
2014 1 16 0 27473 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  34 
 
2015 1 26 0 23000 0 1 Ernst &Young 20.8 
John Holt 2004 1 52 1 2000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.99 
 
2005 1 53 1 2500 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.4 
 
2006 1 54 1 4000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.21 
 
2007 1 55 1 4000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.49 
 
2008 1 56 1 7000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 14 
 
2009 1 57 1 8000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 9.28 
 
2010 0 30 1 10500 0 0 Pannell Kerr Forster 9.28 
 
2011 0 31 1 11000 0 0 Pannell Kerr Forster 5.89 
 
2012 0 32 1 11000 1 0 Pannell Kerr Forster 3.4 
 
2013 0 33 1 11000 1 0 Pannell Kerr Forster 1.12 
 
2014 0 41 0 8500 0 0 BDO Professional Service 0.98 
 
2015 0 42 0 9000 0 0 BDO Professional Service 0.92 
AG Leventis 2004 1 52 1 6173 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.23 
 
2005 1 53 1 7037 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.16 
 
2006 1 54 1 7741 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.86 
 
2007 1 55 1 8515 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.1 
 
2008 1 56 1 8540 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 7.9 
 
2009 1 57 1 8540 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.47 
 
2010 1 58 1 9000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.67 
 
2011 1 59 0 10100 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.38 
 
2012 1 60 0 11362 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.35 
 
2013 1 61 0 12385 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.7 
 
2014 1 62 0 13252 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.31 
 
2015 1 37 0 15200 0 1 KPMG Professional service 0.62 
CHELLARAMS 2004 0 24 0 1450 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 1.71 
 
2005 0 25 0 1600 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 0.83 
 
2006 0 26 0 1850 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 1.59 
 
2007 0 27 0 1850 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 12.4 
 
2008 0 28 0 2000 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 22.4 
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2009 0 29 0 2000 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 14.1 
 
2010 0 30 1 2850 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 7.6 
 
2011 0 31 1 2850 1 1 PFK Pannel Kerr Forster 6.43 
 
2012 0 32 1 4000 1 1 PFK Professional services 6.43 
 
2013 0 33 1 4000 1 1 PFK Professional services 4.15 
 
2014 0 34 0 5500 1 1 PFK Professional services 3.96 
 
2015 0 35 0 6000 1 1 PFK Professional services 3.76 
Uniliver 2004 1 6 0 10912 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  14.6 
 
2005 1 7 0 14500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  20.5 
 
2006 1 8 1 21500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  13 
 
2007 1 9 0 16802 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  21.9 
 
2008 1 10 1 17028 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  10.4 
 
2009 1 11 1 16414 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  18.5 
 
2010 1 12 1 16400 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  26.9 
 
2011 1 13 0 17852 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  29 
 
2012 1 14 0 27539 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  46.5 
 
2013 1 15 0 17539 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  53.8 
 
2014 1 36 1 15800 0 1 KPMG Professional service 35.8 
 
2015 1 37 1 15752 0 1 KPMG Professional service 43.3 
Vitafoam 2004 1 6 0 5250 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  3.33 
 
2005 1 7 0 5250 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  4.51 
 
2006 1 8 1 6000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  4.08 
 
2007 1 9 0 7000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  9.82 
 
2008 1 10 1 8500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  4.65 
 
2009 1 11 1 8500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  5.65 
 
2010 1 12 1 11000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  6.66 
 
2011 1 59 1 12500 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.06 
 
2012 1 60 1 12500 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 3.66 
 
2013 1 61 1 16500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.9 
 
2014 1 62 1 16500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.03 
 
2015 1 63 1 18150 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.41 
PZ Cussion 2004 1 52 1 8250 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 11.6 
 
2005 1 53 1 9900 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 16.2 
 
2006 1 54 0 10600 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 26 
 
2007 1 55 1 12500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 26.5 
 
2008 1 10 1 13180 0 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  11.2 
 
2009 1 11 1 13180 0 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  25 
 
2010 1 12 1 15420 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  31.5 
 
2011 1 13 0 15420 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  28 
 
2012 1 14 0 15160 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  28 
 
2013 1 15 0 18294 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  37 
 
2014 1 16 0 21979 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  23.8 
 
2015 1 17 0 24528 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  25.7 
 143 
 
Appendix B1 continue 
 
Company              Year     AFS     AE AIS AF ATAOP NAME OF AUDIT  Mp/S 
NESTLE 2004 1 26 1 10700 1 1 KPMG Professional service 150 
 
2005 1 27 1 12800 1 1 KPMG Professional service 190 
 
2006 1 28 1 14800 1 1 KPMG Professional service 218 
 
2007 1 29 1 18900 1 1 KPMG Professional service 277 
 
2008 1 30 1 20500 1 1 KPMG Professional service 191 
 
2009 1 31 1 23000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 240 
 
2010 1 32 1 24812 1 1 KPMG Professional service 369 
 
2011 1 33 1 28219 1 1 KPMG Professional service 446 
 
2012 1 34 1 32682 1 1 KPMG Professional service 700 
 
2013 1 35 1 32682 1 1 KPMG Professional service 1200 
 
2014 1 36 1 30783 1 1 KPMG Professional service 1012 
 
2015 1 63 1 30000 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 860 
CADBURY 2004 1 52 1 8370 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 57 
 
2005 1 53 1 12500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 62.4 
 
2006 1 8 1 14000 0 0 Price WaterHouse Coopers  34.2 
 
2007 1 29 1 17500 0 1 KPMG Professional service 36.9 
 
2008 1 30 1 18500 0 0 KPMG Professional service 23.9 
 
2009 1 31 1 18500 1 1 KPMG Professional service 10.5 
 
2010 1 32 1 19000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 25.6 
 
2011 1 33 1 20900 1 1 KPMG Professional service 11.4 
 
2012 1 34 1 24896 1 1 KPMG Professional service 29 
 
2013 1 35 1 26000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 59 
 
2014 1 36 1 26000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 40 
 
2015 1 37 1 24000 1 0 KPMG Professional service 17.2 
Nig. Brew 2004 1 26 1 14586 1 1 KPMG Professional service 40.5 
 
2005 1 27 1 17507 1 1 KPMG Professional service 39.4 
 
2006 1 28 1 20133 1 1 KPMG Professional service 2.81 
 
2007 1 29 1 24160 1 1 KPMG Professional service 49 
 
2008 1 30 1 27059 1 1 KPMG Professional service 40.9 
 
2009 1 31 1 30306 1 1 KPMG Professional service 53 
 
2010 1 32 1 33943 1 1 KPMG Professional service 77.1 
 
2011 1 33 1 33264 1 1 KPMG Professional service 94.4 
 
2012 1 34 1 55964 1 1 KPMG Professional service 147 
 
2013 1 35 1 40043 1 1 KPMG Professional service 168 
 
2014 1 36 1 43692 1 1 KPMG Professional service 165 
 
2015 1 63 1 46239 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 136 
NASCON 2004 0 49 0 250 0 1 Morison Odede &Co 2.06 
 
2005 0 50 0 250 0 1 Morison Odede &Co 0.94 
 
2006 0 51 0 500 1 1 Morison Odede &Co 0.22 
 
2007 1 55 1 1200 0 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 17.1 
 
2008 1 56 0 8000 0 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.59 
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2009 1 57 0 8400 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.35 
 
2010 1 58 0 9000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 6.39 
 
2011 1 59 1 9000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.01 
 
2012 1 60 1 13000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8 
 
2013 1 61 1 14500 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 15 
 
2014 1 62 1 3000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 6.22 
 
2015 1 63 1 4250 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 7.15 
Guinness 2004 1 26 1 10000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 117 
 
2005 1 27 1 12500 1 1 KPMG Professional service 96 
 
2006 1 28 1 14375 1 1 KPMG Professional service 108 
 
2007 1 29 1 14375 1 1 KPMG Professional service 130 
 
2008 1 30 1 19100 1 1 KPMG Professional service 99.5 
 
2009 1 31 1 21965 1 1 KPMG Professional service 128 
 
2010 1 32 1 19000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 191 
 
2011 1 33 1 20900 1 1 KPMG Professional service 250 
 
2012 1 34 1 24896 1 1 KPMG Professional service 275 
 
2013 1 35 1 26000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 236 
 
2014 1 36 1 26000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 168 
 
2015 1 37 1 24000 1 0 KPMG Professional service 120 
Inter. Brew. 2004 0 6 0 800 1 1 Oyelami Soetan Adeleke & Co 2.06 
 
2005 0 7 0 2000 1 0 Oyelami Soetan Adeleke & Co 0.94 
 
2006 0 8 0 2977 1 0 Oyelami Soetan Adeleke & Co 0.22 
 
2007 0 9 0 2977 1 1 Oyelami Soetan Adeleke & Co 2.57 
 
2008 0 10 0 3825 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 4.91 
 
2009 0 11 0 6000 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 2.27 
 
2010 0 12 0 7399 1 0 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 6.42 
 
2011 0 13 0 11000 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 5.7 
 
2012 0 14 0 12490 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 16.2 
 
2013 0 15 0 12490 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 28.7 
 
2014 0 16 0 18796 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 23.4 
 
2015 0 17 0 21618 1 1 BakerTilly Nigeria (OSA) 16 
Flour Mills 2004 1 52 1 12500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 16.6 
 
2005 1 53 1 15000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 24 
 
2006 1 54 0 18000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 61 
 
2007 1 55 1 23500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 82.6 
 
2008 1 56 0 28800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 32 
 
2009 1 57 0 33000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 36 
 
2010 1 58 0 38800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 69 
 
2011 1 59 1 44600 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 65.5 
 
2012 1 60 1 50000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 65 
 
2013 1 61 1 88800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 87 
 
2014 1 62 1 1E+05 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 39.2 
 
2015 1 63 1 1E+05 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 20.8 
 145 
 
Appendix B1 continue 
 
Company              Year     AFS     AE AIS AF ATAOP NAME OF AUDIT  Mp/S 
Dunlop 2004 1 15 0 2000 1 1 Ernst &Young 1.99 
 
2005 1 16 0 2000 1 1 Ernst &Young 2.66 
 
2006 1 17 0 5000 1 1 Ernst &Young 4.16 
 
2007 1 18 0 5000 1 1 Ernst &Young 3.2 
 
2008 1 19 0 9000 1 1 Ernst &Young 0.98 
 
2009 1 20 0 9000 1 1 Ernst &Young 0.5 
 
2010 1 21 0 5000 1 1 Ernst &Young 3.51 
 
2011 1 22 0 5000 1 1 Ernst &Young 0.5 
 
2012 0 25 0 4000 0 1 S.I.A.O 0.5 
 
2013 0 26 0 4000 0 1 S.I.A.O 0.5 
 
2014 1 62 1 10213 0 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.5 
 
2015 0 42 0 4773 0 1 BDO Professional Service 0.5 
VONO PDT 2004 0 31 0 1000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.9 
 
2005 0 32 0 1000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.75 
 
2006 0 33 0 1000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.6 
 
2007 0 34 0 2000 1 0 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 4.4 
 
2008 0 35 0 2000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 2.96 
 
2009 0 36 0 2000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.44 
 
2010 0 37 0 3500 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 2.86 
 
2011 0 38 0 4000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 2.88 
 
2012 0 39 0 5000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 2.88 
 
2013 0 40 0 6000 1 0 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.82 
 
2014 0 41 0 7000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 0.94 
 
2015 0 26 0 7000 0 1 Ernst &Young 0.81 
JULIUS 
BERGER 2004 1 52 1 7650 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 18.2 
 
2005 1 53 1 7650 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 21.7 
 
2006 1 54 1 8800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 43.5 
 
2007 1 55 1 12100 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 84.6 
 
2008 1 56 1 17000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 55.6 
 
2009 1 57 1 24000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 25.8 
 
2010 1 58 1 30000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 50 
 
2011 1 59 1 30000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 31.6 
 
2012 1 60 1 60000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 34.7 
 
2013 1 61 1 63000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 72.3 
 
2014 0 43 1 48750 0 1 Nexia Agbo Abel & Co 60.7 
 
2015 0 44 1 48750 0 1 Nexia Agbo Abel & Co 42 
BOC GAS 2004 1 52 1 3100 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.94 
 
2005 1 53 1 3816 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.57 
 
2006 1 54 1 4400 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 3.3 
 
2007 1 29 1 6000 0 1 KPMG Professional service 9.5 
 
2008 1 30 1 9000 0 1 KPMG Professional service 17.4 
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2009 1 31 1 9000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 13.5 
 
2010 1 32 1 10000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 9.2 
 
2011 1 33 1 10500 1 1 KPMG Professional service 6.85 
 
2012 1 34 1 12789 1 1 KPMG Professional service 5.68 
 
2013 1 35 1 12936 1 1 KPMG Professional service 6.66 
 
2014 1 36 1 14786 1 0 KPMG Professional service 5.48 
 
2015 1 37 1 16164 1 0 KPMG Professional service 3.79 
GLAXO 2004 1 6 1 7200 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  5.42 
 
2005 1 7 1 9000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  4.14 
 
2006 1 8 1 10800 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  17 
 
2007 1 9 1 12000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  23.5 
 
2008 1 10 1 14100 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  14.7 
 
2009 1 11 1 14100 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  22.4 
 
2010 1 12 1 16695 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  26 
 
2011 1 13 1 18900 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  23 
 
2012 1 14 1 21295 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  45.1 
 
2013 1 15 1 25019 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  68 
 
2014 1 16 1 27721 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  50 
 
2015 1 63 1 24000 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 34.2 
M&B 2004 1 52 1 2100 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.27 
 
2005 1 53 1 2800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.8 
 
2006 1 64 1 3250 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 7.8 
 
2007 1 55 1 4250 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 13.4 
 
2008 1 56 1 4800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.87 
 
2009 1 57 1 5280 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 3.86 
 
2010 1 58 1 5280 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.2 
 
2011 1 59 1 7500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.99 
 
2012 1 60 1 12000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.55 
 
2013 1 61 1 8000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.45 
 
2014 1 62 1 9000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.58 
 
2015 0 35 1 9000 0 1 PFK Professional services 1.05 
TRIPPLE GEE 2004 0 24 1 450 0 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  1 
 
2005 0 25 1 600 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  0.51 
 
2006 0 26 1 750 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  1.55 
 
2007 0 27 1 600 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  5.25 
 
2008 0 28 1 1000 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  8.17 
 2009 0 29 1 750 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  4.84 
 2010 0 30 1 750 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  3.59 
 2011 0 31 1 850 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  2.94 
 2012 0 32 1 950 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  2.41 
 2013 0 33 1 1000 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  2.07 
 2014 0 34 1 1100 1 1 Messers Mojibayo Ogunmoyero  1.86 
 2015 0 16 1 1100 0 1 Messers Olusola Olojede & Co 1.69 
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INTERLINKED 2004 0 9 1 450 0 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.27 
 
2005 0 10 1 500 0 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.21 
 
006 0 11 1 500 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.21 
 
2007 0 12 1 500 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.21 
 
2008 0 13 1 500 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 5.42 
 
2009 0 14 1 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 5.15 
 
2010 0 15 1 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 5.15 
 
2011 0 16 1 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 5.15 
 
2012 0 17 1 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 5.15 
 
2013 0 18 1 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 4.99 
 
2014 0 19 1 1000 0 1 Alatta Nzewi Onyeka & Co 4.66 
 
2015 0 20 1 1000 0 1 Alatta Nzewi Onyeka & Co 3.84 
CEMENT 
LAFARGE 2004 1 52 1 18000 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 11.3 
 
2005 1 53 1 14000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 17.3 
 
2006 1 54 1 20000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.5 
 
2007 1 55 1 22000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 79.8 
 
2008 1 56 1 24200 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 25.8 
 
2009 1 57 1 28266 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 30 
 
2010 1 58 1 28266 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 40.7 
 
2011 1 59 1 28266 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 43.3 
 
2012 1 60 1 30800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 58.5 
 
2013 1 61 1 30800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 115 
 
2014 1 62 1 43000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 80.5 
 
2015 1 63 1 41000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 96.8 
DANGOTE 
CEMENT 2004 0 31 0 2300 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 4.1 
 
2005 0 32 0 3000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 6.5 
 
2006 0 33 0 4200 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 37 
 
2007 0 34 0 12000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 51 
 
2008 0 35 0 15000 1 1 BDO Professional Services 18 
 
2009 0 36 0 62000 1 1 BDO Professional Services 43 
 
2010 1 58 1 1E+05 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 120 
 
2011 1 59 1 1E+05 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 111 
 
2012 1 60 1 2E+05 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 129 
 
2013 1 61 1 2E+05 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 200 
 
2014 1 62 1 2E+05 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 170 
 
2015 1 63 1 2E+05 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 7.12 
CAP PLC 2004 1 6 0 6000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  7.12 
 
2005 1 7 0 7000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  8.97 
 
2006 1 8 0 7000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  0.34 
 
2007 1 9 0 8000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  64 
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2008 1 10 1 8000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  42.4 
 
2009 1 11 1 10000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  34 
 
2010 1 12 1 10000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  34 
 
2011 1 13 0 14000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  14.5 
 
2012 1 14 0 17000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  44.1 
 
2013 1 15 0 19500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  48.5 
 
2014 1 16 0 21060 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  37.5 
 
2015 1 26 0 20575 0 1 Ernst & Young 37.6 
BETA GLASS 2004 1 52 1 6000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.53 
 
2005 1 53 1 6800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 6.8 
 
2006 1 54 1 7480 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.23 
 
2007 1 55 1 7540 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 21.4 
 
2008 1 10 1 8400 0 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  21.8 
 
2009 1 11 1 8400 0 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  21.8 
 
2010 1 12 1 14400 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  15.6 
 
2011 1 13 0 14400 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  12.7 
 
2012 1 14 0 19184 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  10.5 
 
2013 1 15 0 19184 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  14.4 
 
2014 1 16 0 20527 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  26.5 
 
2015 1 17 0 22272 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  53.5 
BEGER PAINT 2004 1 52 1 3700 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.85 
 
2005 1 53 1 4000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 3.84 
 
2006 1 54 1 4255 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 4.23 
 
2007 1 55 1 5800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 10.2 
 
2008 1 56 1 8500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8.12 
 
2009 1 57 1 9350 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 5.7 
 
2010 1 58 1 11825 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8.36 
 
2011 1 59 1 14300 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8.47 
 
2012 1 60 1 15000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8.98 
 
2013 1 61 1 15500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8 
 
2014 1 36 0 16500 0 1 KPMG Professional service 9 
 
2015 1 37 0 16500 0 1 KPMG Professional service 10 
ASHAKA 2004 1 
1 
52 
52 
1 
1 
6000 
 
 
6000 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Akintola Williams Deloitte 22.5 
 
2005 1 53 1 6000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 34 
 
2006 1 54 1 8000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 55 
 
2007 1 55 1 14000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 53.1 
 
2008 1 56 1 16000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 17 
 
2009 1 57 1 20000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 11.6 
 
2010 1 58 1 20000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 26.5 
 
2011 1 59 1 20000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 11.3 
 
2012 1 60 1 26000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 18 
 
2013 1 61 1 21000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 21 
 
2014 1 62 1 23000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 21.9 
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2015 1 63 1 20000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 25 
FIRST 
ALUMINIUM 2004 1 6 0 4000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  2.97 
 
2005 1 7 0 4000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  3.41 
 
2006 1 8 0 4400 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  34 
 
2007 1 9 0 8000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  2.28 
 
2008 1 10 1 9000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  4.52 
 
2009 1 11 1 10000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  0.5 
 
2010 1 12 1 9000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  0.73 
 
2011 0 38 0 9000 0 1 BDO Professional Services 0.66 
 
2012 0 39 0 10000 0 1 BDO Professional Services 0.5 
 
2013 0 40 0 11000 1 1 BDO Professional Services 0.5 
 
2014 0 41 0 11000 1 1 BDO Professional Services 0.5 
 
2015 0 42 0 11000 1 1 BDO Professional Services 0.5 
AVON 2004 0 24 0 1200 1 1 PFK Professional services 0.69 
 
2005 0 25 0 1500 1 1 PFK Professional services 0.98 
 
2006 0 26 0 1500 1 1 PFK Professional services 1.24 
 
2007 0 27 0 1750 1 1 PFK Professional services 5.52 
 
2008 0 28 0 2250 1 1 PFK Professional services 9.51 
 
2009 0 29 0 2800 1 1 PFK Professional services 9.04 
 
2010 0 30 0 3300 1 1 PFK Professional services 6.91 
 
2011 0 31 0 3800 1 1 PFK Professional services 5.94 
 
2012 0 32 0 4300 1 1 PFK Professional services 1.9 
 
2013 0 33 0 4800 1 1 PFK Professional services 1.71 
 
2014 0 34 0 5040 1 1 PFK Professional services 1.59 
 
2015 0 35 0 5796 1 1 PFK Professional services 1.45 
CUTIX 2004 0 9 0 550 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.58 
 
2005 0 10 0 550 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 3.15 
 
2006 0 11 0 660 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 3.61 
 
2007 0 12 0 750 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 12.7 
 
2008 0 13 0 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 8.67 
 
2009 0 14 0 1000 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 5.24 
 
2010 0 15 0 1200 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 2.21 
 
2011 0 16 0 1500 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.55 
 
2012 0 17 0 1500 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.44 
 
2013 0 18 0 1800 1 1 Nnamdi Oyeka & Co 1.78 
 
2014 0 19 0 2000 0 1 Alatta Nzewi Onyeka & Co 1.3 
 
2015 0 20 0 2000 0 1 Alatta Nzewi Onyeka & Co 1.66 
TOTAL 2004 1 52 1 10000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 192 
 2005 1 53 1 15000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 183 
 2006 1 54 1 15000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 199 
 2007 1 55 1 17000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 180 
 2008 1 56 1 19000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 204 
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 2009 1 57 1 20900 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 149 
 2010 1 58 1 22990 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 234 
 2011 1 59 1 22900 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 188 
 2012 1 60 1 25289 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 121 
 2013 1 61 1 29977 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 170 
 2014 1 62 1 21446 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 143 
 2015 1 63 1 22776 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 147 
OANDO 2004 1 6 1 12000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  107 
 2005 1 7 1 15000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  96.1 
 2006 1 8 1 18500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  69.1 
 2007 1 9 1 18000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  123 
 2008 1 10 1 24000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  79.8 
 2009 1 11 1 30000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  94 
 2010 1 12 1 21600 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  66 
 2011 1 13 1 23112 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  22 
 2012 1 14 1 63833 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  12.4 
 2013 1 15 1 79991 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  24.3 
 2014 1 16 1 84072 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  16.1 
 2015 1 26 1 90001 0 1 Ernst & Young 5.9 
MRS 2004 1 6 1 7128 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  169 
 2005 1 7 1 7400 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  120 
 2006 1 8 1 8400 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  140 
 2007 1 9 1 9500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  160 
 2008 1 10 1 10500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  160 
 2009 1 11 1 13500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  69.8 
 
2010 1 12 1 12500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  66.6 
 
2011 1 33 0 17114 0 1 KPMG Professional service 59 
 
2012 1 34 0 24914 0 1 KPMG Professional service 23.8 
 
2013 1 35 0 24914 1 1 KPMG Professional service 54.4 
 
2014 1 36 0 27231 1 1 KPMG Professional service 53.2 
 
2015 1 37 0 30000 1 1 KPMG Professional service 49.7 
MOBIL 2004 1 6 1 9003 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  176 
 
2005 1 7 1 8418 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  160 
 
2006 1 8 1 8349 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  188 
 
2007 1 9 1 8398 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  180 
 
2008 1 10 1 11177 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  332 
 
2009 1 11 1 11678 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  98.8 
 
2010 1 12 1 12500 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  141 
 
2011 1 13 1 15000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  134 
 
2012 1 23 0 18790 0 1 Ernst & Young 109 
 
2013 1 24 0 23400 0 1 Ernst & Young 119 
 
2014 1 25 0 26517 1 1 Ernst & Young 158 
 
2015 1 26 1 32023 1 1 Ernst & Young 160 
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JAPAUL 
 
 
2004 
 
 
0 
 
 
10 
 
 
0 
 
 
650 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
Ugboaja Martins & Co 
 
 
1.05 
 
2005 0 11 0 500 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 1.66 
 
2006 0 12 0 700 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 1.17 
 
2007 0 13 0 1200 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 8 
 
2008 0 14 0 2500 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 3.66 
 
2009 0 15 0 2500 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 1.13 
 
2010 0 16 0 3500 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 1.4 
 
2011 0 17 0 5500 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 0.9 
 
2012 0 18 0 7000 1 1 Ugboaja Martins & Co 0.55 
 
2013 0 33 1 8500 0 1 PFK Professional services 0.54 
 
2014 0 34 1 10000 0 1 PFK Professional services 0.5 
 
2015 0 35 1 12500 1 1 PFK Professional services 0.7 
FORTE 2004 1 52 1 14000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.44 
 
2005 1 53 1 20000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.44 
 
2006 1 54 1 32000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.38 
 
2007 1 55 1 38000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 207 
 
2008 1 56 1 45000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 294 
 
2009 1 57 1 50000 1 0 Akintola Williams Deloitte 33.5 
 
2010 0 30 0 30000 0 0 PFK Professional services 21.9 
 
2011 0 31 0 35000 0 0 PFK Professional services 11.6 
 
2012 0 32 0 42500 1 0 PFK Professional services 7.73 
 
2013 0 33 1 56700 1 1 PFK Professional services 97.8 
 
2014 0 34 1 56700 1 1 PFK Professional services 228 
 
2015 0 35 1 60900 1 1 PFK Professional services 330 
ETERNA 2004 1 14 0 2500 1 1 Messers Babington Ashaye & Co 1.95 
 
2005 1 7 1 2900 0 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  3.05 
 
2006 1 8 1 4000 0 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  2.99 
 
2007 1 9 1 5000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  16 
 
2008 1 10 1 6000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  31.1 
 
2009 1 11 1 6000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  4.98 
 
2010 1 12 1 7000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  5.05 
 
2011 1 13 1 7000 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  2.96 
 
2012 1 14 1 7013 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  3.01 
 
2013 1 15 1 9545 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  2.89 
 
2014 1 16 1 9545 1 1 Price WaterHouse Coopers  2.98 
 
2015 1 63 1 13500 0 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.05 
CON OIL 2004 1 52 1 7500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 128 
 
2005 1 53 1 11000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 97.8 
 
2006 1 54 1 14000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 69 
 
2007 1 55 1 16000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 84.2 
 
2008 1 56 1 16500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 78.4 
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2009 1 57 1 18000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 27.6 
 
2010 1 58 1 19500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 36.4 
 
2011 1 59 1 21000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 31.5 
 
2012 1 60 1 18750 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 20.5 
 
2013 1 61 1 19500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 38.1 
 
2014 1 62 1 30000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 35.4 
 
2015 0 44 0 26000 0 1 Nexia Agbo Abel & Co 24.7 
ACADEMY 
PRESS 2004 0 48 0 1000 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 1.95 
 
2005 0 49 0 1000 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 1.5 
 
2006 0 50 0 1000 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 1.56 
 
2007 0 51 0 1200 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 5.42 
 
2008 0 52 0 1200 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 5.52 
 
2009 0 53 0 2000 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 5.4 
 
2010 0 54 0 2000 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 3.68 
 
2011 0 55 0 3500 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 2.24 
 
2012 0 56 0 3500 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 3.75 
 
2013 0 57 0 4500 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 2.55 
 
2014 0 58 1 4500 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 1.18 
 
2015 0 59 1 4500 1 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 0.55 
UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2004 0 31 0 1000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.22 
 
2005 0 32 0 1200 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 1.45 
 
2006 0 33 0 1000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 3.2 
 
2007 0 34 0 1150 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 8.45 
 
2008 0 35 0 1700 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 5.81 
 
2009 0 36 0 1700 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 4.97 
 
2010 0 37 0 2000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 6.8 
 
2011 0 38 0 2000 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 3.4 
 
2012 0 39 0 3200 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 4.47 
 
2013 0 40 0 3200 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 4.18 
 
2014 0 41 0 4200 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 4.22 
 
2015 0 42 0 4200 1 1 BDO Oyediran Faleye Oke & Co 6 
RT BRISCOE 2004 1 52 1 3000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 7.22 
 2005 1 53 1 4000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 7.3 
 2006 1 54 1 5500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.02 
 2007 1 55 1 7000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 29.2 
 2008 1 56 1 11000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 17.1 
 2009 1 57 1 11000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 6.15 
 2010 1 58 1 12500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.9 
 2011 1 59 1 14000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.22 
 2012 1 60 1 16800 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.52 
 2013 1 61 1 18480 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.47 
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 2014 1 62 0 18480 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.77 
 2015 1 63 0 20500 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.72 
TRANS-
NATIONWIDE 2004 0 29 0 750 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 1.05 
 2005 0 30 0 1000 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 1 
 2006 0 31 0 1000 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 0.61 
 2007 0 32 0 1200 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 3.21 
 2008 0 33 0 1200 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 8.04 
 2009 0 34 0 1200 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 7.24 
 2010 0 35 0 1200 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 6.4 
 2011 0 36 0 1500 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 3.45 
 2012 0 37 0 1500 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 3.07 
 2013 0 38 0 1575 1 1 Ojike Okechukwu & Co 1.17 
 2014 0 58 1 2100 0 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 1.29 
 2015 0 59 1 2100 0 1 HLB Z.O. Ososanya & Co 1.13 
CI LEASING 2004 1 52 1 2000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.4 
 2005 1 53 1 2200 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.38 
 2006 1 54 1 2600 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.55 
 2007 1 55 1 2600 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 8.1 
 2008 1 56 1 4000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 11.1 
 2009 1 57 1 11000 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 2.6 
 2010 1 58 1 13255 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 1.53 
 2011 1 59 1 13255 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.63 
 
2012 1 60 1 17700 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.5 
 
2013 1 61 1 18522 1 1 Akintola Williams Deloitte 0.5 
 
2014 0 34 0 18522 0 1 PFK Professional services 0.5 
 
2015 0 35 0 16940 0 1 PFK Professional services 0.5 
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TRANSFORMED DATA 
Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
Okomu  2004 3.39794 1.230449 1.161368 
 
2005 3.39794 1.255273 1.230449 
 
2006 3.544068 1.278754 1.532117 
 
2007 3.845098 1.30103 1.557507 
 
2008 4 1.322219 1.515741 
 
2009 4.176091 1.342423 1.356981 
 
2010 4.30103 1.361728 1.181844 
 
2011 4.322219 0.477121 1.363612 
 
2012 4.380211 0.60206 1.628389 
 
2013 4.380211 0.69897 1.643453 
 
2014 4.301052 0.778151 1.403978 
 
2015 4.361728 0.845098 1.481443 
Presco 2004 3.30103 1.716003 0.966142 
 
2005 3.477121 1.724276 1.071882 
 
2006 3.69897 1.732394 1.034628 
 
2007 3.69897 1.740363 1.162863 
 
2008 3.90309 1.322219 1.004751 
 
2009 3.90309 1.342423 0.748188 
 
2010 3.90309 1.361728 0.835691 
 
2011 3.90309 1.380211 0.938019 
 
2012 4.079181 1.39794 1.230449 
 
2013 4.079181 1.414973 1.585461 
 
2014 4.079181 1.431364 1.389166 
 
2015 4.380211 1.799341 1.518514 
Livestock 2004 3.079181 1.716003 0.451786 
 
2005 3.176091 1.724276 0.450249 
 
2006 3.176091 1.732394 -0.02228 
 
2007 3.176091 1.740363 0.559907 
 
2008 3.740363 1.748188 0.338456 
 
2009 3.477121 1.556303 -0.24413 
 
2010 3.531479 1.568202 -0.18709 
 
2011 3.60206 1.579784 -0.14267 
 
2012 3.681241 1.591065 0.158362 
 
2013 3.778151 1.60206 0.633468 
 
2014 3.838849 1.612784 0.357935 
 
2015 3.838849 1.623249 0.123852 
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UACN 2004 3.653213 0.778151 0.924279 
 
2005 3.653213 0.845098 0.939519 
 
2006 3.778151 0.90309 1.399674 
 
2007 3.792392 0.954243 1.70757 
 
2008 3.90309 1 1.539076 
 
2009 3.90309 1.041393 1.565257 
 
2010 3.835691 1.079181 1.574147 
 
2011 3.835691 1.113943 1.493876 
 
2012 4.61133 1.146128 1.623249 
 
2013 4.342423 1.176091 1.826075 
 
2014 4.438906 1.20412 1.531479 
 
2015 4.361728 1.414973 1.317018 
John Holt 2004 3.30103 1.716003 -0.00436 
 
2005 3.39794 1.724276 0.146128 
 
2006 3.60206 1.732394 0.082785 
 
2007 3.60206 1.740363 0.652246 
 
2008 3.845098 1.748188 1.144574 
 
2009 3.90309 1.755875 0.967548 
 
2010 4.021189 1.477121 0.967548 
 
2011 4.041393 1.491362 0.770115 
 
2012 4.041393 1.50515 0.531479 
 
2013 4.041393 1.518514 0.049218 
 
2014 3.929419 1.612784 -0.00877 
 
2015 3.954243 1.623249 -0.03621 
AG Leventis 2004 3.790496 1.716003 0.089905 
 
2005 3.847388 1.724276 0.064458 
 
2006 3.888797 1.732394 0.269513 
 
2007 3.930185 1.740363 0.70757 
 
2008 3.931458 1.748188 0.897627 
 
2009 3.931458 1.755875 0.392697 
 
2010 3.954243 1.763428 0.426511 
 
2011 4.004321 1.770852 0.139879 
 
2012 4.055455 1.778151 0.130334 
 
2013 4.092896 1.78533 0.230449 
 
2014 4.122281 1.792392 0.117271 
 
2015 4.181844 1.568202 -0.20761 
CHELLARAMS 2004 3.161368 1.380211 0.232996 
 
2005 3.20412 1.39794 -0.08092 
 
2006 3.267172 1.414973 0.201397 
 
2007 3.267172 1.431364 1.092018 
 
2008 3.30103 1.447158 1.349472 
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 2009 3.30103 1.462398 1.150142 
 2010 3.454845 1.477121 0.880814 
 
2011 3.454845 1.491362 0.808211 
 
2012 3.60206 1.50515 0.808211 
 
2013 3.60206 1.518514 0.618048 
 
2014 3.740363 1.531479 0.597695 
 
2015 3.778151 1.544068 0.575188 
Uniliver 2004 4.037904 0.778151 1.164353 
 
2005 4.161368 0.845098 1.311966 
 
2006 4.332438 0.90309 1.113943 
 
2007 4.225361 0.954243 1.339451 
 
2008 4.231164 1 1.016197 
 
2009 4.215214 1.041393 1.267172 
 
2010 4.214844 1.079181 1.429752 
 
2011 4.251687 1.113943 1.462398 
 
2012 4.439948 1.146128 1.667453 
 
2013 4.244005 1.176091 1.730782 
 
2014 4.198657 1.556303 1.553883 
 
2015 4.197336 1.568202 1.635986 
Vitafoam 2004 3.720159 0.778151 0.522444 
 
2005 3.720159 0.845098 0.654177 
 
2006 3.778151 0.90309 0.61066 
 
2007 3.845098 0.954243 0.992111 
 
2008 3.929419 1 0.667453 
 
2009 3.929419 1.041393 0.752048 
 
2010 4.041393 1.079181 0.823474 
 
2011 4.09691 1.770852 0.704151 
 
2012 4.09691 1.778151 0.563481 
 
2013 4.217484 1.78533 0.690196 
 
2014 4.217484 1.792392 0.605305 
 
2015 4.258877 1.799341 0.733197 
PZ Cussion 2004 3.916454 1.716003 1.065953 
 
2005 3.995635 1.724276 1.209515 
 
2006 4.025306 1.732394 1.414973 
 
2007 4.09691 1.740363 1.423246 
 
2008 4.119915 1 1.050766 
 
2009 4.119915 1.041393 1.39794 
 
2010 4.188084 1.079181 1.498311 
 
2011 4.188084 1.113943 1.447158 
 
2012 4.180699 1.146128 1.447158 
 
2013 4.262309 1.176091 1.568202 
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2014 4.342008 1.20412 1.376577 
 
2015 4.389662 1.230449 1.409933 
NESTLE 2004 4.029384 1.414973 2.176091 
 
2005 4.10721 1.431364 2.278731 
 
2006 4.170262 1.447158 2.338855 
 
2007 4.276462 1.462398 2.442041 
 
2008 4.311754 1.477121 2.282033 
 
2009 4.361728 1.491362 2.379306 
 
2010 4.394662 1.50515 2.566496 
 
2011 4.450542 1.518514 2.649004 
 
2012 4.514309 1.531479 2.845098 
 
2013 4.514309 1.544068 3.079181 
 
2014 4.488311 1.556303 3.005073 
 
2015 4.477121 1.799341 2.934498 
CADBURY 2004 3.922725 1.716003 1.755875 
 
2005 4.09691 1.724276 1.795185 
 
2006 4.146128 0.90309 1.533518 
 
2007 4.243038 1.462398 1.566437 
 
2008 4.267172 1.477121 1.378216 
 
2009 4.267172 1.491362 1.020775 
 
2010 4.278754 1.50515 1.408579 
 
2011 4.320146 1.518514 1.056905 
 
2012 4.39613 1.531479 1.462398 
 
2013 4.414973 1.544068 1.770926 
 
2014 4.414973 1.556303 1.60206 
 
2015 4.380211 1.568202 1.234264 
Nig. Brew 2004 4.163936 1.414973 1.607455 
 
2005 4.243212 1.431364 1.595496 
 
2006 4.303908 1.447158 0.448706 
 
2007 4.383097 1.462398 1.690196 
 
2008 4.432312 1.477121 1.611192 
 
2009 4.481529 1.491362 1.72444 
 
2010 4.53075 1.50515 1.887054 
 
2011 4.521974 1.518514 1.975064 
 
2012 4.747909 1.531479 2.167317 
 
2013 4.602527 1.544068 2.225051 
 
2014 4.640402 1.556303 2.218273 
 
2015 4.665008 1.799341 2.133539 
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NASCON 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2.39794 
 
 
1.690196 
 
 
0.313867 
 
2005 2.39794 1.69897 -0.02687 
 
2006 2.69897 1.70757 -0.65758 
 
2007 3.079181 1.740363 1.231724 
 
2008 3.90309 1.748188 0.747412 
 
2009 3.924279 1.755875 0.638489 
 
2010 3.954243 1.763428 0.805501 
 
2011 3.954243 1.770852 0.603144 
 
2012 4.113943 1.778151 0.90309 
 
2013 4.161368 1.78533 1.175802 
 
2014 3.477121 1.792392 0.79379 
 
2015 3.628389 1.799341 0.854306 
Guinness 2004 4 1.414973 2.068149 
 
2005 4.09691 1.431364 1.982271 
 
2006 4.157608 1.447158 2.031691 
 
2007 4.157608 1.462398 2.113943 
 
2008 4.281033 1.477121 1.997823 
 
2009 4.341731 1.491362 2.10551 
 
2010 4.278754 1.50515 2.280032 
 
2011 4.320146 1.518514 2.39794 
 
2012 4.39613 1.531479 2.439333 
 
2013 4.414973 1.544068 2.372912 
 
2014 4.414973 1.556303 2.225697 
 
2015 4.380211 1.568202 2.080626 
Inter. Brew. 2004 2.90309 0.778151 0.313867 
 
2005 3.30103 0.845098 -0.02687 
 
2006 3.473779 0.90309 -0.65758 
 
2007 3.473779 0.954243 0.409933 
 
2008 3.582631 1 0.691081 
 
2009 3.778151 1.041393 0.356026 
 
2010 3.869173 1.079181 0.807535 
 
2011 4.041393 1.113943 0.755875 
 
2012 4.096562 1.146128 1.209515 
 
2013 4.096562 1.176091 1.457882 
 
2014 4.274065 1.20412 1.368659 
 
2015 4.334816 1.230449 1.203848 
Flour Mills 2004 4.09691 1.716003 1.22037 
 
2005 4.176091 1.724276 1.380392 
 
2006 4.255273 1.732394 1.785401 
 
2007 4.371068 1.740363 1.916927 
 
     2008 4.459392 1.748188 1.505014 
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2009 4.518514 1.755875 1.556303 
 
2010 4.588832 1.763428 1.838849 
 
2011 4.649335 1.770852 1.81591 
 
2012 4.69897 1.778151 1.812913 
 
2013 4.948413 1.78533 1.939519 
 
2014 5.0141 1.792392 1.593286 
 
2015 5.071145 1.799341 1.318063 
Dunlop 2004 3.30103 1.176091 0.298853 
 
2005 3.30103 1.20412 0.424882 
 
2006 3.69897 1.230449 0.619093 
 
2007 3.69897 1.255273 0.50515 
 
2008 3.954243 1.278754 -0.00877 
 
2009 3.954243 1.30103 -0.30103 
 
2010 3.69897 1.322219 0.545307 
 
2011 3.69897 1.342423 -0.30103 
 
2012 3.60206 1.39794 -0.30103 
 
2013 3.60206 1.414973 -0.30103 
 
2014 4.009153 1.792392 -0.30103 
 
2015 3.678791 1.623249 -0.30103 
VONO PDT 2004 3 1.491362 0.278754 
 
2005 3 1.50515 0.243038 
 
2006 3 1.518514 0.20412 
 
2007 3.30103 1.531479 0.643453 
 
2008 3.30103 1.544068 0.471292 
 
2009 3.30103 1.556303 0.158362 
 
2010 3.544068 1.568202 0.456366 
 
2011 3.60206 1.579784 0.459392 
 
2012 3.69897 1.591065 0.459392 
 
2013 3.778151 1.60206 0.260071 
 
2014 3.845098 1.612784 -0.02687 
 
2015 3.845098 1.414973 -0.09151 
JULIUS BERGER 2004 3.883661 1.716003 1.259116 
 
2005 3.883661 1.724276 1.33726 
 
2006 3.944483 1.732394 1.638589 
 
2007 4.082785 1.740363 1.927524 
 
2008 4.230449 1.748188 1.745075 
 
2009 4.380211 1.755875 1.411451 
 
2010 4.477121 1.763428 1.69897 
 
2011 4.477121 1.770852 1.499687 
 
2012 4.778151 1.778151 1.539703 
 
2013 4.799341 1.78533 1.859078 
 
2014 4.687975 1.633468 1.782902 
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2015 4.687975 1.643453 1.623249 
BOC GAS 2004 3.491362 1.716003 0.468347 
 
2005 3.581608 1.724276 0.409933 
 
2006 3.643453 1.732394 0.518514 
 
2007 3.778151 1.462398 0.977724 
 
2008 3.954243 1.477121 1.23955 
 
2009 3.954243 1.491362 1.12969 
 
2010 4 1.50515 0.963788 
 
2011 4.021189 1.518514 0.835691 
 
2012 4.106837 1.531479 0.754348 
 
2013 4.1118 1.544068 0.823474 
 
2014 4.169851 1.556303 0.738781 
 
2015 4.208549 1.568202 0.578639 
GLAXO 2004 3.857332 0.778151 0.733999 
 
2005 3.954243 0.845098 0.617 
 
2006 4.033424 0.90309 1.230449 
 
2007 4.079181 0.954243 1.371068 
 
2008 4.149219 1 1.166726 
 
2009 4.149219 1.041393 1.350248 
 
2010 4.222586 1.079181 1.414973 
 
2011 4.276462 1.113943 1.361728 
 
2012 4.328278 1.146128 1.654177 
 
2013 4.39827 1.176091 1.832509 
 
2014 4.442809 1.20412 1.69897 
 
2015 4.380211 1.799341 1.534026 
M&B 2004 3.322219 1.716003 -0.56864 
 
2005 3.447158 1.724276 0.763428 
 
2006 3.511883 1.80618 0.892095 
 
2007 3.628389 1.740363 1.128076 
 
2008 3.681241 1.748188 0.768638 
 
2009 3.722634 1.755875 0.586587 
 
2010 3.722634 1.763428 0.623249 
 
2011 3.875061 1.770852 0.298853 
 
2012 4.079181 1.778151 0.190332 
 
2013 3.90309 1.78533 0.389166 
 
2014 3.954243 1.792392 0.198657 
 
2015 3.954243 1.544068 0.021189 
TRIPPLE GEE 2004 2.653213 1.380211 0 
 
2005 2.778151 1.39794 -0.29243 
 
2006 2.875061 1.414973 0.190332 
 
2007 2.778151 1.431364 0.720159 
 
2008 3 1.447158 0.912222 
 
2009 2.875061 1.462398 0.684845 
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Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
 
 
2010 2.875061 1.477121 0.555094 
 
2011 2.929419 1.491362 0.468347 
 
2012 2.977724 1.50515 0.382017 
 
2013 3 1.518514 0.31597 
 
2014 3.041393 1.531479 0.269513 
 
2015 3.041393 1.20412 0.227887 
INTERLINKED 2004 2.653213 0.954243 0.103804 
 
2005 2.69897 1 0.082785 
 
2006 2.69897 1.041393 0.082785 
 
2007 2.69897 1.079181 0.082785 
 
2008 2.69897 1.113943 0.733999 
 
2009 3 1.146128 0.711807 
 
2010 3 1.176091 0.711807 
 
2011 3 1.20412 0.711807 
 
2012 3 1.230449 0.711807 
 
2013 3 1.255273 0.698101 
 
2014 3 1.278754 0.668386 
 
2015 3 1.30103 0.584331 
CEMENT LAFARGE 2004 4.255273 1.716003 1.053078 
 
2005 4.146128 1.724276 1.238046 
 
2006 4.30103 1.732394 -0.30103 
 
2007 4.342423 1.740363 1.902003 
 
2008 4.383815 1.748188 1.41162 
 
2009 4.451264 1.755875 1.477121 
 
2010 4.451264 1.763428 1.609594 
 
2011 4.451264 1.770852 1.635986 
 
2012 4.488551 1.778151 1.767379 
 
2013 4.488551 1.78533 2.060698 
 
2014 4.633468 1.792392 1.905796 
 
2015 4.612784 1.799341 1.985875 
DANGOTE 
CEMENT 2004 3.361728 1.491362 0.612784 
 
2005 3.477121 1.50515 0.812913 
 
2006 3.623249 1.518514 1.568202 
 
2007 4.079181 1.531479 1.70757 
 
2008 4.176091 1.544068 1.255273 
 
2009 4.792392 1.556303 1.633569 
 
2010 5.079181 1.763428 2.079181 
 
2011 5.120574 1.770852 2.044422 
 
2012 5.20412 1.778151 2.110556 
 
2013 5.20412 1.78533 2.30103 
 
2014 5.245513 1.792392 2.230449 
 
2015 5.281033 1.799341 0.85248 
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Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
 
CAP PLC 2004 3.778151 0.778151 0.85248 
 
2005 3.845098 0.845098 0.952792 
 
2006 3.845098 0.90309 -0.46852 
 
2007 3.90309 0.954243 1.80618 
 
2008 3.90309 1 1.627058 
 
2009 4 1.041393 1.531862 
 
2010 4 1.079181 1.531862 
 
2011 4.146128 1.113943 1.161368 
 
2012 4.230449 1.146128 1.643946 
 
2013 4.290035 1.176091 1.685294 
 
2014 4.323458 1.20412 1.574031 
 
2015 4.31334 1.414973 1.575188 
BETA GLASS 2004 3.778151 1.716003 0.656098 
 
2005 3.832509 1.724276 0.832509 
 
2006 3.873902 1.732394 0.62634 
 
2007 3.877371 1.740363 1.331022 
 
2008 3.924279 1 1.338058 
 
2009 3.924279 1.041393 1.338058 
 
2010 4.158362 1.079181 1.192567 
 
2011 4.158362 1.113943 1.104146 
 
2012 4.282939 1.146128 1.021189 
 
2013 4.282939 1.176091 1.159266 
 
2014 4.312325 1.20412 1.42259 
 
2015 4.347759 1.230449 1.727948 
BEGER PAINT 2004 3.568202 1.716003 0.685742 
 
2005 3.60206 1.724276 0.584331 
 
2006 3.6289 1.732394 0.62634 
 
2007 3.763428 1.740363 1.006466 
 
2008 3.929419 1.748188 0.909556 
 
2009 3.970812 1.755875 0.755875 
 
2010 4.072801 1.763428 0.922206 
 
2011 4.155336 1.770852 0.927883 
 
2012 4.176091 1.778151 0.953276 
 
2013 4.190332 1.78533 0.90309 
 
2014 4.217484 1.556303 0.954243 
 
2015 4.217484 1.568202 1 
ASHAKA 2004 3.778151 1.716003 1.352183 
 
2005 3.778151 1.724276 1.531734 
 
2006 3.90309 1.732394 1.740363 
 
2007 4.146128 1.740363 1.725258 
 
2008 4.20412 1.748188 1.230704 
 
2009 4.30103 1.755875 1.062582 
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Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
 
 
2010 4.30103 1.763428 1.42341 
 
2011 4.30103 1.770852 1.053078 
 
2012 4.414973 1.778151 1.254064 
 
2013 4.322219 1.78533 1.322012 
 
2014 4.361728 1.792392 1.340444 
 
2015 4.30103 1.799341 1.39794 
FIRST ALUMINIUM 2004 3.60206 0.778151 0.472756 
 
2005 3.60206 0.845098 0.532754 
 
2006 3.643453 0.90309 1.531351 
 
2007 3.90309 0.954243 0.357935 
 
2008 3.954243 1 0.655138 
 
2009 4 1.041393 -0.30103 
 
2010 3.954243 1.079181 -0.13668 
 
2011 3.954243 1.579784 -0.18046 
 
2012 4 1.591065 -0.30103 
 
2013 4.041393 1.60206 -0.30103 
 
2014 4.041393 1.612784 -0.30103 
 
2015 4.041393 1.623249 -0.30103 
AVON 2004 3.079181 1.380211 -0.16115 
 
2005 3.176091 1.39794 -0.00877 
 
2006 3.176091 1.414973 0.093422 
 
2007 3.243038 1.431364 0.741939 
 
2008 3.352183 1.447158 0.978181 
 
2009 3.447158 1.462398 0.956168 
 
2010 3.518514 1.477121 0.839478 
 
2011 3.579784 1.491362 0.773786 
 
2012 3.633468 1.50515 0.278754 
 
2013 3.681241 1.518514 0.232996 
 
2014 3.702431 1.531479 0.201397 
 
2015 3.763128 1.544068 0.161368 
CUTIX 2004 2.740363 0.954243 0.198657 
 
2005 2.740363 1 0.498311 
 
2006 2.819544 1.041393 0.557507 
 
2007 2.875061 1.079181 1.103804 
 
2008 3 1.113943 0.938019 
 
2009 3 1.146128 0.719331 
 
2010 3.079181 1.176091 0.344392 
 
2011 3.176091 1.20412 0.190332 
 
2012 3.176091 1.230449 0.158362 
 
2013 3.255273 1.255273 0.25042 
 
2014 3.30103 1.278754 0.113943 
 
2015 3.30103 1.30103 0.220108 
TOTAL 2004 4 1.716003 2.283301 
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Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
 
 
2005 4.176091 1.724276 2.262475 
 
2006 4.176091 1.732394 2.298853 
 
2007 4.230449 1.740363 2.255273 
 
2008 4.278754 1.748188 2.30897 
 
2009 4.320146 1.755875 2.173186 
 
2010 4.361539 1.763428 2.369216 
 
2011 4.359835 1.770852 2.274389 
 
2012 4.402932 1.778151 2.081239 
 
2013 4.476788 1.78533 2.230449 
 
2014 4.331346 1.792392 2.153815 
 
2015 4.357477 1.799341 2.167347 
OANDO 2004 4.079181 0.778151 2.029465 
 
2005 4.176091 0.845098 1.982497 
 
2006 4.267172 0.90309 1.839478 
 
2007 4.255273 0.954243 2.08849 
 
2008 4.380211 1 1.902003 
 
2009 4.477121 1.041393 1.973082 
 
2010 4.334454 1.079181 1.819544 
 
2011 4.363838 1.113943 1.342423 
 
2012 4.805045 1.146128 1.091667 
 
2013 4.903041 1.176091 1.384712 
 
2014 4.924651 1.20412 1.207096 
 
2015 4.954247 1.414973 0.770852 
MRS 2004 3.852968 0.778151 2.227887 
 
2005 3.869232 0.845098 2.079109 
 
2006 3.924279 0.90309 2.146128 
 
2007 3.977724 0.954243 2.20412 
 
2008 4.021189 1 2.203876 
 
2009 4.130334 1.041393 1.843793 
 
2010 4.09691 1.079181 1.823213 
 
2011 4.233352 1.518514 1.770852 
 
2012 4.396443 1.531479 1.375846 
 
2013 4.396443 1.544068 1.735918 
 
2014 4.435064 1.556303 1.725912 
 
2015 4.477121 1.568202 1.696007 
MOBIL 2004 3.954387 0.778151 2.246499 
 
2005 3.925209 0.845098 2.20412 
 
2006 3.921634 0.90309 2.27485 
 
2007 3.924176 0.954243 2.255273 
 
2008 4.048325 1 2.521125 
 
2009 4.067368 1.041393 1.994757 
 
2010 4.09691 1.079181 2.149219 
 
2011 4.176091 1.113943 2.126813 
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Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
 
 
2012 4.273927 1.361728 2.038421 
 
2013 4.369216 1.380211 2.074085 
 
2014 4.423524 1.39794 2.198657 
 
2015 4.505462 1.414973 2.20412 
JAPAUL 2004 2.812913 1 0.021189 
 
2005 2.69897 1.041393 0.220108 
 
2006 2.845098 1.079181 0.068186 
 
2007 3.079181 1.113943 0.90309 
 
2008 3.39794 1.146128 0.563481 
 
2009 3.39794 1.176091 0.053078 
 
2010 3.544068 1.20412 0.146128 
 
2011 3.740363 1.230449 -0.04576 
 
2012 3.845098 1.255273 -0.25964 
 
2013 3.929419 1.518514 -0.26761 
 
2014 4 1.531479 -0.30103 
 
2015 4.09691 1.544068 -0.1549 
FORTE 2004 4.146128 1.716003 0.158362 
 
2005 4.30103 1.724276 0.158362 
 
2006 4.50515 1.732394 -0.42022 
 
2007 4.579784 1.740363 2.31597 
 
2008 4.653213 1.748188 2.468318 
 
2009 4.69897 1.755875 1.525174 
 
2010 4.477121 1.477121 1.340444 
 
2011 4.544068 1.491362 1.064458 
 
2012 4.628389 1.50515 0.888179 
 
2013 4.753583 1.518514 1.990117 
 
2014 4.753583 1.531479 2.357744 
 
2015 4.784617 1.544068 2.518514 
ETERNA 2004 3.39794 1.146128 0.290035 
 
2005 3.462398 0.845098 0.4843 
 
2006 3.60206 0.90309 0.475671 
 
2007 3.69897 0.954243 1.20412 
 
2008 3.778151 1 1.49276 
 
2009 3.778151 1.041393 0.697229 
 
2010 3.845098 1.079181 0.703291 
 
2011 3.845098 1.113943 0.471292 
 
2012 3.845904 1.146128 0.478566 
 
2013 3.979776 1.176091 0.460898 
 
2014 3.979776 1.20412 0.474216 
 
2015 4.130334 1.799341 0.311754 
CON OIL 2004 3.875061 1.716003 2.106531 
 
2005 4.041393 1.724276 1.990339 
 
2006 4.146128 1.732394 1.838849 
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Company       Year LOGAF LOGAE LOGMp/S 
 
 2007 4.20412 1.740363 1.925209 
 
2008 4.217484 1.748188 1.894316 
 
2009 4.255273 1.755875 1.441381 
 
2010 4.290035 1.763428 1.561578 
 
2011 4.322219 1.770852 1.498311 
 
2012 4.273001 1.778151 1.311754 
 
2013 4.290035 1.78533 1.581039 
 
2014 4.477121 1.792392 1.549126 
 
2015 4.414973 1.643453 1.3934 
ACADEMY PRESS 2004 3 1.681241 0.290035 
 
2005 3 1.690196 0.176091 
 
2006 3 1.69897 0.193125 
 
2007 3.079181 1.70757 0.733999 
 
2008 3.079181 1.716003 0.741939 
 
2009 3.30103 1.724276 0.732394 
 
2010 3.30103 1.732394 0.565848 
 
2011 3.544068 1.740363 0.350248 
 
2012 3.544068 1.748188 0.574031 
 
2013 3.653213 1.755875 0.40654 
 
2014 3.653213 1.763428 0.071882 
 
2015 3.653213 1.770852 -0.25964 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2004 3 1.491362 0.08636 
 
2005 3.079181 1.50515 0.161368 
 
2006 3 1.518514 0.50515 
 
2007 3.060698 1.531479 0.926857 
 
2008 3.230449 1.544068 0.764176 
 
2009 3.230449 1.556303 0.696356 
 
2010 3.30103 1.568202 0.832509 
 
2011 3.30103 1.579784 0.531479 
 
2012 3.50515 1.591065 0.650308 
 
2013 3.50515 1.60206 0.621176 
 
2014 3.623249 1.612784 0.625312 
 
2015 3.623249 1.623249 0.778151 
RT BRISCOE 2004 3.477121 1.716003 0.858537 
 
2005 3.60206 1.724276 0.863323 
 
2006 3.740363 1.732394 0.0086 
 
2007 3.845098 1.740363 1.464936 
 
2008 4.041393 1.748188 1.232996 
 
2009 4.041393 1.755875 0.788875 
 
2010 4.09691 1.763428 0.462398 
 
2011 4.146128 1.770852 0.08636 
 
2012 4.225309 1.778151 0.181844 
 
2013 4.266702 1.78533 0.167317 
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2014 4.266702 1.792392 -0.11351 
 
2015 4.311754 1.799341 -0.14267 
TRANS-
NATIONWIDE 2004 2.875061 1.462398 0.021189 
 
2005 3 1.477121 0 
 
2006 3 1.491362 -0.21467 
 
2007 3.079181 1.50515 0.506505 
 
2008 3.079181 1.518514 0.905256 
 
2009 3.079181 1.531479 0.859739 
 
2010 3.079181 1.544068 0.80618 
 
2011 3.176091 1.556303 0.537819 
 
2012 3.176091 1.568202 0.487138 
 
2013 3.197281 1.579784 0.068186 
 
2014 3.322219 1.763428 0.11059 
 
2015 3.322219 1.770852 0.053078 
CI LEASING 2004 3.30103 1.716003 -0.39794 
 
2005 3.342423 1.724276 -0.42022 
 
2006 3.414973 1.732394 0.190332 
 
2007 3.414973 1.740363 0.908485 
 
2008 3.60206 1.748188 1.045323 
 
2009 4.041393 1.755875 0.414973 
 
2010 4.12238 1.763428 0.184691 
 
2011 4.12238 1.770852 -0.20066 
 
2012 4.247973 1.778151 -0.30103 
 
2013 4.267688 1.78533 -0.30103 
 
2014 4.267688 1.531479 -0.30103 
 
2015 4.228913 1.544068 -0.30103 
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APPENDIX C 
RESULT OF DESCIPTIVE STATISTICS AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT MPS 
  /METHOD=ENTER AFS AIS AF AT AOP AE 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZPRED ,*ZRESID) 
  /RESIDUALS HISTOGRAM (ZRESID) NORMPROB (ZRESID). 
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Regression 
Notes 
Output Created 20-JUN-2017 12:28:02 
Comments  
Input 
Data 
C:\Users\Patience 
Ola\Documents\NEWDATAWITH47COYS.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 564 
Missing Value Handling 
Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used 
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values 
for any variable used. 
Syntax 
REGRESSION 
  /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN 
TOL CHANGE ZPP 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT MPS 
  /METHOD=ENTER AFS AIS AF AT AOP AE 
  /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZPRED ,*ZRESID) 
  /RESIDUALS HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) 
NORMPROB(ZRESID). 
Resources 
Processor Time 00:00:04.49 
Elapsed Time 00:00:04.06 
Memory Required 3140 bytes 
Additional Memory Required for 
Residual Plots 
872 bytes 
 
 
[DataSet1] C:\Users\Patience Ola\Documents\NEWDATAWITH47COYS.sav 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
MPS 1.0132 .76393 564 
AFS .6578 .47487 564 
AIS .6454 .47882 564 
AF 3.9052 .51993 564 
AT .8652 .34176 564 
AOP .9326 .25089 564 
AE 1.4532 .30312 564 
 
 
Correlations 
 MPS AFS AIS AF AT AOP AE 
Pearson Correlation 
MPS 1.000 .447 .313 .591 .107 .093 -.057 
AFS .447 1.000 .418 .567 .153 .015 .106 
AIS .313 .418 1.000 .311 .001 -.022 .216 
AF .591 .567 .311 1.000 -.029 -.040 .152 
AT .107 .153 .001 -.029 1.000 .122 -.004 
AOP .093 .015 -.022 -.040 .122 1.000 -.105 
AE -.057 .106 .216 .152 -.004 -.105 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
MPS . .000 .000 .000 .005 .014 .087 
AFS .000 . .000 .000 .000 .362 .006 
AIS .000 .000 . .000 .495 .303 .000 
AF .000 .000 .000 . .245 .172 .000 
AT .005 .000 .495 .245 . .002 .464 
AOP .014 .362 .303 .172 .002 . .006 
AE .087 .006 .000 .000 .464 .006 . 
N 
MPS 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
AFS 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
AIS 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
AF 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
AT 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
AOP 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
AE 564 564 564 564 564 564 564 
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Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed 
Method 
1 
AE, AT, AF, 
AOP, AIS, AFSb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: MPS 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .653a .426 .420 .58198 .426 68.842 6 557 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AE, AT, AF, AOP, AIS, AFS 
b. Dependent Variable: MPS 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 139.903 6 23.317 68.842 .000b 
Residual 188.659 557 .339   
Total 328.562 563    
a. Dependent Variable: MPS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), AE, AT, AF, AOP, AIS, AFS 
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Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Correlations Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) -2.070 .262  -7.888 .000      
AFS .139 .068 .087 2.061 .040 .447 .087 .066 .585 1.710 
AIS .242 .058 .151 4.186 .000 .313 .175 .134 .788 1.270 
AF .774 .058 .527 13.261 .000 .591 .490 .426 .653 1.532 
AT .220 .074 .098 2.973 .003 .107 .125 .095 .941 1.063 
AOP .262 .099 .086 2.645 .008 .093 .111 .085 .973 1.028 
AE -.428 .084 -.170 -5.119 .000 -.057 -.212 -.164 .935 1.070 
a. Dependent Variable: MPS 
Collinearity Diagnosticsa 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) AFS AIS AF AT AOP AE 
1 
1 6.234 1.000 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2 .363 4.145 .00 .17 .34 .00 .03 .01 .00 
3 .207 5.493 .00 .54 .54 .00 .01 .00 .00 
4 .107 7.628 .00 .02 .08 .01 .89 .03 .02 
5 .061 10.104 .00 .00 .03 .01 .00 .70 .19 
6 .023 16.358 .06 .06 .01 .17 .00 .18 .73 
7 .005 33.854 .94 .22 .00 .82 .06 .08 .05 
a. Dependent Variable: MPS 
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Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -.6793 2.1109 1.0132 .49849 564 
Residual -1.74467 1.66606 .00000 .57888 564 
Std. Predicted Value -3.395 2.202 .000 1.000 564 
Std. Residual -2.998 2.863 .000 .995 564 
a. Dependent Variable: MPS 
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APPENDIX D 
CHARTS OF THE P-P PLOT 
 
Charts 
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